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CITY OF ROME

Motion to Expedite
Consideration

v.
UNITED STATES
SUMMARY:

If this case is noted, appts ask that this appeal be

expedited, so that it can be heard in the early part of next Term, at
or about the same time. the Court hears City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 771844, r eargu e d.
FACTS:

The 3-jc (USDC D.C.) (McGowan, · Gash, Richey), according to
,..-------· -

appts ., determined that the electoral changes and annexations were
-------~

enacted without discriminatory purpose, and without dilution, but

?

refused to allow Rome, Ga. to "bailout" from coverage of the Act and
refused to pre-clear the changes and annexations.
CONTEN TIONS:

The issues involved in this case must be resolved

before Jan. 1980, when the Ga. General Assembly meets, in order for
the necessary legislation to be enacted in time for the next regularly
sch e duled election in Rome, Ga.

- 2 -

This appeal raises several issued, including whether the 15th
Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination (which is also
raised in City of Mobile) and whether Congress can prohibit electoral
changes which were enacted without discriminatory purpose.
Rome, Ga., is unable to hold elections prior to the resolution
of this appeal.
DISCUSSION:

Appts filed their js on .June 7.

July 7 to file a motion to dismiss or affirm.
will be on List 1 for next Term.

The U.S. has until

That means the case

If the Court notes this case, it

could expedite the briefing schedule if it thought it advisable.
of Mobile is scheduled to be reargued in November.

City

In all events, appt

does not make a substantial showing that expedited treatment is necessary.
There is no response.
6/18/79
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DOS

~N~EMORANDtlM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

September 22, 1979

RE:

City · of · Rome · v; · United States, No. 78-1840

The
points.

SG has

filed

his

brief

and

raised

a

few

interesting

I will discuss them in the order in which they are treated

in my first memo.

BAILOUT

tlNDER - ~ · 4(a)

The
governments

SG

points

out

that

there

are

in the nine states subject to §

over

7,000

local

5 of the Voting Rights

Act (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina,

Texas,

governments were

Virginia).
to file

If

bailout

only
suits,

ten

per

cent

court's docket would be drastic.

those

the District Court for

District of Columbia would be swamped beyond rescue.
one per cent of the localities filed

of

such suits,

the

the

Indeed, if only
impact on the

Congress insulated that court from

this problem in the preclearance area by giving the Attorney General
the power to preclear; but by not extending such power to the A/G on
~

. ..

-bailouts, the SG argues, Congress demonstrated that only states were
to have the bailout option.

2.

The

SG

also

contends

that

the

decision

of

the

DC

that

bailout is not available to local governments may be reconciled with

7

the

broad

purpose

of

Sheffield, ·· Alabama,
attempted
would

to prevent

result

"register

if

restricting

u.s.

435

local

under

while

to

(1978).

The

Court

those

of

were

the

were.

states,

Act

Equally,

this

in

the Act 1 s

governments

14

§

others

bailout

110

fragment at ion of

the

some

voters"

preclearance

United ·· states · v; ·-- soard ·· of ·· commissioners · of

Court

would

coverage that
that

not

the

Sheffield

SG

did

not

subject
insists,

ensure

to
by

consistent

~5~ ~ ,4, ~ ~·

coverage.

INTENT AND THE · FIFTEENTH ·· AMENDMENT
The SG completely ignores the DC 1 s "irrebutable presumption"
analysis of
DC 1 s

this

analogy

literacy

constitutional

between

tests

under

Oregon ··· v~ ·- Mitchell,

preclearance
the
400

under
In

statute.

u.s.

He

question.

112

relies

the Voting
particular,

(1971),

ex tens ion

of

the

~f analog~en

u

state

I

§

5 was

-'L

still

not

1 i teracy

by

accomplished

the

Rights Act

and

inter · alia,

each

seem

on
the

201 of the 1970

§

especially
tests:

focusses

moved

by

this

The

intrusion on

of

dramatically
Mr.

Justice

point I overlooked in the earlier memo.

Unlike

would

~

am

preclearance and

prerogatives

di

that

Act.

on

he

in which,

Court upheld the national ban on literacy tests in

first

point

unconstitutional,

out

Mr.

the

position of

Justice

BLACK approved

of

the

'-I

national ban on literacy tests in the 1970 extension.
He emphasized
-;:::::::::::=- -==- - ..
that, "In imposing a nationwide ban on literacy tests, Congress has

e::z:S: -;:~-

·.

~

3.

recognized

a national problem for what

it is -- a serious national

- ----

dilemma that touches every corner of our land.

In this legislation

Congress has recognized that discrimination on account of color and
racial origin is ngt confined to the South •

• 11 400

n.s.

at 133-

{L-.1 ~~~~~~~1-v-

1 3 4. )

t;,.;_~~-

The

SG-

a i so

.
~~ ~ .~ ~ -

& • . _,Q..>

argues

that

Congress

may

reach

under

the ~
~.~.

.......

Fifteenth Amendment any facially neutral public action that interacts ~
with private discriminatory practices to cause denial or
of

the

right

to vote.

He

relies

on Terry ·· v. ·· Adams,

abridqmen~

345 U.S.

4~

( 19 53), a case I dis cussed at some length in the City · of · Mobile memo.
The target of the suit was a private political club which preselected
(white)

candidates

general elections.
that

the

joint

who

invariably

won

the

Democratic

primary

and

In three separate opinions, eight Justices agreed

operation

procedures constituted

of

the

private

a violation of

the

club

and

state

elections

Fifteenth Amendment.

In

the instant case, the key question for this analysis is whether bloc
voting, the

11

private d i scr imi natory practice, 11

is present.

The leap

that the SG suggests is that under § 2 of the Amendment Congress can
determine when such interaction of private and public practices is so
likely to deny or abridge voting rights that preclearance under
of

the

Act

is

a

reasonable

requirement.

reduces to the SG's first claim:

That,

For

me,

this

~

5

argument

like literacy tests, voting

changes by governments subi ect to §

5 of

deny or

they must be pre cleared by the

abridge

voting

federal government.

rights

that

the A.ct

are

so 1 ikely to

My reservations about this claim are heightened

because on the facts of this case,

'
~----------~--~--presence
of
bloc voting in Rome.

I have serious doubts as to the

4.
THE MERITS
The SG stresses that in a declaratory iudgment action under
the Voting Rights Act, the plaintiff local government has the burden

-

of proving
votes

of

defeated

that

a

racial
this

voting

change or annexation has not diluted
He

minorities.
presumption

of

concludes

dilution

Attorney General refuses to approve
well-taken.
c..____-bloc voting

that

that

a voting

the

City

attaches

has

not

after

the

-

The point

change.

the

.

is

Although the record does not establish the presence of
I (

in Rome,

''

it also does not establish beyond peradventure

the presumption that the A/G is correct.

Still, I might distinguish

~----------

between the burden of going

forward,

which the City clearly bears,

and the burden of persuasion, which I would think would proper! y be
on

both

trial

parties.

if

findings?

there

Indeed,
is

Review

a

what

strong

could

is the point of a
presumption

simply

be

on

in

the

full

favor

evidentiary

of

the

administrative

A/G's
record

instead of de - novo.
In a welcome contribution,

the SG explains the role of the

disputed residency requirement in the City Commission portion of this
case.

(I was unable to penetrate this question

in my first memo.)

Under the DC's ruling, the voting changes of 1966 were disallowed and
voting

procedures

reverted

to

the

pre-1966

elected at-large by plurality vote,
each of nine

wards.

~he

system:

commissioners

with one commissioner living

SG concedes

ordinarily works in favor of minorities

that

n

a

in

residency requirement
argues that the effect

is the opposite here "by reducing the number of potential candidates
from

any

one

of

the

..

~

...

The question comes down to the weight of~~

the absence of bloc voting.

nine

wards,

..

thereby

'

promoting

head-to-head

5.
contests

in which racial bloc votinq would guarantee the success of

the white candidate."
convincing.

It

Brief

assumes

uncertain on this record.

for

racial

SG,
bloc

Moreover,

at 41.
votinq,

This

is

which

not
I

entirely

still

the nine wards miqht be

find
small

enouqh so that blacks would be a sizable minority -- or even maiority
-- in one or two.

David

DOS

BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:

David

DATE:

Sept. 17, 1979

RE:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Whether

1)

covered by
"bailout"

5 of

§

from

the

Act's
§

coverage

through

in

states

independently
a

declaratory

4(b) of the Act.

Whether

unconstitutionally

located

the Voting Rights Act can

judgment action under

2)

municipalities

the

expanded

the

Voting

Rights

Fifteenth

Amendment

Act
by

banning discrimination regardless of intent.
Whether

3)

unconstitutionally

-------------..
5
of
the
Voting

Rights

Act

basic

notions

of

voting

procedures

in

§

intrudes

upon

federalism.
4)

Whether

the

changes

in

this case were "precleared" by the Attorney General of the
United States.
5)

Whether these voting changes and annexations,
~ ~htC/1~~
adopted without discriminatory intent, violate § 5.
~~---------~

~

~f~-.~.L;;,;-:;~
~
~~
~~~ 2.
I.

tnu- ~J_'/!,wrq&.. ~·
'1 7 J.. ~ ~.J.u- .• ,
~ acks make --Jp 23 per cent of

L11

BACKGROUND:

Rome is a city of 30,000

the population and 15 per cent of the voters.

-

The city government

after 1918 consisted of a seven-man commission, elected at-large with
one commissioner from each of

---

seven wards.

The Board of

--------

was elected entirely on an at-large basis.

Education

Beginning in 1966,

the

Georgia General Assembly modified the city's election procedures in
several

material

respects:

a

majority

vote

requirement

was

established for primary and general elections for the Commission and
Board of Education;

the number of wards was reduced to three, with

three commissioners from each ward elected to numbered "posts"; two
Board of Education members were slated
ward.

Between

1964

and

the

1973,

from numbered posts in each
city

also

completed
I~'-- -

~t:> a.--~~~

annexations of neighboring land.

....

sixty
--

-r

~.

The racial situation in Rome does not sound bad, at least in
comparison
~

1844).

~~device

to

that described

in City of Mobile v.

Bolden

has

been

employed

in

Rome

as

a

prerequisite

registration during the past seventeen years,"

~r

registration was relatively high throughout the period.
at

77-

The three-judge court found that "no literacy test or other

~

';1 rrl

(No.

5b-6b.

Although

Commission or

the

black

no

has

ever

been

to

voter

and that black voter

elected

~--------~------------------------of Education, the DC found

Board

Juris.

St.

the

City

to
that

"whites,

including City officials, have encouraged blacks to run for elective
posts in Rome" and that

~ne

the Board of Education.

Id.

white

in

elected

interests of

officials
the

black was appointed to fill a vacancy on
at 7b.
Rome

black community"

The DC also concluded that the

are

"responsive

in providing

to

the

needs

and

services and hiring

I

3.
blacks for public jobs.

Id.

Most striking, the DC stated, "In Rome

politics, the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably

determine

contests."

the

outcome

of

many

if

not

most

[electoral]

p~~~~~~~-~.

Id. at 8b.

~a._ ~~~A.~~

;-('< tt.!<. ~
and -- - -·

19~0s

Two blacks ran for the Board of Education in the

early 1960s, and one in the Republican primary for City Commission in
1972;

none

received

much

support.

In

1970,

however,

Rev.

Clyde

Hill, a black minister, won a plurality in a contest for the Board of
Education.

-·-

He lost the runoff 55-45, but his percentage of the vote

was three times the percentage of black voters in the city.
these

------------~---·------ --~- ---......-_______..

figures,

voting"

Despite

in

statements

the DC

Rome.
by

found
at

13b.

The

that

votes

were

Id.

blacks

"a substantial measure of racial bloc
DC's
most

conclusions
frequently

relied

cast on

on
the

basis of race, and testimony by a sociologist who analyzed the votes
in Floyd County in a race between incumbent Sen. Herman Talmadge and
then-unknown Maynard Jackson, now the first black mayor of Atlanta.
On June 15,

1974,

the City submitted an annexation to the

Attorney General for preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
(No explanation has been offered for the delay in submission of the
other

annexations

and

changes

investigation by the A-G,

I

in

voting

procedures.)

The A-G did not object to

or withdrew his objections to all changes except:
annexations,

elections;

2)

absence

only

as

they

~

effected

l)

the

Twelve of the
City

Commission

the majority vote, runoff, numbered post and staggered

term provisions
the

but

an

the City also submitted for his approval

the voting changes and other annexations.

sixty

After

of

for

the

a

ward

Commission
residency

and Board of
requirement

Education;
for

the

and

3)

Board

of

7

Education.

The City

___

______

of the District"-----_......._
of Columbia to reverse the
A-G's
decision.
_........__.--,
Judge

McGowan,

for

writing

Judge

Richey

with

Judge

Gasch ~IJJ)<:..
-4

ulelf

concurring in the judgment, ruled against the City.

He argued that JwL.,(

the

indicated

~

legislative

history

of

the

Voting

m~icip~ s we ~ntitle!_:o
parent

State

is

--

still

subject

Rights

Act

that~;

~f

"bailout" from § 5 so long as

to

that

provision;

that

§

S

-

is ./l6-

--------~ .-~
w~------------------------------constitutional; that the A-G had not precleared the changes in this
suit when he approved the 1968 Georgia Election Code;

-

and that the

changes and annexations abridged the right to vote on the basis of

i -color.
h earing

This Court granted cert and adopted an expedited briefing and
schedule.

No local elections have been held

in Rome

since LJbl.tr

--

1974.

II.

BAILOUT UNDER §4:
Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act permits a jurisdiction

subject to the preclearance requirement of §5 to seek a delcaratory

----

judgment in the District of Columbia DC that it has not maintained a
discriminatory
years.

Upon

voting
such

a

test

or

device

finding,

the

for

the

preceding

seventeen

jurisdiction need not submit any

~

future voting changes for preclearance.

When this Court upheld the

constitutionality of § 5 in South Carolina v.
301,

331

averting

( 1966),
the

the

"bailout"

"possibility

of

Katzenbach,

383 U.S.

provision was cited specifically as
overbreadth"

in

the

ambitious

legislative scheme.
This

Court's

decision

Commissioners of Sheffield, 435

in

u.s.

United

States

110 (1978)

v.

Board of
-------

(Sheffield), created

a difficult problem for the DC on this issue.

Sheffield,

-

in which

-

you concurred in part and in the judgment, held that § 5 applies to
all political subdivisions in a state covered by the Act.
of

§

5 is

defined

subdivisions"

in §

subject

to

4(a)

as

including

the Act.

"States"

The reach

and

"political

Although § 14(c)(2)

of the Act

defines political subidivisions as entities that register voters, the
Sheffield

Court

thought

applicability

of§

Rather,

Court

the

interpreted
state.
close

The

as

5

to

definition

local

governments

said,

extending

Court

that

the
to

reference

all

emphasized

did

"interrelationship" · between

its
§

5

that
to

restrict

register

the

voters.

"State"

should

be

subdivisions

within

the

interpretation drew on

the

political

that

not

and

§4.

Because

of

that

interrelationship, the preclearance requirement was found to apply to
all entities exercising control over the electoral process.
The

Court

also

derived

somewhat

tenuous

outcome from the legislative history of the Act and
practice under the statute.

-

r

A

contrary

for

its

from the A-G's

Perhaps most important, a clear policy

concern underlay the majority's analysis of
language:

support

result

would

the

permit

tortuous

states

to

statutory
delegate

responsibilitiy for voting practices to localities and thereby open
the back door to discriminatory practices.

,. ,.-.
~~
. .--: J). ,.,..-

Whatever the wisdom of Sheffield,

~case.
~"State"

Id. at 124-125.
it certainly complicates

Since the Sheffield Court concluded that the reference to

in§ 4(a) extends§ 5 to all political subdivisions within a

state, as a logical matter the bailout procedure specified in § 4(a)

~~~

must also be available to those political subdivisions.

i DC

'--.--..........-'---"'"-

noted,

it might not be that simple.

But, as the

---..

First, both the Senate and

~{5

6.

{ [House Reports on

L bailout

the

1965 Act

state

in unequivocal

terms that the
Juris.

provision is to be available ONLY to states.

20b-21 b.

Second,

such

a

case-by-case

approach

could

St.

sap

at
the

effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act, which "shift[s] the advantage
of

time

and

victims."
Third,

inertia

from

South Carolina v.

the

perpetrators

Katzenbach,

of

383 U.S.

the

evil

301,

328

to

its

(1966).

permitting bailout suits by all political subdivisions could

create a litigation nightmare that would tax the resources of the A-

G.
~

Juris. St. at 21b.

successfully bailed out of the Voting Rights Act, it could be subject

~o .strong

pressure

~ollcles.The

from

state

officials

to

adopt

DC's last three arguments have little

r · J.t/ City's view of

~-

Finally, the DC feared that once a locality

the

bailout

provision,

the

discriminatory

force~n~~e

burden

of

instituting

litigation is still on the local government, leaving the advantage of
time and inertia with the Attorney General.

Bringing a bailout suit

in the District of Columbia would probably be sufficiently difficult
for

local

Moreover,

~

r-

governments

that

it

§

preclearing

changes

all

future

seems little ground
reintroduce

officials.

not

be

attempted

frequently.

it might be less expensive in the long run to have local

governments bail out of

would

would

for

5 and thereby save the A-G the trouble of

fearing

discrminatory

The state

in voting-related practices.
that

a

locality,

practices

at

the

once bailed out,
behest

itself would still be subject to

state action could be taken without preclearance.

§

of

state

5,

so no

Consequently, any

pressure would have to be behind-the-scenes and informal.
am naive, but this seems an unlikely turn of events.

There

Perhaps I

Nevertheless,
crystal clear:
___.....,
DC did
that

not

feel

the

-

No local governments are to be free to bail out.
free to ignore that legislative history,

bailout

subdivisions.

mechanism

Petrs

stress

is
the

not

available

logical

The

and ruled
political

to

inconsistency

between

Sheffield and the result below, but I find that less disturbing than
the

problem

of

overbreadth,

alluded

to

in

South

Carolina

v.

~

(~·

Katzenbach,

that may

arise

if

local

governments

independe~

are

covered by § 5 (per Sheffield) but cannot bail out of coverage.

The

bailout provision is especially important because the application of
§ 5 by the Attorney General is completely unreviewable under§ 4(b).
~

The best way out of this situation that occurs to me now -- short of

~~ reversing Sheffield -- is to contrast structural features of the Act

~ith

y

the mechanics of its implementation.

If Section 5 is applied to

states, then states should be the entities to initiate bailout.
applicability
subdivisions

of

preclearance

requirements

to

all

The

political

(Sheffield) must be viewed as a mechanical question of

how the Act works.

And the resolution of such a mechanical

issue,

~

regardless

~

"interrelationship" of Sections 4 and 5, should certainly not control

~~~

" outcome
/)./ ,_~the
r

~

~

of

language

in

Sheffield

about

the

~

INTENT:
The

there

loose

on an important structural question like the availability

of bailout.

I II.

any

is a

City argues
finding

of

that

there

purposeful

is no violation of § 5 unless

discrimination.

The

text of

the

provision states that a voting change may be approved if it "does not

??
•

8.
gur~~e

have the

-

-

and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
__,
42 u.s.c. § l973c
the right to vote on account of race or color."
I<.

(1976).

The

City

contends

that

this

phrase

requires

a

sequential

-""'
~-------~----'---~----------------~~--------------~~------If the A-G or DC of the District of Columbia finds no
..

determination.
~

discriminatory intent,

the inquiry ends;

inquiry must consider whether
City's reading

there

is exactly wrong.

if intent is present, the

is discriminatory

impact.

The

The use of the conjunction "and"

~ --

between

the

references

to

purpose

and

effect means

that

a

voting

change may be approved only if there is NEITHER discriminatory intent
NOR

impact.

See Beer v.

United States,

425 U.S.

130,

141

(1976);

Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969).
The City presents a more difficult question when it argues ~ ~
that

ll~l.

if

intent,

5 extends to voting changes taken without discriminatory

§

Congress

exceeded

the

limits

of

the

Fifteenth

Amendment. J $"'-f!:

(The role of intent under the Fifteenth Amendment is also implicated
in the City of Mobile cases, while Fullilove v. Kreps, No.
involves

the

requiring
holding

acceptability

intent

in

Title

in Nevett v.

Sides,

under

the

VII

Fourteenth

actions.)

571 F.2d 209

The

78-l007C

Amendment
City

(5th Cir.

cites
1978)

of

not

CA

5's

that the

Fifteenth Amendment reaches only discriminatory purpose, and repeats
that

court's

theory

that

the

emphasis

on

intent

in

Fourteenth

Amendment cases (Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
252

( 1977))

addition,
Fifteenth

should

the

City

Amendment

requirement,

also

apply

points out
would

to

the

that

have

voting
some

rights

proposed

completely

amendment.
wordings

excluded

~

any

of

u.s.
In
the

intent

so Congress must have meant to inject purpose into the

9.

~~-k.J~~

provision.

~~--~~

I

-------

find

Amendment:

no intent requirement

in the text of the Fift enth

;~ltv

"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall

not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

-------------------------

Indeed,

-----------

the phrase "shall not be denied or abridged" looks to the effect of

'----------------------

government action, without concern for

the

intent behind

---~

discussed

in my memo on the City of Mobile cases,

As I

it.

Judge Wisdom in

Nevett v. Sides, supra, presented a strong argument for not extending
to Fifteenth Amendment law the intent requirement of Washington and
Arlington

Heights:

fundamental
Amendment

to

all

The
other

right

of

rights

in

political
the

polity;

participation
and

the

is

Fifteenth

is specific to race discrimination in voting matters,

so

the absence of an intent requirement there would have little impact
on other substantive areas.

There is little probabtive value in the

wordings of the Amendment that Congress did not adopt.
The DC,
but

assumed

McGowan

then

Fifteenth

however,

not approach this question directly,

arguendo

that

asked

Congress

Amendment

legislation")

did

by

if

(under

the

Amendment
could

its

establishing

an

§

2

required

intent.

constitutionally
power

to

make

intent-or-impact

Judge

enforce

the

"appropriate

standard.

His

answer was "Yes," and drew on South Carolina v. Katzenbach's approval
of the drastic measures of the Voting Rights Act.
"Congress

1

can

be

said

to

have

instructed

the

He concluded that
courts

existence of racially disproportionate impact raises an

~resu~ti~o~o~ ~~u!-Eu;:~se."

that

t-he

irrebuttab~e

Another ex:mple of this approach,

according to Judge McGowan, was the blanket ban on literacy tests in

)=.·
~·~

~
~~

~

~:f-~

~4~

J

Katzenbach despite

this Court's earlier ruling

Northamp~County

Board of

find Judge McGowan' s appr_o_ a_c_h__s_o_m_~_a_t_ _p_e_c_u_l i ar.

The DC

not unconstitutional per se.
Elections, 360

~

~j f'

I

_..:J..i zed

u.s.

Lassiter v.

45 (1959).

on " i rrebu table presumption"

~.f'('r question

whether Congress could

Fifteenth

that such tests are

Amendment

analysis

in order to avoid the

"extend the substantive content of

protections

as

so

to

proscribe

discrimination in effect as well as in purpose."
n.74.

voting

Juris. St. at 37b

But an irrebutable presumption is usually analyzed in terms of

denial of due process, and remains an uncertain doctrine even in that
limited field.
63 2,

6

See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.

(1974)

((cwell,

J.,

Most

concurring).

frequently,

of

course, the analysis has been used to strike down a law, not uphold
it.

E.g., LaFleur, supra (forced leave for women teacher five months

pregnant);

Vlandis

v.

Kline,

412

U.S.

441

(1973)

(presumption of

nonresidency at state university); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972)
VII,

(unmarried fathers presumed unfit parents).

which

Even under Title

is authorized by the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth

Amendment, the presumption of discrimination following a statistical
showing

is subject to rebut tal.

tests

is

poorly drawn.

Court

emphasized

the

In

Moreover,

upholding

empirical

the

the analogy to 1 i teracy
Act,

correlation

the

South Carol ina

between

literacy tests and voting discrimination against blacks.

the

use

of

383 U.S. at

330-331.

The literacy test prohibition was thus supported in "both

practice

and

congressional

theory."
power

~

This

than

seems

imposing

a

far

more

modest

exercise

of

a

disparate-impact

standard

to

11.

enforce a constitutional ban on intentional discrimination.
~he

I

t~ e

wisest course, in my view, would be to decide

on statutory grounds and not reach the constitutional issues.

Should

the Court reach this question, I would not endorse the DC's approach,

but

would

follow

Judge

Wisdom

and

find

no

intent

element

in

the

Fifteenth Amendment.*

IV.

FEDERALISM PROBLEMS:
On several occasions you have expressed concern over Section J~

5's intrusion on state and local sovereignty.

E.g., Dougherty County

Board of Education v. White, 99 S.Ct.

368,

380

dissenting);

190,

200-201

J.,

Berry v.

Doles,

438 U.S.

(1978)

·v
(Powell,
v

(1978)

J.,

(Powell,

concurring in the judgment); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
t/

526, 545 n. (1973)

(Powell, J., dissenting).

The City urges reversal

of South Carolina v. Katzenbach on this issue, pointing in particular
to

this

Court's

concern

for

the

integrity of

system in National League of Cities v. Usery,
Although

the

basic

claim

by

the

City

426 U.S.

proceeds

under

the

federal

833

(1976).

the

Tenth

Amendment, it also claims support from the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV,
*The mayor and city manager of Rome argue that their
constitutional rights have been denied by the absence of elections
during this litigation.
The DC pointed out that such a five-year
suspension of elections, although lamentable, is not uncommon in
voting rights cases.
Amicus State of Mississippi contends somewhat hysterically
that this Court must find § 5 unconstitutional.
Mississippi asks
this
Court
to
take
judicial
notice
of
the
"insurmountable
difficulties" of conducting a § 5 suit in Washington, D.C.
The
result has been, according to Mississippi, that the A-G can dictate
the terms of settlement to penurious localities.
Mississippi also
claims that the A-G's implementation of the Act has been so inept and
cavalier as to violate due process.

l:,..,e.,~

7.5 L; ~ M~

~ aA..; 44--4-~0-/

1/ZJ<LJ

J.Av Sb~ 1'2-la~ .a.......~~
§

and diverse other amendments.

4'

Because this is familiar ground

for you, I will not belabor the argument.
The only new contention

(to me) presented on this score is

~Cva,.....A-~

that South Carolina approved

1\
The relevant
conditions

passage
can

of

justify

5 strictly as emergency legislation.

§

that

opinion

legislative

states

that

"exceptional

not

measures

otherwise

appropriate," and cites Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917)

(upholding

legislative imposition of eight-hour day to settle railroad dispute)
and

Home

(1934)

u.s.

Building

&

Loan

Association

v.

Blaisdell,

290

U.S.

398

(upholding state mortgage moratorium during Depression).

at 330.

According

discrimination
required

against

unusual

to the City,
blacks

had

remedial measures.

Congress enacted

reached

a

crisis

5 because

§

stage

The City emphasizes,

brief supports that claim.

that

however,

that voting statistics show that blacks in states covered by
vote at or above national levels.

383

§

5 now !

A table at page 73 of appellants'

-

In the 1976 presidential election, 58.5

per cent of all voting-age blacks in this country cast ballots; the
figures in the

§

5 states were: Alabama, 58.1 per cent; Georgia, 56.3

per cent; Louisiana, 63.9 per cent; Mississippi, 67.4 per cent; South
Carolina,

60.6

per

cent;

and

Virginia,

60.7

per

The

cent.

City

claims that in view of the dramatic increase in black voting in the
South,

there

can

be

no

further

justification

for

§

5,

much

as

Blaisdell's mortgage moratorium could not have been sustained under
the Constitution in 1947.
Judge

McGowan answered

by

invoking Fitzpatrick v.

Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445 (1976), which upheld legislation permitting retroactive
monetary relief against the states in order to enforce the Fourteenth

p~

1 3.

Amendment.

He stressed language in that opinion that describes the

"Civil War Amendments" as sanctioning intrusions "into the judicial,
executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to
the States."

Juris. St. at 40b.

Although Fitzpatrick involved the

Eleventh Amendment's shield of the states in the courts, the DC found
that provision,

like the Tenth Amendment, grounded in principles of

state sovereignty.
in

this

context

The DC said:
the

states'

"[W]e see no reason to suppose that

Tenth

Amendment

immunities

should

be

significantly broader than those under the Eleventh Amendment."

Id.

Judge

for

McGowan

j enforcing

went

the

on

to

Fifteenth

find

5

§

an

"appropriate"

The

Amendment.

DC

also

method

rejected

Guarantee Clause argument as involving a political question.
v. Carr,

369 U.S.

186

(1962);

Luther v. Borden,

48 U.S.

the
Baker

(7 How.) 1

(1849).
I think there is substantial force to the City's argument on
this

point.

Fitzpatrick,
than the

Although

the

DC

ably

the concerns raised

issues here,

where

the

process is arguably undermined.
recently as Briscoe v. Bell,

defended

§

5 on

the

basis

in that case were far more narrow

----....

integrity of the state's lawmaking
I would point out, however, that as

432 U.S.

404

(1977), eight members of

the Court joined an opinion expressly stating that by enacting
"Congress

acted

within

Fifteenth Amendments

vi(you

concurred

its

'power

to

enforce'

the

'by appropriate legislation.'"

in the

judgment).

of

Fourteenth
Id.

§

5,
and

at 414-415

Some unhappiness with the nearly

continuous expansion of the Act was evident in Dougherty County last
term,

when

the Chief,

Rehnquist,

and Stewart

joined your

dissent.

And in Sheffield, Stevens, Rehnquist and the Chief dissented to the

1 4.

extension of preclearance to all political subdivisions.

Still,

view of the uncertain breakdown of

_pol.J.!.~ al

impact of striking down §
~

overturning

the

DC

in

5,

the Court,

the

l i_ kely

in

and the presence of other grounds for

this

case,

I

am

not

sure

that

the

Tenth

Amendment argument would be the best ground of decision.
V.

PRECLEARANCE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL:
The City argues that several of the voting changes at issue

here

the majority vote requirement, runoff elections, and numbered

post

provision -- were

approved

revisions

in

Under those revisions,

precleared by
the

1968

the Attorney General when he

Georgia

Municipal

the City continues,

Election

Code.

Rome had to conduct its

elections with majority votes,

runoff elections and numbered posts,

so

re-preclear

the

A-G

has

no

right

to

the

changes.

Realistically,

sensibly rejected this contention.

The

DC

impact of voting

changes in particular communities cannot be predicted on a statewide
basis.

The presence of bloc voting, a history of discrimination, or

peculiar

political

practices

in a

community may convert a

election device into a discriminatory one.
under

§

5

a

unambiguous

voting
and

Elections, 393
concluded

that

change

recordable

u.s.
in

at 571.
1968

must

be

See

Georgia

This Court has held that

submitted

manner."

to

Allen

submitted

the

v.

to

A-G

State

u.s.

Sheffield, 435
had

neutral

in

"an

Board

of

at 136.

the

The DC

A-G only

its

decision to grant municipalities wide discretion in structuring local
elections; the actual provisions of each municipal charter could not
be deemed precleared by acceptance of the statewide action.
The City also claims that
its

voting

•,

changes

and

annexations

the Attorney General
by

failing

to

act

precleared
within

the

1 5.

statutorily prescribed 60-day period.

On May 24, 1976 Rome asked the

A-G to reconsider his objection to the changes; on July 14, 1976, the
City spontaneously submitted two brief affidavits in support of its
petition

for

reconsideration;

the

A-G

declined

to

withdraw

his

objection on August 12, 1976, almost eighty days after the City first
asked for reconsideration.

The question is whether the 60-day period

began anew when the City submitted supplemental affidavits on July
14.

In Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977), you wrote an opinion

for

the

Court

submission for

holding,

inter

alia,

that

insufficient information,

if

the

A-G

a

the 60-day period does not

commence until the preclearance request is resubmitted.
instant case,

returns

But in the

the supplementation was volunteered by the City, and,

according to the DC, was "hardly of a nature to impose a significant
additional burden on the Attorney General."

Juris. St. at 28B n.63.

The DC found no violation of the 60-day rule, stating that
it was "unwilling to second-guess the Attorney General on an issue
implicating

his

application."

unreviewable

Id. at n.64.

judgment

on

the

merits

of

a

§

5

Judge McGowan also observed that since

the voting changes at issue were not submitted to the A-G until ten
years after their enactment, "the City's hands are not scrupulously
clean when it comes to timeliness."

Id. at n.65. v.;here is no clear

answer to this question in the statute or in the Justice Department's
rules.

See 28 C. F. R.

51.18

§

(a).

~e

best reason I see for the

DC's position is that otherwise a local government might try to swamp
the

A-G

course,

with

information

near

the

end

of

the

60-day

period.

Of

the 60-day period was established in order to ensure swift

action on

preclearance

and

thereby minimize

the disruption

to

the

,;

•,.

16

local

government.

This

concern

fades

if

the

locality

0

itself

initiates the delay by submitting more data.
The City directs this Court's attention to United States v.
Georgia,

No.

court),

C76-1531A

aff'd mem.

(N.D.

98 S.

Ct.

Ga.,
2840

Sept.

30,

(1978),

1977)

(three-judge

where the DC found

that

preclearance of the entire Georgia election code in 1970 barred the
A-G from preclearing two provisions involving county elections.

The

City

A-G

reasons

that

this

case

requires

a

finding

precleared Rome's election practices in 19 68.
distinguished,

however,

because

it concerned

that

the

This case should be
state provisions

that

had simply not been highlighted when the entire code was submitted to
the A-G,

while the instant litigation involves charter requirements

that were not directly before the A-G at all.

VI.

WAS

§

5 VIOLATED.?

/i~-r~~~~~~~

~~,Ld_~

..J..,.u~
- •. - ~. J.... ~I •
--~~~,~- ;:::::('~/~~--,
J

1

C~ s

"burden of showing

,,·d (.'./.
"'

i ~~he

The DC found that "[a]lthough ttie
1

~.

that

its non-annexation voting

----------~,------------------------~--------------------·
changes were not enacted
with a discriminatory purpose." Juris. St.
at

4 Sb.

And

the

Attorney

General

did

not

even

allege

annexations were undertaken with a discriminatory purpose.

that

the

The City

did not, however, establish to the DC's satisfaction that the effects
of those changes were not discriminatory.

The defeat of Rev. Hill in

his 1970 race for the Board of Education "exemplifie[d]
effect

on

black

plurality-win

voting

system Rev.

strength

of

Hill would

these
have

rules,"
prevailed.

the dilutive

since
Id.

under
at

a

48b.

The DC expressed dissatisfaction with the Government's "conclusory"
argument against the voting changes,

but stated that "the City has

7

shown us nothing at all that might refute the Government's argument."
Id. at 49b

·-------------------.. . ·

With respect to the annexations, the DC attempted to walk a
.....,_________~...............
~
thin line. Judge McGowan found that as a result of the 13 challenged

-------·----

-----

annexations,

white

<.......

almost

10

per

voting

cent

strength

(actually

in

7.5

per

increased by less than one per cent.
I

will

discuss

below,

was

the

city

cent),

had

increased

while

black

by

voters

(This statistical analysis, as

misleading.)

Having

found

a

negative

impact on black voting strength, the DC asked if blacks would have a
commensurate voice in the city after the annexations, comparing the
situation in Rome to that in City of Petersburg v. United States, 354
F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972)
(1973).

(three-judge court), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962

In Petersburg, the DC found a history of discrimination and

government

unresponsiveness

annexation

would

majority.

The

convert
Petersburg

a

to

the

black

55/45 black majority
Court

said

that

so

to

a

long

that

and

community,

54/46 white
as

the

city

retained its at-large voting system, the annexations would inevitably
dilute

the

acknowledged
that

black

vote.

In

the "relatively benign racial

"Rome's

elected

officials

have

interests of the black community."
that

instant

the

blacks

would

representation

still

reasonably

voting strength."

Id.

"have

been

case,

Judge

atmosphere"
quite

fair

commensurate

with

in Rome

responsive

Juris. St. at 55b.
a

McGowan

opportunity
their

to

and
the

He concluded
to

obtain

post-annexation

Nevertheless, in a move that baffles me, the

---------------~-------

DC conditioned preclearance of the annexations on abandonment of the
requirement
wards.

that

three

Id. at 58b.

city commissioners reside

in each of

three

?'(?

18.

The

standard

for

evaluating voting

changes under

5 was

§

articulated in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 141:
[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
reference to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.

This "non-retrogression" principle has been satisfied in this case.
The

DC's

finding

on

the

voting

changes

was

based

on

the

City's

failure to refute the Government's claim that they "promote head-tohead

contests

black

between

community of

white

the

and

black

opportunity

to

lame.

II

Th e

.

.

elect

Id.

choice through single-shot voting."

candidates
a

and

candidate of

at 48b.

the

their

This seems pretty

.
"'
v'o_t_e~...a_n_~.~~~nts

ma]or1ty

deprive

serve

the

.

val1d

purpose of ensuring that elected officials receive the approval of a

,,

/(

majority

of

the

voters.

The

place

requirement

...

ensures

that

all

regions in the city will be represented on the council and avoids the
confusion
Indeed,

caused

the

by

a

lengthy

combination of

ballot

listing

many

the place requirement

with

candidates.
a

residency

requirement can be viewed as a pro-minority measure that ensures that
the richer parts of town will not produce all the elected officials.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975).
over

the DC • s

view of

the

impact of

a

residency

(My confusion
requirement

also

arises with respect to the annexations.)
Moreover,

the

Government's position.
officials
voting.

in

Rome,

but

evidence

in

Of course,
there

was

this

case

did

not

support

the

there had been no black elected
little

evidence

of

racial

bloc

Indeed, a large share of Rev. Hill's votes had to come from

whites.

The countervailing testimony

voting, and of blacks that there is, would seem to cancel each other
out.

And

the

evidence

as

to

the

1968

senatorial

primary

is

inconclusive at best, since the black challenger was an unknown and
the white was a long-time incumbent.

Moreover, the District Court

found

sensitive

that

(Although

the
I

city

suspect

government
that

this

was

litigation

relations between the races in Rome.)

has

to

black

somewhat

needs.
impaired

Minorities are not entitled to

elect representatives in proportion to their numbers, but must have
"a fair opportunity" to do so.
the

balance

of

power

The DC found that "blacks often hold

in Rome elections,"

and due

to

the

at-large

election system, "they are situated to exert considerable influence
over

many

exclusively

elected

officials,

not

black

constituency."

simply

Juris.

those

St.

at

representing
55b.

This

an

sounds

pretty good to me.
On

the

annexation question,

At time of annexation,

nine of the

were completely vacant,
four

plots.

black voters,
voters
you

By 1978,
while

all

the

of

thirteen plots of

held

annexe

823 white

and

nine

the city as a whole had 10,982 white

and 2,026 black voters
the

land

288 white voters 1 ived on the other

thirteen plots

in 1975,

(84.4 per cent)

subtract

while

the DC strained even harder.*

voters

living

in

(15.6 per cent).
the

thirteen

If

annexed

regions, the City in 1975 would have had 10,159 white voters and
*The discussion in the amicus brief by the Pacific Legal Foundation
was illuminating on this 1ssue.
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I see no

asis for finding that the votes of blacks in Rome have been
---....,____
diluted by the annexations.
~ ~
~./1... ""1 ?4. .G"-'~. .

F

2,017 black voters, or a ratio of 83.4 per cent to 16.6 per
Thus the actual loss in black voting power was one per cent.

cent.
This

contrasts

with

the

shifts

in

voting

power

resulting

from

municipal annexations in Petersburg (55/45 black to 54/46 white) and
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (52/48 black to 58/42
white).

In partial recognition of the weakness of the Government's

case, the court below eschewed the more drastic remedy in Petersburg
Instead, the

that the city adopt a single-member districting plan.

DC conditioned its preclearance of the annexations on abandonment of
the residency requirement.
community

of

dispensing

There seems little advantage to the black
with

this

requirement.

If,

as

in

most

American cities, Rome's neighborhoods are not very well integrated,
the ward requirement would most likely enhance the opportunity for
blacks to be candidates from a ward where blacks were concentrated.
Assuming

for

the

sake

of

argument

that

housing

patterns

are

not

racially segregated in Rome, or that the black community is dispersed
in small pockets so that none of the three wards has a substantial
black

population,

the

residency

requirement

should

have

no

more

adverse effect on black voting strength than that caused by pure atlarge voting,

which

the DC would

restore.

Perhaps

I

am missing

something here.

VII.

RECOMMENDATION
My inclination would be to reverse the DC's ruling on the

--------

merits of the

§

5 claim because there was no showing of racial bloc

21.

voting or retrogression of black voting strength.

·- - - · - - - _ . . . , . . .

sidestep

---

tenable.

the

constitutional

questions,

the

Although I would

federalism

claim

is

'---------------------~

I would resist the contention that the Fifteenth Amendment

requires a showing of intent,

since the text of the Amendment does

not support such a reading and there is no practical reason -- as
there

is

in

the

equal

restrictive standard.
day preclearance issue,

protection context

--

for

injecting

such

a

I think the DC should be affirmed on the 60and would

lack of a better alternative.

let

the bailout ruling

As must be clear,

room in this case for strategic maneuvering.
David

stand

for

there is a lot of

78-1840

City of Rome v.U.S.
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OC'rOBER TERl\I,

1972

No. 72-865
CITY OF PE'rERSBURG, VIRGINIA, A.PI'ELLANT

v.

uNI1'ED STATES OF AlVIEIUCA.
ON APPEAL FROM TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT .COURT FOil
TilE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA . .

s~J

.1\ MOTION

TO AFFIRM
.~

.

'

The Solicitor General, on behalf .of the United
States, moves, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 16
(1) (c), that the judgment of the district court in this
case he affirrned.
. . . ..
OPINION BELOW

0

•

••

•

•

•

The opmwn of the district court (J:S. App. 5a24a) is not yet r eported.

•

.

··..

:

JURISDICTION

The order of the district court (J.S. App;·24a-26a)
was entered on November 22, 19·72. A notice ·of appenl
was filed on December 6, 1972, and the, Jurisdictional
~.tatenient \vas filed on December 12, 1p_72.. Tli~ jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1253.
(1)

~-- ·------------------------------~

2
QUESTION PRESENTED

\Vhether the district court properly found that appellant had failed 'to demonstrate satisfactorily in its
declaratory judgment suit under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1973c) that the annexation
of surrounding territory by the City of Petersburg,
Virginia, would not have a racially discriminatory
effect on the election of City Councilmen under the
City's at-la1·ge electoral system.
STATEMENT

The relevant facts are recounted in the opinion of
the district court (J.S. App. 5a-13a). The City of
Petersburg is an independent city in Virginia, which,
prior to the present annexation, covered an eightsquare-mile area and had a 1970 population of 36,103;
approximately 55 percent of the 1970 population was
black and 45 percent was white (J.S. App. 9a). The
City is g<?verned by a five-member City Council.1 Each
member is ·chosen in at-large elections, which are nonpartisan, and serves for four years; elections are staggered at two-year intervals, with three members elected
in each presidential year and two members elected in
each off year (J.S. App. 11a).
In 1971, Petersburg expanded the city limits by
annexing 14 square miles of surrounding area. The
annexation added approximately 7,323 persons to the
City's population, 7,000 of w'hom (a group nearly half
the size of the pre-annexation white population ( J.S.
In 1972, the Virginia Legislature by speci~tl act increased
tho siz·e o.f the Council to se \·en members ( ,T.S. App. lla, n. 6).
1

3

.

..

App. 6a)) \vcre wbite (.J.S. 4); th'is reduced the 55
percent black majority to a 46 11ercent millOI·ity (.T.S.
App. 9a-10a). An attempt hy the only black mcmbcr
of the Council to compen:atc for tbis alteration in
the City's racial makeup by having Council members
elected from single-member districts, rather than
at-large, was rejected by the Council ( J.S. App. 1f5a).
In December 1971, the City submitted its annexation plan to the Attorney General }_)ursnant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. On February 22, 1972,
the Attorney General, acting through the Assistant
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed an objection, ach-ising Petersburg that (J.S.
App. Sa, n. 2):
Unquestionably, the above facts indicate
that the proportional voting strength ..of blacks
has been reduced. r_rhe issue is whether this reduction amounts to a discriminatory effect on
voting within the meaning of the Voting Rights
Act. vVe conclude that it does. The reason lies
not in the fact of annexation-Congress certainly did not intend for all southern cities to be
prevented from annexing any tenitory. Ratliei·,
in re-adopting the at-large election system in
the context o.f a significant change of population-from black to white ma,iority-ancl simultaneously re,iccting a proposed wm·cl system,
the potential for an adverse ancl discriminatory
voting effect l1as been \\Titten into th e Petrrsburg clcdion Jaw. \Yhile the l'Casons the c-ity
advances fol' using an at-l n1:gt· systrm an' crcLlihle and would normally prcscnt no SJX'rial.
pl'ohlem, in the particular context oE Prtr.rs-

4

burg we arc unable to conclude that the at-large
feature will not have a discriminatory effect on
voting rights. * * *
On ~larch 17, 1972, the City filed the present Section 5 snit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment
that its annexation of the pl'edominantly white surrounding areas, to " ·hich it extended the at-large
method of electing City Cotmcilmen, "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on 'account of race or
color * * ·X·" ( 42 u.s.a. 1973c). The matter was heard
by three judges, as requiTed by statute ( 42 U.S.C.
1973b).
On October 24, 1972, the district cou1·t ruled against
'appellmit, holding that it had failed to carry its
burden of proving that "the Petersburg annexation
in the context of an at-large voting system" ''~ill not
have ' tbe effect prohibited by ihe Act" (.J.S. App.
20a). In so concluding, the court made clrm· that the
objectionable aspect of the City's decision to enlarge
its electorate did not lie in the "ntel'e bom1<.lal'y
change," but rather Tesultecl from "an expansion of
an at-large system" to the ne,Yly-annexecl c.n·c:.1s (J.S.
App. 22a). It thus ruled that the annexation could
"be approYcd only on tl1e condition that modifications
calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any
adverse effect upon the political participation of hlaek
voters nrc adopted, i.P., that the [appellant] sh] ft
from an ·at - 1~u-gc to a \Htl·d ~>ystcm of clcctitJg its city
co unci lmcn'' ( ib Z:d.).

5
ARGU1J:ENT

The district cou1-t carefully examined the Petersburg annexation p1·oposa1, both in its historical perspective and in terms of the impact that it would have
.· on the voting po,Yer of Negroes residing within the
enlarged city limits. Far from annotmcing any per se
rule with respect to municipal annexations where local
officials are elected at large (see J.S. App. 21a), asappellant seems to suggest ( J.S. 8) ,Z the court correctly
held that in the pa1ticular circtm1stances })resented in
this case the change in the Petersburg election procedures, although "fairly intended to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose" (J.S. App. lOa), would
have the prohibited effect of diluting "the weight,
strength and povver of the votes of the black voters in the
· City * * *" (J.S. App. 18a). Its decision not to approve the annexation if at-large voting was retained is
entirely consistent with the decisions of this Cotut and
other federal courts safeguarding the voting rights of
"millions of non-white Americans" ( So1tth Camz.ina v.
Ka.tzen lHlch, 383 U.S. 301, 337), and presents no issue
warranting plenary review by this Court. 3
Appellant specnlntes that tho Petersburg annexation is no
different from any other municipal annexation in the context of
an at.-la.1·ge voting system. But the nnusnal nature of the Petersburg annexation is indicated by the fact that the Attorney General has found it necessary to object only to it and two other
annexations of the 527 submitted to him from 105 cities electing local officials at large. See .\ppendix to ).Iotion to Dismiss
or Affirm filed by Charles P. Tioyall, et al.
3
Contrary to appellant's suggestion, the dc•cision be]on· is not
in c:oni!id with Lipscomb Y. Jon sson, -:l-50 F. 2cl 835 (C.A. 5) , or
fl ol t Y. 0 ity of Riehm our1~ 459 F. 2cl 1003 ( C.A. 4), certiomri. de2

..

6

1. AppelJant argues that because the court below
found "nothing in the annexation which indicated
that it had a racial pu1·pose" (J.S. App. lla), judicial
inc1uiry in a suit of this natn1·e into the effect on the
Negro voter of an extension of the city limits into
whtte suburbia is foreclosed. The plain language of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, howC\·er, rc.fntes
this argument. It requires a covered State or political
strb'clivision seeking •c learance of its proposed change
in election procedures to demonstrate that the change
"does not have the pnrpose and will not lwve the effect
of denyjng Ol' abridging the right to vote on accotmt of
raceorcolor * * *"(42U.S.C. l973c;emphasisaclded).
The distriet court therefore properly did not end
its inquiry upon finding that the Petersburg annexation was ''a necessary measure to allow the Cj ty to
nied, 408 U.S. 931. Neithn Lipscomb nor Holt was a suit
for declaratory relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
In neither case was the burden on the city to demonstrate "by
the prC'pondera11ce of evidence" that its change in election procedure was not racially discriminatory. \Vhilc the changC's involved in !Jolt and Lipscomb "·ere upheld as constitutional,
neithC'r case involved a change that would efl'ectinly Pxcludc
blacks from the political process. Here, by contrast, the conrt
found that the evidence with respect to this annexation in the
context of at-large voting created "the clear possibility of
totally excluding black citizens from participation in the city
government'' (J.S. App. 22a). Unlike Ifolt and Lipscomb, the
burden here was on the City o:f Petersburg to proYe otherwise.
Nor is there any reason for the Comt to hear this case in
light of Hullocl~ Y. R cgestm·. X o. 72-147, probable jmi::;cliction
lloted, October 10, 1072. Bullock is not. n. SC'ction ;) snit. l\IorC'm·er, as apprllant acknowledges (.J.S. 11- 12). that casP a ri sl'::i
in a "·holly cliffC'rent context and in...-olYes di:fl'ercnt iss urs from
those here.

7

\
I

expand its tax base and its potential for growth and
development" (J.S. App. lOa). It looked fnrther, to
ascertain whether, as this Court stated in a related context in Fo1·tson v. Dor::;ey) 379 U.S. 433, 439, "designedJy
or otherwise," the extension of the city limits, "tmclel'
the circumstances of [tl1is] particular case, would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
o·f racial * * ·:+ elements of the voting population." See
also Btwns v. R'l'cha.nlson, 384 U.S. 73, 88. 4
The record fu]]y djscloses, and appellant does not
dispute, that "there has been a long history of racial
segregation and discrimination in the City of Petel'sbnrg" (J.S. App. lla). The result has been, as pointed
out by the court below, "a dramatic polarization of
the races ·* * ·Y.- 'vith respect to voting * * *" (id. at
11a-12a), and "almost total bloc voting by race has
been the well estabJished pattern * -:f *" (id. at 12a).
Contrary to appellant's assertion, this Coutt did not hold
in Whitcomb v. Chavis: 403 U.S. 12±, that such an inquiry is
lmnecessary if a. lrgitimate purpose can be shown. Indeed, the
Court there made an exhaustive examination of the "eileci"
that the change from single-member to mult.i-mcmLer districts
would have on minority ,-oting rights (403 U.S. at 148-155).
In ally event, appellant can deri,·e no support in this case
from dicta in Whitcomb for its argument that the court below
should have pretermitted consideration of the "efi'ec.t '' of the
Petersburg annexation once it \\·as satisfied with the legislative
"purpose." lVMtcomb " ·as not a snit for declaratory judgment under Section 5, and tlms did not inYoke the explicit
statutory command that the jmiscliction seeking Section 5
clearance demonstrate to the court that its ,·oting change woultl
not be racially discriminatory in either purpo:-:1:', or eJiect. In
lVkitc01n b, the lmrclen of proof was, moreover, on the party
challenging the election change, not on the party seeking to
sustain it.
4

..

8

The City Councilmen are eleetecl on a non-paTtisan
basis, having no political party identification Ud. at
lla), and "the vote in precincts which are racially
identifiable as being almost completely black or y;;hite
llas he en overwhelmingly along racial lines" (id. at
12a). As might be expected, the majority-white Council 5 "has been generaJly unresponsive to some of the
expressed needs and desires of the blacl\: community
and has on some occasions rejected or failed to adopt
programs, employment policies and appointments l'ecommenclecl by blacks" (icl. at 14a).
It is from this perspective that the court below
consideTed the effect on mtmicipal elections of an increase in the number of whites in Petersburg by almost half while retaining an at-large voting system. 6
The Council has only once since HlG4 had t\\-o black members (lDGG-1968); at the present time it has one black member
(J.S. :App. 14a).
6
Appellant seeks to remon~ from the Conrfs consideration of
the Petel'sburg annexation under Section 5 the City's decision
to retain an at-large voti11g system. But a boundary change of
the sort im-olwd here cannot be so easily isolated. Any time
there is "a change in the composition of the electorate afl'ectecl
Ly the election" there is "a potential for racial discrimin:1 tion
in Yoting" (Perldns v. Matthmus, 400 U.S. 379, 380). And that
potential inheres as much in the manner in which the ne"\Y
voters elect their reprcsentatins as it clocs in their numerical
impact on the racial Lalance in the affected community. An atlargo system of voting in the context of a city co\-cring- 8 sqnare
miles differs fl'om at-large representation in a city tlwt, by annexation, is almost three times that size. The annexation not
only adds tenitory and people, but, as obsetTed by the c1istrict
comt ( .T.S. App. '2 0a), al so expands the at-large Yoting system. Such a "change" in the Plrctoral process is no more
entitled to exemption :from thP. bi·oad scope .of Section 5 conr5

t
f

g

T

I

As it pointed ont Ud. at 12a): "'I'he simple transformation of a potential black voting majority into a
c:Jear minority ha s no effect on relative voting
strengths unless votes are cast along racial lines." But
whe1·e race is the "dominant factor" (id. at 14a) in
electjons, as in Petcrshnrg, the sudden injection into
the electorate of a Jarge numbe1· of white voters, which
concededly has the effect of ''dilut[ing] the 'Yeight,
strength and power of the votes of the black voters
in the City * ·:+ *" (J.S. App. 18a), does in a very
real sense deny the black segn1ent of the municipal
population access to the political system. Compare
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S. at 155. 7
age than is the change in boundary lines. See Allen Y. State
Boet?Yl of Electiorw, 3!)3 U.S. 5"14, 5G7; Pe1·kins v. 1.l latthe~vs,
supm, 400 U.S. at 390.
7
In Whitcomb, by contrast, the question concerning possiuJe
racial discrimination in voting arose in the context of partisan
elections along party, not racial, lines. The Court there found
from the evidence that "tlw failure of the ghetto to h:wc legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a
function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor
Negroes" (403 U.S. at 153). It concluded that the poor blacks
"·ere not "any more underrepresented than poor ghetto whites
" ·ho also voted Democratic ancl lost, or any more discriminated
against than other interest groups or Yoters in :M arion County
with allegiance to the Democratic Party, or, conversely, any
lPss represented than Republican areas or voters in years of
Republican defeat" ( 403 U.S. at 154). It "·as in that contexti.e., partisan elections along party lines- that the Conrt rejected
the argument that "im·idious discrimination "-' * * results \Yhen
the ghetto, along w·ith all otlwr Democrats, suffers the disastl'r
of losing too many elections" (403 U.S. at 153). But. the decision in 1Vllitcomb, enn assuming arguendo its applicah ilit~·
here (sl'c n. 4, S1tJ11'o), has little b0aring on the pr0sent case
invoh·ing non-partisan elections where the voting hus Lccn along:
rncial lines .

..

10

Consequc'ntly, in holding that the Petersbm·g annexation in the context of at-large elections and blockvoting by race Cl'eatrs "the clear possibility of totally
excluding black citizens from participation in the city
government" (J.S. App. 22a), the district court d~cl
not invoke "a mere cnphemism for political defeat at
the polls" (lVhitcomu Y. Cluc.vis, sup1·a, 4.03 U.S. at
153), as appellant seem:s to argnc. Here the dilutive
effect is far more fundamental. Contrary to appellant's contentions, it cannot be disregarded on grounds
that the admitted racial discrimination in voting was
"lawfnlly motivated" (J.S. 17), 8 was "incidental" to
legitimate legislative goals (J.S. 20-21), 9 or ·was only
"temporary" (J.S. 26). 10 Nor is it a proper answer
to the responsibilities that the Act places in the court?
to say that the extent to which the Negro vote has
been impaired by the present annexation is an inquiry
for "social scientists" and "beyond the ken of the
judiciary" ( J.S. 27-28).
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act imposes on the
jurisdiction seeking dcclarat01-y 1·rlicf the burd('ll of
proving that its change in election procedures is not
A similar arg-ument \Yas rejected Ly this Comt in Allen v.
State Board of Elections, wpN; as there noted, it is not the
motiYe behind the election law change that is relenmt under
Sectioi1 5, but only whether the change has a racially disc riminatory pnrpose or effect (:-3D3 CS. at 5G:\ n. 2rl).
9
See pp. \r--7, supro.
10
Appellant s uggests tlwt \Yhatenr the c11lution o f the X<'gro
1·ot c as a result. of this :umrxntion in tl w context of at-large
cl0ction s, it soon " 'ill he l'<'llll'diccl "bcC'allSC [the] lll't rep rod llC'tion rate [of blacks] is 2:1.0'> g reatrr tha11 that of ''hitcs ::: '~ ':':'
( id. at 2G: 11. :n).
8

11

I

I

l
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I
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racially discriminato1-y m purpose or effect. South
Ccwol-ina v. Katzenbach, supnt, 383 "G.S. at 335. 11 In
non-partisan elections where the voting "has been
overwhelmingly along racial lines" (J.S. App. 12a),
as is the case here, that burden is not met simply by
seeking to "justify" the admitted dilution of the
Negro vote as an inevitable "by-product of other legislative action" (J.S. 20). An erosion of the blacks'
voting power which "effectively exclude[s] [them]
from participation in the process of selecting city
council members" (Lipscomb v. Jonsson, 459 F.2d
335, 339 (C.A. 5)) is no more permissible when accomplished indirectly, "designedly or otherwise," than
when it results from direct legislative action. As this
Court stated in Lane v. 1iVilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275, and
reiterated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342,
the Fifteenth Amendment condemns "sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."
Contrary to appellant's contention, the district court. properly imposed on Petersburg the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that its change in election procedures" would not have a racially discriminatory purpose or
effect (J.S. App. 16a-17a). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U.S. at 331-332. The fact that the court acknowledged in its opinion that, with respect to the matter of legislative pnrpose, appellant had gone beyond that requirement and
introduced "compelling evidence demonstrating the necessity for
this annexation" ( J.S. App. 21a-22a), in no way suggests that
it was holding the City to a standard of proof higher than the
one it stated \YaS applieable here. Since, as pointed out by appellee Royall in his Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (p. 11), no
effort \\as made by the City of Petersburg "to meet its burden
of proving that the at-large system would not discriminate
against black voters in Petersbw·g" (emphasis in original), the
district court correctly held that the City had failed to cany
its bnrclen.
11

,,
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD_,.
Solicitor Geneml.
DAviD

L.

NoRMAN,

Assistant Attorney Genentl.
W lVI.

BRADFORD REYNOLDS,

Assistant to the Solicitor General.
FEBRUARY
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F. Powell,
Rome
The unreality of Wallace's argument today persuades
me even more strongly than before that I would like to find a
way to relieve Rome from the absurdities of §5.
I do not foreclose the possibility of concluding
that under Sheffield, a city, as a governmental unit required
to preclear with the Attorney General, also has the riqht to
seek a "bail out".

I recognize there are some analytical

difficulties, and yet they may not be quite as severe as
those we overcame in reachinq our judgment in Sheffield.

~:~~·$

"' ,_

~

I would prefer, however, to find a somewhat
different approach.

i.

J

ii

'"

Perhaps the most appealinq idea -

subject to further thinking - would be an arqument qenerally
alonq the followinq lines:
The provisions of the Act that do not permit a
local qovernmental unit to bail out are an invalid
infringement of the riqhts of localities under principles of
federalism and the lOth Amendment.

The Solicitor General

concedes that if a sinqle local unit of government, however
small, has violated the prohibitions of

~5

within the past 17

,;
Jl'

,,

"'

2.
v:;
~

years, the entire state - and every other subdivision -

,1

remains subject to the onerous preclearance provisions of the
Act.

Congress could not have intended this, and it is a

severe intrusion upon the automony of local governments and,
as has been arqued, upon individual riqhts.
It also is counterproductive to the purposes of the
Act, as
,~,,

t~operation

could lessen the incentive of

localities to comply with the Act - as Rome has done in every

..

substantive way.
I have had no opportunity to think this throuqh.
would appreciate your qivinq it careful reflection, and
talkinq with me Thursday morninq.

You may devise some other
""

,,

theory that would enable us to decide, in a principled way,
~~

that the Act as applied to a city that has a lonq record of

"'

no discrimination, and of constructive policies towards black
citizens.

Congress could not have intended the bizarre

result of this kind of case.

I wonder what Justice Huqo

Black would say about this!
CADC, several years aqo (about 1974, I think),
decided that Virqinia was not entitled to bail out.
look at that case.

Mv recollection is that arquable

violations were relatively isolated.

t:_ _-j-:(J
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

\

Take a

>/,

-~ '

'----

301

383 U.S.

wn. This was
em, for which
titutional pro79 u. S. 294,
. 100, 120-121.
litigation was
istent ·discrimtte amount of
obstructionist
·suits. ~ After
sistance to the
vell decide to
om the perpe:stion remains,
~scribed in the
tting the evil,
ress ourselves.
;hese remedies
1 subdivisions
1 Congress by
wc:J c dealing
thh>v- substanin certain secof accurately
l elsewhere in
1ion, Congress
ic areas where
McGowan v.
'Jaryland, 346
e equality of
not bar this
to the terms
3

Opinion of the Court.

upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not
to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, and cases
cited therein.

I

Coverage formula .
We now consider the related question of whether the
specific States and political subdivisions within § 4 (b) of
the Act '?'ere an appropriate target for the new remedies.
South Carolina contends that the coverage formula is
awkwardly designed in a number of respects and that it
disregards various local conditions which have nothing
to do with racial discrimination. These arguments, however, are largely beside the point. 87 Congress began
work with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the States and political subdivisions affected by the new remedies of the Act. The
formula eventually evolved to describe these areas was
relevant to the problem of voting discrimination, and
Congress was therefore entitled to infer a significant
danger of the evil in the few remaining States and political subdivisions covered by § 4 (b) of the Act. No more
was required to justify the application to these areas of
Congress' express powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. Cf. North American Co. v. S. E. C., 327 U.S. 686,
710-711; Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 582-583.
To be specific, the new remedies of the Act are imposed
on three States-Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippiin which federal courts have repeatedly found substantial .
voting discrimination. 88 Section 4 (b) of the Act also
embraces two other States-Georgia and South Carolina-plus large portions of a third State-North Carolina-for which there was more fragmentary evidence of

I
'

37

For Congress' defense of the formula, see House Report 13-14;
Senate Report 13-14.
38
House Report 12; Senate Report 9-10.
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recent voting discrimination mainly adduced by the Justice Department and the Civil Rights Commission. 39 All
of these areas were appropriately subjected to the new
remedies. In identifying past evils, Congress obviously
may avail itself of information from any probative source.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S.
241, 252--253; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S., at
299- 301.
The areas listed above, for which there was evidence of
actual voting discrimination, share two characteristics incorporated by Congress into the coverage formula: the
use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12
points below the national average. Tests and devices are
relevant to voting discrimination because of their long
history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting
rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of
actual voters. Accordingly, the coverage formula is r·ational in both practice and theory. It was therefore permissible to impose the new remedies on the few remaining States and political subdivisions covered by the
formula, at least in the absence of proof tha.t they have
been free of substantial voting discrimination in recent
years. Congress is clearly not bound by the rules· relating to statutory presumptions in criminal cases when it
prescribes civil remedies against other organs of govern- '
ment under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Compare
United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136; Tot v. United
States, 319 U. S. 463.
)
It is irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes cer/ tain localities which do not employ voting tests and
Georgia : House Hearings 160-176; Senate Hearings 1182-1184,
1237, 1253, 1300-1301, 133&-1345. North Carolina : Senate Hearings 27-28, 39, 246-248. South Carolina : House Hearings 114-116,
, · 196-201 ; Senate Hearings 1353-1354.
39
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devices but for which there is evidence of voting discrimination by other means. Congress had learned that
widespread and persistent discrimination in voting during recent years has typically entailed the misuse of tests
and devices, and this was the evil for which the new
remedies were specifically designed! 0 At the same time,
through §§ 3, 6 (a), and 13 (b) of the Act, Congress
strengthened existing remedies for voting discrimination .
in other areas of the country. Legislation need not deal
with all phases of a problem in the same way, so long as
the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483, 488-489; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U. S. 106. There are no States or political subdivisions
exempted from coverage under § 4 (b) in which the record reveals recent racial discrimination involving tests
and devices. This fact confirms the rationality of the
formula.
/Acknowledging.the.~ibilit:r, of overbr~th, the Act
provides for termmatwn oT spec1ai statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which {_V
the danger of s~~~~~r:g. . . discn ·na 'on has ~ot
materialized during the precedmg-}ive years. Despite
South Carolina's argument to the contrary, Congress
might appropriately limit litigation under this provision
to a single court in the District of Columbia, pursuant
to its constitutional power under Art. III, § 1, to "ordain
and establish" inferior federal tribunals. See Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-512; Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414, 427-431; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U. S. 182. At the present time, contractual claims
against the United St;!tes for more than $10,000 must be
brought in the Court of Claims, and, until 1962, the District of Columbia was the sole venue of suits against

/t\

40

.
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House Hearings 7fr77; Senate Hearings 241-243 .
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federal officers officially residing in the Nation's Capital.41 We have discovered no suggestion that Congress
exceeded constitutional bounds in imposing these limitations on litigation against the Federal Government, and
the Act is no less reasonable in this respect.
South Carolina contends that these termination procedures are .a nullity because they impose an impossible
burden of proof u~n States and political subdivisions
entitled to relief. ~s the Attorney General pointed out
during hearings on the Act, however, an area need do no
more than submit affidavits from votingofficials, asserting that they have not been guilty of racial discrimin~through the use of tests and devices ~uring thepast
five years, and then refute whatever evidence to the
contrary may be adduced by the Federal Government. 42
Section 4 (d) further assures that an area need not disprove each isolated instance of voting discrimination in
order to obtain relief in the termination proceedings.
The burden of proof is therefore quite bearable, particularly since the relevant facts relating to the conduct of
1 voting officials are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
\ States and political subdivisions themselves. See United
I States v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 355 U.S. 253,
256, n. 5; cf. S. E. C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S.
\' 119, 126.
' The Act bars direct judicial review of the findings by
the Attorney General and the Director of the Census
which trigger application of the coverage formula.· We
reject the claim by Alabama as amicus curiae that this
provision is invalid because it allows the new remedies of
41
Regarding claims against the United StatP.s, see 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1491, 1346 (a) (1964 ed.). Concerning suits against federal officers, see Stroud v. Benson, 254 F. 2d 448; H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.; 28 U.S . C.
§ 1391 (e) (1964 ed.); 2 Moore, Federal Practice,- 4.29 (1964 ed.).
2
·J House Hearings 92-93; Senate Hearings 26-27.
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is simply not a realistic alternative in this situation.
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entirely consistent with the interpretation of the Act in Sheffield,
where politicial subdivisions that do not register voters were found
to be subject to preclearance requirements.
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4 and 5 of the Act means the State and all

of its political subdivisions.

Mechanical application of that view

to the statutory language in this case supports the outcome proposed
by this argument.
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The remaining two arguments of the District Court
Permitting local governments to bail out would

only shift the flood of litigation from the Attorney General's office
to the District Court; and I would question whether many localities
would

have

sufficient

incentive

to

int iate

such

a

suit.

And

the

District Court's fear that a bailed-out subdivision would be subject
to

informal

pressures

from

state officials to adopt d iscr imina tory

practices seems paranoid at best.

J

~ ~.Jl 5 '/- -1-o ~~-~ ~

~4~-~,

~~....?

,,

"A·i

~~H..Lth.-1 -~~ ~~

.,,

~s-~ -·~~~

·~

;.) ~ '7' cZd-.s

.

-0CL4.-/~ ~

-

~

~~~~~-~
-

~~~~~~~

.. .· , ( /ti:C., 9~; ~~.d.)

.

.

I

J4; !~':':~In--~

'·

''l ~~-~

~~~-,1--

~

~~~-"'~z~~s~
.ZtJ

~~~~AA~.c.)

t4

~~ -1-o~-~~~~
H;~~~·~~·~

-t·';

~- -·

~ ~ lf{ § ~ ~w;ndJ2 ~
' ~~-~~~~~ ~.

""ThL

"1•
~·

. , ·~ ~ -~r~ll-jf'2+t--chJ.~,< ,
z;(;: Aczd nc;e;&. d:bir.
4 ..;-· ~

.flr..,,j.c:J..

~ ~ VV\/~ ~P1A)~~-

,,_:{..._

.'

.....

, ~-

.

f

. , ._.........
•.
."

I
I

78-1840

City of Rome v. U.S.

The· Chief Justice

Mr • ..Justice Brennan ~ .

.,
·'

'

..

Con£.

10/12/79

('

(

I .

Mr. Justice 'White ~

,.
(

---~--------=--------------------

Mr. Justice Marshall ~
,.

Mr. Justice Blackmu~ ~

,.

_ _ ,_ .

13.~~(;) o-c:~~~
~~ ~s--G-- · ~~

~~~~~~
rh;.,~~

.

;f

- - - - - - ---

~

- ·- - ---Mr-.....,.-J-u.-st-ic.e Powe l l

-----

Mr. Justice Rehn quist

•'

~

.·

---·
-- - ~·

'' .

Hr. Justice Stev ens

)

··

~~S~d.~~f
. ~~~~~.~~~~

~ · ~~ ~~ · 7~ ~

.,.

.

.$>u.premt cq01tt1 crf f~t ~rt+l.tb .§frur.s
:Wrurlytngton, ~- <.q. 2n?J!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

December 3, 1979

Re:

No. 78-1840 - City of Rome v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
In due course, I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Court

~tntt C4nnrl of flrt ~~ ,jhttt~uJrington. ~. <4. 20~~~
CHAM8ERS OP'"

JUSTICE

w .. .

December 4, 1979

J. BRENNAN, JR.

/
RE:

No. 78-1840 City ·of Rome v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

December 4, 1 cnq

7A-1840 City of Rome v.

u.s.

Dear Thurqood:
I will circulate orornptlv a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.§np-rnn-t ~tltttt :Of tqt ~.h ~tares
~as£rittghm. ~.

<!J. 20.5Ji.;J

CHAMBERS OF

December 5, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

No. 78-1840 - City of Rome v.

~.

Dear Thurgood,
'

Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
erne

{.

.iu:prtntt Qfllltttltf tJrt ~lt .ibdts
Jfa;gfrhtgLnt, JJ. <!f. 21)'~)1.,
CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

' '

December 6, 1979

~Re:

No. 78-1840, City of Rome v. U.S.

Dear Thurgood,
I shall await Bill Rehnquist•s dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

~-

.

. I

;§u.prnnt <!fouri of t1yt ~b ;%\ltttg

Jlultittghtn. ~. <!f.

2llp>!>~

CHAMI!!ERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 10, 1980

RE:

78-1840 - City of Rome v. United States

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Dear Thurgood:
I join.

t

Regards,

\JN)
Nr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

/

.§u:pr mtt ~.omi

cf tqr ~b' .§taka'J{trurfringicn. :!B. <!f. 2rtc?J!.;l

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 2, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1840, City of Rome v. United States

Dea r Bill,
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

)
T. :\I.

I"/JJ-/7t;

~~~

~

L. F. P.

c~~

H .. \ B.

~

,,.f~/?7

1

~
,_,/f/7?

jgo

'L~~ ~~~

t-vl~
/4-,.,,/{ J-·ir~/7 4J

t~lri?1
1-....l

l1/lf!ro
1 /"

,,

)
.T . 1'- :-' .

·------- -----

\\· . l i. H.

~

~

J-v/¥/79

at-/7/P

J-v/1J)77

;J~?(

d;&..-..1
~
~

f-4~
~~/17(7,

l

'L--.1 ~-... -~ ?,~~

u.s.

'/?j~o

78-1840 ( ity of Rome v.

I

lS

'.

L

RJEVIJEW & OUTLOOK
,,
'

Defending the Constitution

'.(he Supreme Court this week limat-large elections, the Court emphatiited .some applications of the Voting
cally rejected the notion, attributed to
Rights Acts, raising predictable howls
Justice Thurgood Marshall "that evthat it is abandoning civil rights. The
ery 'political group,' or at least every
truth is to the contrary. The Court has
such group that is in the minority, has
movt>d against a threat to American
a federal constitutional right to elect
polihcal vitality, and enhanced the candidates in proportion to its numpre~fige of civil rights Jaws, by repubers." Wrote Justice Stewart, "The
diatjng an overbearing judicial and
Equal Protection Clause . . . does not
bureaucratic perversion of their .inrequire proportional representation."
tent.··
This decision cuts the ground from
Under color of the Voting Rights
Wlder Justice Department policy that
Act ~f 1965, and even .more so of its · has so far forced City Council restruc197S 1 extension, the Justice Departturing in three of the nation's 10 largest cities and patalyzed local policies
Civil Rights Division has been
tryi~g to redraw the local form of govin hundreds more, and for flimsier
ermpent throughout the South and
reasons than in Mobile. But the Court
Southwest. This activity has been far
refused to end this business altomm~e widespread than even the series
gether. A simultaneous decision, in
of private suits and lower court deciCity of Rome, Georgia v. United
sio~~ now overturned by the Supreme
States, upheld the 1975 Voting Rights
Court's Mobile decision on Tuesday.
Act and its preclearance provision.
I,ry the name of preventing plots to
Justice Marshall, who this time wrote
disenfranchise black and Hispanic votthe majority opinion, stated it didn't
matter that the act intruded on "state
ers;~ the Voting Rights Acts have resovereignty"; "principles uf federalquired local governments in these reism that might otherwise be an obstagions to obtain '·preclearance" from
cle to congressional authority," he
the Justice Department for· such rou\
wrote, "are necessarily overridden by
tine:: actions a.S land annexations. In
I case after case, "Justice" has used the power to enforce the Civil War
this ·leverage to freeze elections and
Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.· "
. fo~e a switch from at-large voting to
Justice Marshall is right, of course,
single-member districts. Its aim .was
both in history and practice when the
no longer to guarantee equality in use
issue is guaranteeing to blacks and
of the ballot; but to produce equality
other minorities their Fifteenth
of r_esult. The Voting Rights Acts had
Amendment right to vote. The growth
bee~ transformed into an affirmative
of the black suffrage since 1965 has
actiOn employment program for. mi·
brought enormously beneficial change
nority candidates.
to Southern politics. But the law has
The Supreme Court has spoken
been perverted from this original noaga\nst the worst abuse of this authorble purpose to a carte blanche for fedity.: ~beit in the divided voice that is
eral tinkering with local governments.
becoming its trademark. In the deciThe Justice Department and lower
sion. in City of Mobile, Alabama v.
Bolden, the court overturned lower federal courts have consistently misread local politics and would be surcourt directives to scrap the city's
prised by the new constellations their
three·member at-large commission
go\iernment in favor of a mayor and intervention has produced. By limiting
the most arbitrary of these actions,
single-member-district City Council.
Thts drastic change had been ordered the Supreme Court gives some relief
to our valued but much harassed syswirpout any proof that the commission
sys}em, . a standard feature of many tem of local government. But the
small cities, was deliberately installed Court will also enhance the prestige of
to keep blacks out of government. AI· the Voting Rights law when it is
though no blacks had won in Mobile's turned against genuine abuses. .
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-1840 ··
City of Rome et al., Appellants,) On Appeal from the United
v.
States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
United States et aL
[November-, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State''
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions thereof that control eiection processes, and that those·
subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State'; in § 4 (a) when it comes to an action to "bail out"
from the preclearance requirement. Because this decision not
only conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as
to the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although my dissent is based on statutory and constitutional grounds, the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the
facts of this case. Rome is a city of about 30,000, and 15% of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action. First, in 1966 the Georgia Assembly established a majority vote requirement with runoff elections for
the City Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced
the number of election wards from nine to three. Under the
new arrangement, three city commissioners and two members
of the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for

78-1840-DISSENT
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

2

numbered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com~
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations are alleged to have diluted the
black vote in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters,
but 9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978
the additional white voters in the annexed lands had caused a
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged bla~ks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community," and actively seek black political support. 8 !d.,
As part of the package of revisionR, the A8sembly increased the Board
of Education from five to six membrrs, eased voter registration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
221, 224 (DC 1979).
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26.
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the transit system
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
1
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds, while nine of the annexations at issue were
of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting when
they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider whether this
Court should reverse the District Court's ruling on the evidence as clearly erroneous. Rather, I cite the contradictions
and apparent inconsistencies in the factual aspects of the holding below because they highlight how far the courts, including
this Court, have departed from the original understanding of
the Act's purpose and meaning. Against this background, I
address the substantive questions posed by this case.

II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
District Court of the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal government. 472 F. Supp., at 225.

'l
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand~
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See p. 3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
proviSIOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. 4
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
·and holds that no subdivision may bailout so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers
back to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests ( 1) "in
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (2) "in any
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5
4 Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance.
A local government
may ask the District Court of the District of ColumhirL for a rnling that
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attornry General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c (1976). The administrative procedure is used almost exclusively,
since it takes less time.
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part:
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of his failure to comply with any test or device in any state with respect
to which the determ·ination.s have been made unde1· the first two se~
tences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with 1·espect to tvhirh such determinations have been made as a sepm·ate
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing with
the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color. . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1976) (emphasis supplied) .
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition. 6 Thus
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, in States covered by the Act all changes in local
voting rules and regulations must now be reviewed by federal
authorities. I d., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
has construed the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are located in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 7 Yet the only
6 Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subject to the Act if
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.

§§ 1973b (b), 1973c ( 1976).
7
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bailout but
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argument nevertheless faHs, according to the Court's opinion, because congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 states that bailout should not be available to a subdivision if the State in which it is located is covered by the
Act. Ante, at-. It is elementary that where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to
look at its legislative history. We resort to legislative rnaNo. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry,
McKinley and Otem Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three coun1ies); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Camlina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elm01·e County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972,
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two yC'ars later after a District Court
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating the Act. New Y O?"k v. United States, C. A. No. 24-19-71
(DC Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974) (referring to Torres v.
Sachs, C. A. No . 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)).
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three
were dismisRed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners,
El Paso County. Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC
Nov. 8, 1977); Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 752170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States,
C. A. No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969)).
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terials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its
face. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1948); United States
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.''
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
language must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require..
ments for bailout.

III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes impermissibly on the prerogatives of state and local
governments and abridges the voting rights of all citizens in
States covered under the Act. Under § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is acting to remedy violations of voting
rights. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
327-328 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the District
Court finding that Rome has not discriminated against the
voting rights of blacks, there is no authority under the Fifteenth Amendment for continuing those deprivations until the
entire State of Georgia satisfies the bailout standards of
§ 4 (a).

•

!
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When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
!d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion). 8
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity. 9 Unless the federa.l structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con8 Other Justices have expressed the same concern.
E. g., South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and dis;;:enting);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring a.nd dissenting); .see also Georgia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (PowELL, J., dissenting).
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the
States, is protected by the principles of federalism.
1l The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); L011site1· v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959).
This Court has emphasized the import.ance in a democratic society of
preserving local control of local matters. Sec Milliken v. Bradley, 418
'U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ...
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n. 8, 426 U. S., at 855;
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).
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stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." !d.,
at 330.10
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions exempted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their
rare." I d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J .); id., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension
of those few literacy tests that were still in use, see id., at 147 (Douglas,
J.), without providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclea.rance
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination did not in
fact continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." !d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is c1ear. So long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its subdivisions meets those criteria. This outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the
errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.11 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has
involves a broad restraint on all state and local voting pra<'tices, regardless of whether they have been, or even could be, used to disrriminate.
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
The Court's position dictates this absurd result
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre-clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
which could not bailout due to the failings of a single subdivision. A
more rational approach would treat the states and local governments
independently for purposes of bailout. If subdivisions in Georgia were
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succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.12
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
approximately five million people and 877 local governments. 13
Thus, the consequence of today's ruling is to seal off the con-·
stitutionally necessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
free to seek bailout on their own , then a bailout action by the State
could properly focus on the State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia
were entitled to bailout, preclearance would continue to apply to subdivisions that by their own noncompliance remained subject to the Act.
Of course, the situation would be different if, overtly or covertly, the
State had contributed to the subdivision's failure to comply.
12 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
.Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by the rccoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. Unit ed States, C. A. No. 78--0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action).
One other State-Virginia-has attempted to bailout under § 4 (a).
Commonwealth of Virginia v. U·nited States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not
satisfy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test administered in some localities
between 1963 and 1965 was found to be discriminatory in the context of
the inferior education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties
before that period.
1 3 The Solicitor General states that in Georgia there arc 159 counties, 530
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every
voting change, no matter how irrelevant it might be to discrimination in
voting. Brief of Unted States, Appendix, at 1a.
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be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif.
teenth Amendment. But if bailout is not available to governments like the city of Rome, the statute oversteps those limits. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
District Court.

IV
The Court today offers several "practical" bases for its new
interpretation of§ 4 (a). Ante, at-. Although my statutory and constitutional analyses are independent of these con.
siderations, it is informative to scrutinize this aspect of the
Court's opinion. Far from demonstrating that the Court's
tortured approach is necessary to the effective implementation of the Voting Rights Act, these considerations accent the
makeweight nature of the Court's analysis.
First, the Court argues that if bailout were available to the
city of Rome, the "advantage of time and inertia," South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 328, would be
shifted away from the victims of voting discrimination. Ante,
at - . But a bailout suit must be brought by the local gov, ernment in the District Court of the District of Columbia, and
in that action the plaintiff bears the burden of showing its
compliance with the criteria in § 4 (a). The subdivision remains subject to the Act while a bailout suit is pending.
Realistically, for the local government there is no advantage
of time and inertia in this scheme.
Second, the Court notes that over 7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes. Bailout suits
by a small percentage of those subdivisions, the Court insists,
would swamp the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Ante, at - . In view of the acknowledged difficulties that
confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District
of Columbia, it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the Court would ever open. Such suits,
involving substantial expense as well as uncertainty, would
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not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial likelihood of success. Moreover, the Court's argument ignores the
procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to contest bailout if he finds that the state
or local government has not used a discriminatory test or
device over the preceding 17 years. 14 In fact, the Attorney
General consented to bailout in the nine actions under § 4 (a)
that have succeeded, while only three bailout suits have gone
to trial. 1 5 Thus the Department of Justice, not the courts,
would shoulder much of the added burden that might arise
from recognizing a bailout right for governments like the city
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than
the Attorney General's present responsibility for preclearing
all voting changes by 7,000 subdivisions. In the first six
months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting changes were submitted
to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25 per working
day.1o
14 The statute provides
" If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe
that any such test or device has been used during the seventeen years
preceding the filing of [a bailout] action ... he shall consent to the
entry of such judgment." 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a).
15 In addition to this case, the other bailout actions that have been tried
were Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, supra n. 7, and
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, supra n. 13. Three actions
under § 4 (a) have been dismissed by stipulution of the parties, and in
one-the New York City case-bailout was granted and then rescinded
without a trial. See n. 7, supra.
16 Letter to Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice (Aug. 3,
1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c. These astonishing
figures compare unfavorably with those cited by MR. Jus•rrcE STEVENS in
his Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of the Attorney
General's review of preclearance requests that were then arriving at the
rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8, 10. See
B erry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowELL, J., concurring). It
hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Justice Departmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg-

....
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Third, the majority theorizes-wholly without justification
in the record-that discrimination-minded state officials would
pressure a bailed-out local government to adopt discriminatory
voting policies. Ante, at - . There is simply no basis for
such speculation in fact or theory. Rome's eligibility for bailout demonstrates that if state pressures to discriminate exist,
they can be resisted. Moreover, if the unlikely event imagined
by the Court were to occur, there are ample remedies for
such discrimination under both the Act and the Fifteenth
Amendment.

v

If there were any reason to believe that today's decision
would protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, perhaps this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern ..
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet the Act's requirements diligently. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.

ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the Federal
bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing.

•
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\City of Rome et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the United
v.
States District Court for
Umted States et al.
the District of Columbia,
[November-, 1979]
Mu. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State"
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in ~ 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State'' when it comes to an act1011 to "bail out" from the
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although I dissent ou statutory and constitutional grounds,
the need to exami11e closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15%, of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local actwn affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia'
Assembly established a maJority vote requirement for the City
Commission and the Board of Educatwn, aud reduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of
the Board of EducatioJ.l ar<.' chosen from each ward for num~ ·

..
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bered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
111 Rome by disproportiOnately adding white voters.
But
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court m this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
m Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
commumty,'' and actively seek black political support. 8 !d.,
As part of the package of revisions, the A~:;embly increasrd the Board
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration rrquirements, and :;hli'trd registratiOn responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
·~21, 224 (DC 1Y79).
2 The t>tatistH·s on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 populatiOn of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
votrr registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that. percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823
white voters and mne black voter:; who lived m the annexed areas m
1978. See Brief for Umted States, at 38, n. 26.
3 The District Court al~o noted that the ctty has "made an effort to
upgradP some black netghborhood~." lw~ subsidtzrd the transit system
1
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
''the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-tests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, tHe District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning. Again this
backgTound, I address the substantive questions posed by this
casP.

u

Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-.
ment. 472 F . Supp., at 22/'i,
·
-
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand~
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3, supra.. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provisiOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by ~ 5 Of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. 4
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. · Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5
4

Section 5 permit;;; two mrthods of preclearance. A local government
may ask the District Court of the Distnct of Columbia. for a ruling that
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c. Thr administrative procedure ts ttsrd amost Pxclusively, since
it takrs lffis time.
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relrvant part :
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of his failure io comply with any test or device in any State with respect
to which the determinations have been rnaae under the first two sentences of subclivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate
uuit, nnless the Umtcd State~ Distnct Court for the District of Columbia
1n an actwn for a declaratory judgment bronght by such State o1· subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or
device hu~ been u ~ed durwg thr ::;eventt>eu years preceding the filing of the
action wtth the purpo~e or wtth the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote ou ll,Ccount of racP or color.
" 42 U S C. ~ 1973b (a) (em~ ·
pbasis . :>upplied).
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Because the en tire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerus the first category in that definition. 0 Thus
the crucial lauguage here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisious with any control over voting. 435 U. S .. at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. ld., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context. however. the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
i11 another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are iu States covered by
§ 4 (b). aml those of covered local governments that are located in States not covered by the Act. Tweuty-eight subdivisiolJS in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 7 Yet the only
6 UmlPr § 4 (b), a State or politieal HulxllVI::non i~ subJect to thr Act If
the Din>etor of tilP C'en.sus findH that lf'sS than 50% or tlw Pligible populn1ion voted in lhc l:u.;t pre,;identi:ll Plectwn, and the Attorney General
dPtPrmineH that a di,;criminatory "t<•st or cfpvice" wa.s maintained in the
jnri.sdictwn in 1964. Tho;;e cf('(prmination::;, which arP unrPviewable, trigger the application or the prccl<•arance rPqlllrement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1973b (b) , 1973c.
7

Counties of Choctaw aud l\IcCurtain, Oklahornu v. United Statel!, C. A.
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which ,Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force'' of this argument. The argument uevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, beeause congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at - -.
It is elementary that where the langauge of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials only when
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two countiefl); New Mexico, Cun·y,
McKinley and Otem Counties v. United States, C. A. No . 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (tlm·e countiPs) ; Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations") ; Wake
Couuty, North Carolina v. Umted States, C . A. No . 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
19l'i7) (one county); Elmore County, idaho v. United States, C. A. No
:3:20-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Cocon·ino Counties. Arizona v. Unitecl States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(thrt>e countit>s). ThrPc counties in N ew York City bailed out in 1972, •
New York v. United States, C . A. No . 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded l wo yE-an; later after a D1strict Court.
found that the StatP had conducted elections in English only, thereby' r',
violating the Act. New York v. Untted States, C. A. No. 2419- 71 (DC
.lan. liS, 1974), aff'd, 4Hl U.S. 888 (1974) (ref(•rring to Torres v. Sachs,
C A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY SPpt. 27, 197:3)) .
Bailout wa:o demed m one actwn mvolvmg a loeal subd1viswn, Gaston
County, North Carolina v. United States, 895 U. S. 285 (1969) , and three
werf' di:>missed by sllpnlalwn of the p:uhes, Board of Commtssioners,
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC
Nov. S, HJ77) ; Yuba County, CaLifonna v. Umted States, C. A. No . 752170 (DC May 25, 1976) ; Nash Co,u nty, North Carolina v. UnztPd States~
(' A No 1702-(16 (DC Sept. 26 , 1969) ).
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the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. Ex parte
Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. Oregon,
366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee reports
in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning of
ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded
if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." Good·ing v. United States, 416 U.S. 430,468 (1974) (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting) .
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there
i.s no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.

III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies.
~he bailout standards of ~ 4 (a)

..
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When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
ld., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment 011 state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion). 8
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity. 9 Unless the federal structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its owu course within the boundaries marked by the ConOther Justiceti have expre:;~ed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and di~entmg) ;
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J ., concurring and discenting); see also Georgia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545 (Hl73) (PowELL, J., dissenting).
In National League of Cities v. Usery , 426 U.S. R33, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority
and power from their re,;pective States," their mtegrity, like that of the
States, 1s protected by the principles of federalism.
9 The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state
aud local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U . S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassiter v. Northampton Co·unty Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) .
This Court has emphasized the 1mportance in a democratic society of
preserving locul control of Jocul matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of schools through their elrcted representatives" ) ; James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public housing project "ensure!:! that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditureH ...
and to lower tax revenue,;"). Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, wvolves protecting the mtegrity of state and local governments.
See National League of Cities v. Use1'y, supra n . 8, 426 U. S., at 855;:
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U S. 559, 565 (1911)
8
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stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only ill response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d.,
at 330. 10
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions exempted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supm n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that
the congressional action was ju:stified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy test:; to disfranchise voters on account of their
ral'e." !d., -at 122. See td .. at 146 (Douglas, J.); td., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, .J.) ; td., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWAH'l', J .) . That history supported temporary suspension
of tho:se few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dongas, J .) , with·(lllt providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclearance involve~·

..
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act
provides for termiuatiou of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period].'' I d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressio11al powers by imposing
preclearance ou a nondiscriminating governmellt. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutioual authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.11 Since the statute was e11acted, only one State has
a broad restraint on all stat(' and lof•al votmg practice~. regardl!'l:is of
whether they haw been. or evrn could be, u~rd to di;:cnminate.
11 Tr. of Om! Arg. 38.
The Court's po~ition dirtatr;: th1s rccentric rl'sult
by insisting that ;;ubdivi:sionK in covered State:" ran be rrlirved of preclearancE' only whPn thPir Sta1t• bail:,; out. In m~' view thiR alHo would
cast l:'erions doubt on thE' Ad 'R constitutionality as u,pplied to any State
which could not bail out dur to the failing::; of a ;;inglp Hubdivi;:ion . A
rational approach would treat t hr states and lora! govrrnm!'nt;; mdependt>ntly for purpo,;e" of bailout. If ;mbdivi;.;ions m Georgia were free
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succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971. 12
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
approximately five million people a.nd 877local governments. 13
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutio11ally neccessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
to ~:;eek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could
properly focus on the State's voting policieH. Th!'n, if Georgia were
entitled to bail out, preclearance would cont.i nue to apply to Hubdivisions
that by their own noncompliance met thE> coveragr critE>ria of § 4 (6) .
Of course, the :situation would bE> differ!'nt if the State had contributed,
overtly or covertly, to the :subdivision's failure to comply.
12 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's
1971 suit wa~ prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 exten~:;ion. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-eHtablished
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-04R4 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated disnnssal of action).
One other Sta.te-Virgmia-lu.tH <Lttemped to bail out under § 4 (a) .
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. HOI (1975). The court held that Virginia did not
satiHfy § 4 (a) bcca uPe a. state li terucy te:st admimsterE>d m some localities
between 1963 und 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior
educatiOn offered to Virgima blaeks in certain rural countieH before that
penod .
13
The Sohc1tor General :statt-s that Ororgu1 ha" 159 counties, 530
municipalities, and 188 other :subdiviHions that now must preclear every
voting change, no matter how irrPlevant the chang<> might be to di:serimi"'
rtation in voting. Bmf of UnitE>d StatE's, Appmdix, at, la,

..
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be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif~
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For
these reasons, I would reverse the · judgment of the District
Court.
IV
The Court today offers several "practical" bases for its new
interpretation of§ 4 (a). Ante, at-. Although my statu~
tory and constitutional analyses are independent of these considerations, it is informative to scrutinize this aspect of the
Court's opinion. Far from demonstrating that the Court's
tortured approach is necessary to the effective implementation of the Voting Rights Act, these considerations accent the
makeweight nature of the Court's analysis.
First, the Court argues that if bailout were available to the
city of Rome, the "advantage of time and inertia," South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 328, would be
shifted away from the victims of voting discrimination. Ante,
at - . But a bailout suit must be brought by the local government in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and
in that action the plaintiff bears the burden of showing its
compliance with the criteria in § 4 (a). The subdivision remains subject to the Act while a bailout suit is pending.
Realistically, for the local government there is no advantage
of time and inertia in this scheme.
Second, the Court notes that over 7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes. Bailout suits
by a small percentage of those subdivisions, the Court insists,
would swamp the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Ante, at - - . In view of the acknowledged difficulties that
confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District
of Columbia, it is by no means self-evident that the "flood~ates" perceived by the Court would ever open. Such suits,
involving substantial expense as well as uncertainty, would
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·not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial likelihood of success. Moreover, the Court's argument ignores the
procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to contest bailout if he finds that the state
or local government has not used a discriminatory test or
device over the preceding 17 years. 11 In fact, the Attorney
General conse11ted to bailout in the nine actions under § 4 (a)
that have succeeded, while only three bailout suits have gone
to trial.' 5 Thus the Department of Justice, not the courts,
would shoulder much of the added burden that might arise
from recognizing a bailout right for governments like the city
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than
the Attorney General's present responsibility for preclearing
all voting changes in 7,000 subdivisions. In the first six
months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting changes were submitted
to the Attorney General, a. rate of more than 25 per working
day. 16
14 The statute provides
"If the Attorney General determines that he has no rea::;on to believe
that any such te::;t or device has been u;;ed during the seventePn years
preceding the filing of [a bailout] action .. . , he shall consent to the
entry of ;;urh judgment." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a).
1 5 In addition to thi;; rase, the other bailout actions that have been tried
were Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, supra 11. 7, and
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, supra n. 13. Three actions
under § 4 (a) havp been dismis;;ed by stipulation of the partieH, and in
one--the New York City ca:;e--bailout was granted and then rescinded
without a trial. See n. 7, supra.
IG Letter to Jmseph W. Dorn from DrewS. Day~; III, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Right8 Division, U. S. Department of Justice (Aug. 3,
1979), 1·eprinted in Brief for Petitioner::;, App . C, at 1c. These astoniHhing
figure::; compare unfavorably with those cited by MR .•Ju::;·rrcE S'I'EVENs in
his Sheffield dis;;ent , where he que::;tioned the efficacy of the Attorney
Grneral'::; review of preclearance reque;;ts that then w<>re arrtving at the
rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn . 8, 10. See
Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowF;LL, J ., concurring). It
hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Ju;;tice Departmentmuch le::;;; the Attorney Qpneral-could make a thoughtful, personal Jndg-.
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Third, the ml'j>jority theorizes-wholly without justification
in the record-that discrimination-minded state officials would
pressure a bailed-out local government to adopt discriminatory
voting policies. Ante, at - . There is simply no basis in
fact or theory for such speculation. Rome's eligibility for bailout demonstrates that any state pressures to discriminate can
be resisted. Moreover, if the unlikely event imagined by tl~e
Court were to occur, there are ample remedies for such discrimination undyr both the Act and the Fifteenth Amendment.

v
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.

ment on an average of twenty-jive preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions
and States are finajly judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal
b~reaucracy, usuall~ without anything resembling an evidentiary hearin~.
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MR.

delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and its applicability to electoral changes
and annexations made by the city of Rome, Ga.
JusTICE MARSHALL

I
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by appellant
city of Rome, a municipality in north western Georgia, under
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 et seq.
(1976) . In 1970 the city had a population of 30,759, the
racial composition of which was 76.6% white and 23.4%
Negro. The voting-age population in 1970 was 79.4o/o white
and 20.6% Negro.
The governmental structure of the city is established by a
charter e11acted in 1918 by the General Assembly of Georgia.
Before the amendmeuts at issue in this case, Rome's city
charter provided for a nine-member city commission and a
five-member board of education to be elected concurrently on
an at-large basis by a plurality of the vote. The city was
divided into nine wards, with one city commissioner from
each ward to be chosen in the citywide election. There was
no residency requirement for board of education candidates.
In 1966, the General Assembly of Georgia passed several
laws of local application that extensively amended the elec~
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toral provisions of the city's charter. 'l'hese e11actmen ts
altered the Rome electoral scheme in the following ways :
(1) the number of wards was reduced from nine to three;
(2) each of the nine commissioners would henceforth be
elected to one of three numbered posts established within each
ward;
(3) each commissioner would be elected by majority rather
than plurality vote, and if no candidate for a particular position received a majority, a runoff election would be held
bet ween the two candidates who had received the largest
number of votes:
(4) the terms of the three commissioners from each war·d
would be staggered;
( 5) the board of education was expanded from five to six
members;
(6) each board member would be elected at-large, by
majority vote, for one of two numbered posts created iu each
of the three wards, with runoff procedures identical to those
applicable to city commission elections;
(7) board members would be required to reside in the
wards from which they were elected;
(8) the terms of the two members from each ward would be
staggered.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires preclearance by the Attorney Genera] or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of auy change in a
"standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," 42
U. S. C. § 1973c (1976), made after November 1, 1974, by
jurisdictions that fall within the coverage formula set forth
in § 4 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973b (b) (1976). In
1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered
jurisdiction under the Act, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, and the
municipalities of that State must therefore comply with the
preclearance procedure, United States v. Board of Comrnib's·iorrers of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U, R 110 ( 1978) ,
·

;,

'!

1840-0PINION

ClTY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

It is not disputed that. the 1966 changes in Rome's electoral
system were within the purview of the Act. E. g., Allen v.
State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) . Nonetheless,
the city failed to seek preclearance for them. In addition, the
city did not seek preclearance for 60 annexations made
between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975, even
though required to do so because an annexation constitutes a
change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to
voting" under tlw Act., Perk1:ns v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379
(1971) .
In June 1974, the city did submit one annexation to the
Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General
discovered that other annexations had occurred. and, in
response to his inquiries, the city submitted all the annexations and the 1966 electoral changes for preclearance. The
Attorney General declined to preclear the provisions for
majority vote, numbered posts, and staggered terms for city
commission anu board of education elections, as well as the
residency requirement for board elections. He concluded that
.in a city such as Rome, in which the population is predominately white and racial bloc voting has Leen common, these
electoral changes would deprive Negro voters of the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The Attorney
General also refused to preclear 13 of the 60 annexatious in
question. He found that the disapproved annexations either
contamed predominately wh1te populations of significant size
or were near· predominately white areas and were zoned for
residential subdivisiOn development. Considering these factors in light of Rome's at-large electoral scheme and history
of racial block voting, he determined that the city had not
carried its burden of proving that the aunexations would not
dilute the Negro vote.
In response to the city's motion for reconsideratiou, the
Attorney General agreed to clear the 13 annexations for school
board electiOns, He reasoned that his disapproval of the 1965

\, .
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voting changes had resurrected the pre-existing electoral
scheme and that the revivified scheme passed muster under the
Act. At the same time, he refused to clear the annexations
for city commission elections because, in his view, the resi~
dency requirement for city commission contained in the pre~
existing electoral procedures could have a discriminatory
effect.
The city and two of its officials then filed this action, seek~
ing relief from the Act based on a variety of claims. A threejudge court, convened pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (a)
and 1973c (1976), rejected- the city's arguments and granted
summary JUdgment for the defendants. 472 F. Supp. 221
(DC 1979). We noted probable jurisdiCtion, 443 U, S. (1979) , and uow affirm.
II
We must first address the appellants 1 assertion that, for
two reasons, t.h1s Court may avoid reaching the merits of this
action,

A
The appellants contend that the city may exempt itself
from the coverage of the Act. To _evaluate this argument, we
must examine the provisions of the Act in some detail.
Section 5 of the Act requires that a covered jurisdiction that
wishes to enact any "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on
November 1, Hl64," must seek preclearance from the Attorney
General or the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. 42 U, S. C. § 1973c ( 1976) 1 Section 4 (a) of
1

In Its entiret), § 5 provide~ ·
''Whenever a State or politwal subdivisiOn witl1 respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of th1s title based upon de~
tPrminations made under the fir~1. ~entence of ~ectwn 1973 (b) of this
title are l11 effect shall enact or sePk to adrmm~ter any voting qualification or prerequiRite to votmg, or staJ!dard , practice, or procedure
with respeef to voting diff('rrnt. from that m force or effeet, on Novem'
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the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1976), 2 provides that the
preclearance requirement of § 5 is applicable to "any State"
that the Attorney General has determined qualifies under the
her 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions ~et forth in ~,;ectwn 1973b (a.) of this title
based upon determinations madP under the second sentence o( section
1973b (b) of this title are in effrc1 shall enact or serk to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to votmg, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from thnt in force
or effect ou November 1, 1968, or wlwnever a. State or political subdivision with respect to whiCh the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a)
of this title based upon delerminntions made under the third sentence
of section 1973b (b) of th1s title are 111 effect :ohall enact or seek to
admimster any votmg qualificatiOn or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect fo votmg diffen·nt. from tlult
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may
institute an aciwn in the United Stn.tes District. Court. for t.he District
of Columbm for a dC'claratory JUdgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or almdgmg the l'ight to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravcutwn of th(' guarantees seL
forth in sectwn 1973b (f) (2) of tl1is title, and unlrss and until the court
enters such Judgment no pen.;on shall be d('nied the nght fo vote for
failure to comply w1th such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure : Provided, 'I11at such qualification, prereqm~ite, standard, practice, or proc£>dure may be £>nforced without such proceeding
if the qualification, prer£>qni:oit£>, standard, practice. or procedure has
been submitted by the chi£>f legal officer or other appropriate official
of such State or snbdiviswn to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not. interposed an objectiOn within sixty days after such
submission, or upon good cause :-;hown, to facilitate an expedit£>cl ap- '
proval within 8ixty days after such :-;ubmission, the Attornt'Y General
has affirmatively mdicated that. ~nch objPction will not be made. Nei-·
thor an affirmative mdication by tht> At.t omey General thaL no objection will be made, nor the Attorney G£>neral's failure to obje<'t, nor a
declaratory judgment. entered undPr thP ~ectwn shall bar a. ~ubsequcnt
action to enJoin enforcement of such qualificatiOn, JW<'requi;,;ite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day peri:od followmg receipt of a. submi~siou, the At.t orney General mcly reserve! Foot111J{r .'? IN on p. 6']
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coverage formula of § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) (1973), 8
and to "any political subdivision with respect to which such
determinations have been made as a separate unit." As we
the right to re-examine the submissiOn if additional information comes
to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which
would otherwise reqmre objection in accordance with this section. Any
action under this ;:;ectwn shall be heard and determined by a court · of
three judges in accordancf' w1th the provisions of sectwn 22154 of Title
28 and any appeal shall he to the Supreme Court." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c
(1976).
2 In its entirrty, § 4 (a) provides:
"To assure that the right of citizens of the Umted States to vote is
not drnwd or abndged on account of race or color, or in contravention
of the guarantPcs srt forth in Rubsection (f) (2) of thu; sechon, no citizen
shall be demrd t·he righL to vote in nny Federal, State, or local election
because of hi~ failure to comply with any test or device in any State
with respect !o which the dctermmationR have beeu made under the
fir::;t two senteJJC<!t> of sub~ect10n (h) of this sect.Jon or m any political
subdivision with respect to which such determinations ha.ve been made
as a separat.e nnit, unles::; the United States District Court. for the Di::;~
triet of Columhw, in an achon for a declaratory judgment brought by
such State or subdivision against, the United States ha:> determined that
no such test or device has been used during the seventeen years pre~
ceding the filing of the action for lhe purpose or with the effect of denying or abndging the ngh! to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantee~ set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this
section . Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shnll il:lsue with
respect to any plamtiff for a period of ::;evente<,n years after the entry
of a final Judgment of nny court of the United Statrs, other than the
denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered
prior to or after the ennctrrwnt of tlus subchapter, determining that
denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account. of race or color,
or in contravention of the guarantees HeL forth m i:iub::;ection (f) (2) of
this section through the u:>e of ;;nch tests or devices ha,ve oecurr·ed anywhere m the terntory of such plamtiff. No Citizen ;;hall be denied the
right to vote m any Fedt>ral, State, or local electiOn because of his failnre to comply with any tei:it or device in any 8tate with rrspect to wluch
the determina twn::; have been made under the third Hmtence of subsection (b) of this 8cct10n or m any politiCal ~ubdivi~ion with respect
t o whwh such determinatwns have been made as a separate umt, unless .
(Puotuote 8 is on p. 8]

.....
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have noted, the city of Rome comes within the preclearance
requirement because it is a politwal unit m a covered jurisdiction, the State of Georgia. United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama., 435 U. S. 110 (1978).
the United States District Court for the District of Colnmbia in an action
for a declaratory Judgment brought by such State or subdivision against
the United State1:1 has determined that. no such test or device has been
used during the ten year8 ]Jrecedmg the fi ling of the action for the
purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on accoum of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in .,;ubsrctwn (f) (2) of this ;,;ectwn : Provided, That no such
declaratory jndgment, shaJl i~sue w1th respect t,o any plaintiff for a
period of ten year::; after tl1e entry of a final judgment of any court of
the United States, other l han the denial of a declnratory judgment under
this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment of this
paragraph, determining that. denials or abndgments of the right to vote
on account of mce or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in subsectiOn (f) (2) of this section through the use of teAts or devices
have occurred anywhere m the territory of such plmnt1ff.
An a.ct10n pursuant to thi;; sU:bsectwn ::;hall be heard and determined
by a court of three judgrii m accordancr with the proviswns of section
2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall he to the Supreme Court. The
court shall retain JUrisdiction of any actiou pursuant to this subsection
for five years after judgment and sha11 reopen the action upon motion
of the Attorney General allegmg that a test or deviCe has been used
for the purpose or w1th the effect of denying or abndging the nght to
vote on account, of race or color, or in coutrnventwn of the guarantees
set forth in sub~echon U) (2) of this secnon .
If the Attorney General determme:s that he ha::; no rruson to believe
that any such teRt or devwc has been used durmg the seventeen years
preceding the filing of an action under tlw firl-'t sentencr of this subsection for the JJilflJOI:le or with the effect or denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees ~et forth in subsection (f) (2) of tln~ sectwn, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment.
1f the Attorney General determmes that he ha:; no reason to believe·
that any such test or dev1ce has bern usrd during the ten year::; preceding the tlling of an actwn under the second sentence of this subsection
for the purpose or with the effect of denymg or abndglng the right to
vote on account o( race or color, or 111 eontravenhou of the guarantee~

;.
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Section 4 (a) also provides, however, a procedure for exemption from the Act. This so-called "bail out" provision allows
a covered jurisdiction to escape the ..prcc1earance r<>quircment
of § 5 by bringing a declaratory JUdgment action before a
three-Judge panel of the V nited States District Court for the
set forth m :;uh:;ertion (f) (2) of this Hl'rtJOn, hr shall ronHent. to the entry
of ::;uch judgment.'' 4:2 U. S. C.§ H)73 (b)(n) (l!:l7fi) .
:J In its entirety, § 4 (b) provtder,
"The provision;; of :,;ub~:~ection (a) of this sectwn shall apply in any
State or m any political subchvunon of a state winch (1) the Attorney
eletwral determine:-; maintamecl on November 1, 1964, any teRt or ci('VICe,
ami with rr~pect to winch (2) the Dtreetor of the Cpn:-;us detenmnes
that les::; than 50 prr centum of the per:-;ons of votm11: age re:;iding
therem were rrgt::<trred on Nowmber 1, 1964, or that lr:;H than 50 per
centum of such per:;ons votrd 111 tlw prr>'tclentwl election of Novrmber
1964. On and after August 6, 1970, 111 additiOn to any Statr or political
subdtvi::;JOn of a State detrrmined to ll<' subJrct to ~ubsrction (a) of this
section pmsuant. to the prrvtous ~rntrncr, the provi~:~wm; of sub~rctwn
(a) of thts 1:>Pct10n ;;hall apply m any State or any polthcal subdtvtSIOrt of
a State whtch (i) t.Jw Attornry General drtrrnmw~ mamtauwd on Novembrr 1, 1968, :my t<>~t or device, and wtth r·espert to wluch (n) the
I>irector of the Crnsus drtrrminrs that leks than 50 prr centum of the
persons of voting age rr~iding then•in were rrgi::;tered on November 1,
1968, or t.Jmt le;;s than 50 per centum of such persons votrd 111 thr presiden!Jal election of November 1068. On and aftc•r August G, 1975, in addttion to any State or pohtreal subdtvtflton of a St.atc detrrmined to be
subject to subsrction (a) of tlu,; 8eetwn pur~uant to the previous two
sentences, the provtHto!l~ of i:(Ub;;rction (a) of lht~ Hrctwn ~hall apply m
any State or any polltical subdivt~JOn of a State wluch (t) the Attorney
0eneral detrrmme,; mamtamrd on November 1, 1!:!72, any test or device,
and with respect to whrrh (11) thr Dtrector of thr Crn::;u;;; detemunes
that less than 50 per cPntnm of the cthzrn:; of votmg age were registered
on November 1, 1!:!72, or that le:-;::; than 50 per centum of Huch pcr:-;ons
voted m the Prektdl'ntta! elretwn of Novrmber 1!:!72.
" A determmatwn or crrtttieation of the Attorney GruPral or of the
Director of the Cl'nt<u,; under tlu::; ::;cction or under ~ectron 197:3d or
1973k of thrs tttlr ,;hall not he reviewable Ill any court and shall be
effective· upon puhhcat.wn m thP FPrlernl He!J:t~1cr." 42 ll S C § 19730.
(b) (1976) •

...
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District of Columbia and proving that no "test or device" 4
has been used in the jurisdiction "during the seventeen years
preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the
effect of denyiug or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color.'' The District Court refused to allow the city to
" bail out'" of the Act's coverage, holding that the political
units of a covered jurisdiction cannot independently bring a
§ 4 (a) bailout action. We agree.
In the terms of § 4 (a), the i~e tll[Q,S on whether the city
is, for bailout purposes, either a "State with respect to which
the determinations have been made under subsection (b) of
this section" or a "political subdivision with respect to which
such determinations have been made as a separate unit," the
"determinations" in each instance being the Attorney General's decision whether the jurisdiction falls within the coverage formula of § 4 (b) On the face of the statute, the city
fails to meet the definition for either term, since the coverage
formula of ~ 4 (b) has never been applied to it. Rather, the
city comes within the Act because it is part of a covered
State. Under the plain language of the statute, then, it
appears that any bailout action to exempt the city must be
fi~y, anQ_ seek~"@ o1, the State of Goorg_ia.
The appellants seek to avoid this conclusion by relying on
our decision in Un£ted States v. Board of Commissioners of
Sheffield, Alabama, supra. That decision, however, did not
even discuss the bailout process. In Sheffield, the Court held
that when the Attorney General determines that a State falls
within the coverage formula of § 4 (b), any political unit of
4 Section 4 (e) of the Act provides:
"The phrase ' test or device' shall mean any requirement that a person
as a prerequisite for votmg or registration for votmg (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, wnt.e, understand, or mterpret any matter, (2) d<'monstrate
any educational achi<'vement or· his knowledge of any particular subject,
(3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his quahfications by the
voucher of registered voterio or members of any other class." 42 U S. c.'
l973b (c) (1976).

•
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the State must preclear new voting procedures under § 5
regardless of whether the unit registers voters and therefore
would otherwise come within the Act as a "political subdivi~ion." 5 In so holding, the Court necessarily determined that
the scope of ~§ 4 (a) and 5 is "geographic" or "territorial,"
id., at 120, 126. and thus that, when an entire State is covered.
it is irrelevant whether political units of it might otherwise
come under § 5 as "political subdivisions.'' I d., at 126-129·.
Shl}ffield, then, did not hold that cities slJJl.h. as Rome are
~'political subdivisionS" nder §§ 4 and 5. Thus, our dedsion
in that case is in no way inconsistent with our conclusion that,
under the express statutory language. the city is uot a "political subdivision'' for purposes of § 4 (a) "ba1l out.''
Nor did Sheffield suggest that a municipality in a covered
State is itself a "State'' for purposes of the § 4 (a) exemption
procedure. Sheffield held that, based Oll the structure and
purposes of the Act. the legislative history, and the contemporaneous interpretation of the Attorney GeneraL the ambiguities of ~ ~ 4 (a) and 5 should be resolved by holding that
§ 5's preclearance requirement for electoral changes by a covered "State'' reached all such changes made by political units
in that State. See id., at 117-118. By contrast, in this case
the le islative history precludes an ar ument that § 4 (a)'s
bai1_9ut proce~. made ava1 able to a covered "State," ~s
also implicitly made available to political uni .in the State.
The
onumttee eport stated :
"This opportunity to obtain exemption is afforded only
to those States or to those subdivisions as to which the
formula has been determined to apply as a separate unit;
5

SectiOn 14 (c)(2) of the Ael providrs:
" The term 'politi!'al subdivision' shall mean any county or parish,
except that where registration for votiug Is not conducted under the
supervision of a. county or puriHh, the ferm shall lnclnclc any other sub~
division oi a Stale which conduct~'! regi~tmtJon for votmg " 42 U S. C~
§ 19731 (c) (2) (1976 ) •

... ··.
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subdivisions within a State which is covered by the for~
mula are not afforded the opportunity for separate exemption." H . R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14
(1965).
The Senate Committee 1s majority report is to the same

effect~

awe are also of the view that an entire State covered by
the test and device prohibition of section 4 must be able
to lift the prohibition if any part of it is to be relieved
from the requirements of section 4." S. Rep. No. 1621
(Pt. 3) , 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 ( 1965) o
See also id., at 21. Bound by this u11ambiguous congressional
intent, we hold that the cit,y of Rom«:> may not use the bailout.
procedure of § 4 (a) .6
6 We also reject the appPllants' argument that the majority vote, runoff'
election, and numbered posts provisions of the c1ty's charter have already
been precleared by the Attornry General because in 196S the State of
Georgia submitted, and the Attorney General precleared, a comprehensive
Municipal Elect~wn Code t11at is now Title 84A of the Codr of Georgia.
Both the relevanL regulation,· 28 CFR § 51.10 (1978), and the decision
of this Court require that. the jurisdictiOn 11 in some unambiguous and
recordable manner ~ubmit any legislation or regula.tion in que8tion directly
to the Attomey General wit11 a request for his considenttion pursuant
to the Act, '' Allen v. State Boa1'd of Elections, ;393 U. S. 571, ·574 (1969) ,
and that the At1orney General be afforded an adequate opportunity to
determine the purpose of the electoral changes and whether they will
adversely affect, mmority voting in that jurisdJCtJOn, 8ee United States v.
Boar·d of Cmnrnissioners of Sheffield, Alabama.. 485 U. S. 110, 137-188
( 1978) . Under this standard, the State's 1968 :;ubmission cannot be viewed
as a subm1sSJOn of the city'R 1966 elf'ctoral changes, for, a<> the District
Court noted, the State's submissiOn mformed the Attorney General only
of "its decis10n to defer to local charters and ordmancE's regardmg rna.
jority votmg, runoff elections, and numbered po:;;ts," and "d1d not .. :
submit in an 'unambiguous and recordable manner' all municipa.l char.t er
provisions, as written in 1968 or as amended thereafter, regarding these
issues." C'.t!! of Rome v. Umted State..~. 472 F . Supp 221, 283 (DC'
"1979) .
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B
The appellants next argue that its electoral changes have
been precleared because of allegedly tardy action by the
Attorney General. On May 24, 1976, the city asked the
Attorney General to reconsider his refusal to preclear the
electoral changes and the 13 annexations. On July 14, 1976,
upon its own accord, the city submitted two additional affidavits. The Attorney General denied the motion to recon,~
sider on August 12, 1976.
Section 5 of the Act provides that the Attorney General
must interpose objections to origmal submissions within ,60
days of their filing. ' If the Attorney General fails to make
a timely objection, the voting practices submitted become
fully enforceable. By regulation, the Attorney General has
provided that requests for reconsideration shall also be decided
within 60 days of their receipt. 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) (1978).8
If in the present case the 60-clay period for reconsideration ls
computed as running continuously from May 24, the date of
the initial submission of the reconsideration motion, the period
expired before the Attorney General made his August 12
response. ln contrast, if the period is measured from July 14,
the date the City supplemented its request, the Attorney Gen~
eral'g response wa.s timely.
The timing provisions of both the Act and the regulations
are silent on the effect of supplements to requests for reconsideration. We agree with the Attorney General that the
See n . 1, supra.
This regulatwn provide.;, :
"When the Attorney General object:; to a snbrnith•d change affecting
voting, and the ~u bmitting authority scekmg reconsidE'ration of ihe
objection brings additwnal mformatwn to the attention of the Attorney
General, the Attorney General shall decide withm 60 clay8 of receipt of a
request for reconsJderatwn (provided that hE' shall have at. least 15 days
following a conference held at the submitting authority's reqncHt) whether·
to withdraw or lo r.ontmue hJR objection '' 28 C'FH § 51.3 (d) (1978) .
'l
8

,,
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purposes of the Act and its implementing regulations would
be furthered if the 60-day period provided by 28 CFR § 51.3
(d) were interpreted to commence anew when additional information is supplied by the submitting jurisdiction on its own
accord.
The logic of Georgia. v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973),.
indicates that the Government's approach fully comports with
the Act and regulations. In that case, the Court examined a
regulation of the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 51.18 (a), that
provided that § 5's mandatory 60-day period for consideration
of original submissions is tolled whenever the Attorney General finds it necessary to request additional information from
the submitting jurisdiction. Under the regulation, the 60-day
period commences anew when the jurisdiction in question
furnishes the requested information to the Attorney General. The Court upheld the regulation, holding that it was
"wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act." I d., at 541.
Georgia v. United States stands for the proposition that the
purposes of the Act are furthered if, once all information
relevant to a submission is placed before the Attorney General,
the Attorney General is accorded the full 60-day period provided by law in which to make his "difficult and complex"
decision, id., at 540. It follows, then, that when the submitting jurisdiction deems its initial submission on a reconsideration motion to be inadequate and decides to supplement it, as
the city of Rome did m the present case, the 60-day period
under 28 CFR § 51.3d is commenced anew. A contrary ruling
would mean that the Attorney General would, in some cases,
be unable to give adequate consideration to materials submitted in piecemeal fashion. In such circumstances, the
Attorney General might be able to respond only by denying
the reconsideration motion. Such a result would run counter
t.o t.he rurpos~s of thP Act and regulations, since it would.

.
L
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penalize submitting jurisdictions that, have legitimate reasons
to file supplementary materials.~

III
The appellants raise five issues of law in support of their
contentiou that the Act may Ilot properly be applied to the
electoral changes and annexations disapproved by the Attorney General.

A
The District Court found that the disapproved electoral
changes and annexations had not been made for any discriminatory purpose, but did have a discriminatory effect.
The appellants argue that § 5 of the Act may not be read as
prohibiting voting practices that have only a discriminatory
effect. The appellants do not dispute that the plain language
of § 5 commands that the Attorney General may clear a practice only if it "does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color.'' 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1976) (emphasis
added). By describing the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive, Congress plainly intended
that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent. Our decisions have consistently interpreted § 5 in this fashion. Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976); City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U. S. 358, 372 (1975); Georgia v. United States,
411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,
387, 388 (1971). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the
Act prohibited both discriminatory purpose and effect when,
in 1975, it extended the Act for another seven years. S. Rep.
No. 94--295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1975); H. R. Rep.
No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1975) .
e Because of our resolution of thi:; is:;ue, we need not address the
Government's contention that the 60-day period providrd by 28 CFR'
§ 51.3 (d) is prrm1s:;ive rather than mandittory .

.
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Hi

The appellants urge that we abandon this settled interpretation because in their view § 5, to the extent that it prohibits
voting changes that have only a discriminatory effect, is
unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and congressional intent are plain, however, we are required to reject
the appellants' suggestion that we eugage in a saving construction and avoid the constitutional issues they raise. See, e. g.,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 499-501
(1979); id., at 508-511 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Instead,
we now turn to their constitutional contentions.

B
Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by
the Fifteenth Amendment. 10 The appellants contend that the
Act is uncOI{stfhttional ~ecause it exceeds Congress' power to
enforce that Amendment. They claim that§ 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination in voting,
and that in enforcing that provision pursuant to § 2, Congress
may not prohibit voting practices lacking discriminatory
intent even if they are discriminatory in effect. For purposes
of this case, we need not-and do not-decide whether § 1 of
the Fifteenth Amendment reaches only voting practices that
have a discriminatory purpose. We hold that, even if § 1 of
the Amendment prohibits only purposeiul discrimination, the
pri_or deci~Court fore~ose any argument that Qon- ;
gress may_pot, pu~ 2'; outlaw ~mg ..12~ctic~s that
are discriminatory in efl'ect.
~sking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v Katzeribach, 383 U. S.

--.....

----------

The Amendment providet:. •
"Section 1. The right of cit1zeus of the Umted State~ to vote shall nol be
denied or abridged by the United State~ or by any State or account of
race, color, or prevwus conditwn of serv1tude.
''Section 2. The Congress shall h~tve powrr to eiJforre this artier by appropriate leg:isla t10n."·
10
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301 (1966), in which we upheld the constitutionality of the
Act. The Court in that case observed that, after making
an extensive investigation, Congress had determined that its
earlier attempts to remedy the "insidious and pervasive evil"
of racial discrimination in voting had failed because of "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" in some
parts of this country. Id., at 309. Case-by-case adjudication
had proved too ponderous a method to remedy voting discrimination, and, when it had produced favorable results,
affected jurisdictions often "merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees." ld., at 314. In
response to tts determination that "sterner and more elaborate
measures'' were necessary, id., at 309, Congress adopted the
Act, a "complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas
where voting discriminatiou has been most flagrant, '' id., at
315.
The Court then turned to the question whether the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress to impose the rigors
of the Act upon the covered jurisdictions. The Court examined the interplay between the judicial remedy created by § 1
of the Amendment and the legislative authority conferred
by § 2 :
uBy adding this authorization [in § 2] , the Framers
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible
for implementing the rights created by § 1. 'It is the
power of Congress which has beeu enlarged. Congress
is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the
[Civil War] amendments fully effective.1 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the
courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in votiug." I d. , at 325-326 (emphasis ln original) .
Congress' authority u11der § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,.
we held, was no less broad than its authority under the Neces-
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sary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 421 ( 1819) . This authority, as applied by longstanding
precedent to congressional enforcement of the Civil War
Amendments, is defined in these terms :
" 'Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objects the l Civil War] amendments
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to
the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons
the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the
domain of congressional power.' Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. [339,] 345-346.'' South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, at 327.
Applying this standard, the Court held that the coverage formula of § 4 (b), the ban on the use of literacy tests and related
devices, the requirement that new voting rules must be
precleared and must lack both discriminatory purpose and
effect, and the use of federal examiners were all appropriate
methods for Congress to use to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. !d., at 329-337.
The Court's treatment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of
the Act's ban on literacy tests demonstrates that, under the
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices
tha.t have only a discriminatory effect. The Court had earlier
held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,
360 U. S. 45 (1959), that the use of a literacy test that was
fair on its face and was not employed in a discriminatory
fashion did not violate ~ 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In
upholding the Act's per se ban on such tests in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach , the Court found no reason to overrule Lassiter.
Instead, the Court recognized that the prohibition was an
appropriate method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
because for many years most of the covered jurisdictions had
irnposed &uch tests to, f!ffect, voting discrimination and the con-

•.

.'

78-1840-0PINION
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

18

tinued use of even nondiscriminatory, fairly administered
literacy tests would "freeze the effect" of past discrimination
by allowing white illiterates to remain on the voting rolls while
excluding illiterate Negroes. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. This holdiug makes clear that Congress may, under the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative
of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
Other decisions of this Court also recognize Congress' broad
power to enforce the Oivil War Amendments. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court held that
legislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 11 would be upheld so long as the Court could
find that the enactment "'is plainly adapted to [the] end'"
of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and "is not prohibited by but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the
constitution,'" regardless of whether the practices outlawed
by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection
Clause. !d., at 651 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, supra,
at 421). The Court stated that, '' [c] orrectly vit>wed, § 5 is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Ibid. Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court unanimously upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315, imposing a five-year 11ationwide ban
on literacy tests and similar requirements for registering to
vote in state and federal elections. The Court concluded that
Congress could rationally have determined that these provisions were appropriate methods of attacking the perpetuation
of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless of
whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provJdE>t> that, " [t]he Con~
shall have power t,o enforce, by appropri11te lrgit>latlon, the provisions·
of this arf.wl~."
·
H

gres~
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in efl'ect. See id., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.) ; id., at
144-147 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216-217 (opinion of
Harlan, J.); id., at 231-236 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and
MARSHALL, JJ.); id., at 282-284 (opinion of STEWART, J .,
joined by BURGER, C.-J., and BLACKMUN, J.). 12
..
It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves qo
not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions
attacking racial discrimination in voting are "appropriate," as
that term is defined in M cCiilloch v. Maryland and Ex parte
Virginia. In the present case, we hold that .tb,e...Act~l@l on
electoral changes that are discriminator in effect is an appropriate method o )romotin the purposes of the Fifteenth
A~, even if it is assume that § 1 of the Amenilment
prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress
could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes
by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional
racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful
discrimination/ 3 it was proper to prohibit changes that have
a discriminatory impact. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, at 335; Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 216 (opinion of
Harlan, J.). We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress'
considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have
a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing
States from "'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently
12

There wns no opinion for the Court. in thit; ca:::;e . Mr. Justice Douglas
the virw that the legislation in queo;tion was authorized under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112,
144-147 (1970) . The other eight. Members of the Court believed that
the Congre:ss had permis:::~ibly acted withlll the authority provided it by
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. ld., at 132-133 (opinion of Black,
J.); ·id., at 216 (opmion of Harlan, .J.) ; id., at 232-2;34 (opinion ofBHENNAN, WHITE, and lVIAH:::iHALL, .J.J.); id., at 283 (opin1on of STEWAH'l',
J ., joined by THE CHIEF Jut:~•nm: and BLACKMUN, J.) .
13 See South Car-olina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 335, and n . 47'·
(1966) (citing H. R. Rep . No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Se:ss. , 10-11 (1965) i'
S.. Rep. No. 162 (Pt.3),, 89tl~ Cong., M Seo;:::;., 8, 12 (1965)) .
.

expres~:;ed

'·
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won' by Negroes." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140
(1976) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
8 (1969) ).

c

The appellants next assert that, even if the Fifteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights
Act, that legislation violates princi,gles,.J.>f federalism articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833
(1976). This contention necessarily supposes that National
League of Cities signifies a retreat from our decision in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, S'upra, where we rejected the argument that the Act "exceed[s] the powers of Congress and
encroach [ es l on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution," 383 U. S., at 323, and determined that, "[a]s
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use
any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
of racial discrimination in voting," id., at 324. To the contrary, we find no inconsistency between these decisions. ·
In National League of Cities, the Court held that federal
legislatiOn ~ng mirlTinum wages and hours could not
constitutionally be extended to employees of state and local
governments. The Court determined that the Commerce
Clause did not provide Cougress the authority to enact legislation "directly displac[ing] the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," 426 U. S., at 852, which, it held, included employeremployee relationships m programs traditionally conducted
by States, id., at 851-852.
The decision in National Leag'ue of Cities was based solely
on an assessmeut of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and we explicitly reserved the question "whether
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of State governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as . ..
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." !d., at 852, n. 17" ·:The

~
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answer to this question came four days later in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). That case presented the issue
whether, in spite of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress had
the authority to bring the States as employers within the
coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and to provide that successful plaintiffs could recover retroactive monetary relief. 'The Court
held that this extension of Title VII was an appropriate
method of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment :
"[W] e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, . . . are
necessarily limited by the enforcement rovisions of ·5
of the Fourteenth mendment. In that section Congress
autfiOi:ity to enforce 'by appropriate
is expresSly gran
legislation' the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that
js plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant,
it is exercising that authority under oue section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, at 456,

tea

We agree with the court below that Fitzpatrick stands for
the proposition that principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily
overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislatiou.'' Those Amendments
were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power
and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state
and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act. 14 N ational League of Cities, then, provides no reason to
14

Tncleed,

--------------------------------------------JI
v. B it~er, 427 U, S, 445 (1976), strongly suggested
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78-1840-0PINION

22

CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

depart from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenba,ch that
"the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of
state power," 383 U. S., at 325, and that the Act is "an
appropriate means for carrying out Congress' constitutional
responsibilities," id., at 308,15
D

vi--

The appellants contend in the alternative that, even the
Act and its preclearance requirement were appropriate means
of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in 1965, they had outlived their usefulness by 1975, when Congress extended the
Act for another seven years. We decline this invitation to
overrule Congress' judgment that the 1975 extension was
warranted.
In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged
that, largely as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration
had improved dramatically since 1965. H. R. Rep. No. 94196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1975). Congress determined. however,
that "a bleaker side of the picture yet exists.'' H. R. Rep.
No. 94-196, supra, at 7; S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 13.
Significant disparity persisted between the percentages of
whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered
jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro
elected officials had increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held statewide office, and their
this result by citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966),
as one of several cases sanctioning
11
intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War amendments, into the
judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded on
the expansion of Congress' powers-with the correRponding diminution of
state sovereignty-found to be intended by the Framers and made part of
the Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments, a
phenomenon aptly described as a 'carving out' in Ex parte Virginia, [100
U. S. 339, 346 (1880)] .'' Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra., at 455-456.
15 See also Katzenbach v, Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 646-647 (1966).

;;·
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number in the state legislatures fell far short of being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered
jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority
political progress under the Act, though "undeniable," had
been "modest and spotty," extension of the Act was warranted,
H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, supra, at 7-11; S. Rep. No. 94-295,
S'upra, at 11-19.
Congress gave careful consideration to the propriety of
readopting § 5's preclearance requirement. It first noted that
"[i]n recent years the importance of this provision has become
widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving
minority political gains in covered jurisdictions." H. R. Rep.
No. 94-196, supra, at 8; S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 15. "'"
After examining information on the number aud types of submissions made by covered jurisdictions and the number and
nature of objections interposed by the Attorney General, Congress not only determined that § 5 should be extended for
another seven years, it gave that provision this ringing
endorsement:
"The recent objections entered by the Attorney General ... to Section 5 submissions clearly bespeak the continuing need for this preclearance mechanism. As registration and voting of minority citizens ·increases, other
measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength.
"The Committee is convinced that it is largely Section 5 which has contributed to the gains thus far
achieved in minority political participation, and it is likewise Seeton [sic] 5 which serves to insure that that
progress not be destroyed through new procedures and
techniques. Now is not the time to remove those preclearance protections from such limited and fragile success.'' H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, supra, at 10-11.
See also S. Rep. No . 94-295, supra, at 15- 19 ..

. ..
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It must not be forgotten that in 1965, 95 years after ratifica~
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote
to all citizens regardless of race or color, Congress found that
racial discrimination in voting was an "insidious and pervasive
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our coun~
try through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 309. In
adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to remedy
this century of obstruction by shifting "the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims."
I d., at 328. Ten years later, Congress found that a seven-year
extension of the Act was necessary to preserve the "limited
and fragile" achievements of the Act and to promote further
amelioration of voting discrimination. When viewed in this
light, Congress' considered detennination that at least another
seven years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter
the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive votiHg discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable. The extension of
the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment.
E
As their final constitutional challenge to the Act, 1.a the individual appellants argue that, because no elections have been
held in Rome since 1974, their First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendment rights as private citizens of the city have been
abridged. ln blaming the Act for this result, these appellants
identify the wrong culprit. The Act does not restrict private
political expression or prevent a covered jurisdiction from
holding elections; rather, it simply provides that elections may
be held either under electoral rules in effect on November 1,
1964, or under rules adopted since that time that have been
properly precleared. When the Attorney Gelleral refused to
We do not re<~rh thr merits of thr appellant.~ ' argument that the Act
the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justiciable. See, e. g., Baker· v.. Carr,. 369 U. S. 186 (1962') .
10

violate~:>
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preclear the city's electoral changes, the city had the authority
to conduct elections under its electoral scheme in effect on
November 1, 1964. Indeed, the Attorney Genera.! offered
to preclear any technical amendments to the city charter
necessary to permjt election£ under the pre-existing scheme or
a modification of that scheme consistent with .the Act. In
these circumstances, the city's failure to hold elections can
only be attributed to its own officials, and not to the operation
·of the Act.

IV
Now that we have reaffirmed our holdings in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that the Act is "an appropriate means for
carrying out Congress' constitutional responsibilities" and ·is
"consonant with all ... J'>rovisions of the Constitution," 383
U. S., at 308, we must address the appellants' contentions that
the 1966 electoral changes and the annexations disapproved by
the Attorney General do not, in fact, have a discriminatory
effect. We are mindful that the District Court's findings of
fact must be u·pheld unless they are clearly erroneous.

A
We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in
finding that the city had failed to prove that the 1966 electoral changes would not dilute the effectiveness of the Negro
vote in Rome. 17 The District Court determined that racial
bl~g_ existing in J1ome. It found that the electoral
changes from plurality-win to majority-win elections, numbered posts, and staggered terms, when combined with the
presence of racial bloc voting, Rome's majority white population, and at-large electoral system, would dilute Negro voting
strength. The District Court recognized that, under the preUnder § 5, the city bears the burden of proving lack of discrimina~
tory purpose and effect. Bee1· v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140-141
(1976); Geor-gia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973); South
(JarolirW, v. l(atzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966) .
17

'

"
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existing plurality-win system, a Negro candidate would have
a fair opportunity to be elected by a plurality of the vote if
white citizens split their votes among several white candidates
and Negroes engage in "single-shot voting" in his favor. 18
Tfhe 1966 change to the majority vote/runoff election scheme
significantly decreased the opportunity for such a Negro candidate since, "even if he gained a plurality of votes in the
·general election, [he] would still have to face the runner-up
white candidate in a head-to-head runoff election in which,
given bloc voting by race and a white majority. [he] would
be at a severe disadvantage." City of Rome v. United States,
472 F. Supp. 221, 244 (DC 1979) (footnotes omitted). 10
1s Single-shot voting l1as been dPscribed as follows:
"Consider [a.] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election to choose four council members. Each voter is nble to cnst four
votes. Suppose there are eight white candidates, witl1 the votes of the·
whites split among them approximately equally, and one black candidate,
with all the blacks voting for him and no one else. The ref'ult is that
each white candidate receives nbout 300 vot.cs nncl tho black cnnclidate
receives 400 votes. The black has probably won a seat. This technique
is called single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a minorit~r group
to win some at-large. seats if it concentrates its vote behind a limited
number of candidates and if tho vote of the majority is divided among a
number of ca.ndidates."
U . S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years
After 206-207 . (1975).
1'0 The District Court found that Rome's Negro citizens believed that a
Negro will nevrr be elected ns long as the city's present electoral system
remains in effect. City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226
(DC 1979) . Only four Negroes have ever sought elective office in Rome,
and none of them wnR elected. The campaign of the Rev. Clyde Hill,
who made the strongest showillg of the four, indicat('S both the presence
of bloc voting in the city and the dilutive effect of the majority votE/
runoff C>!ection scheme adopted in 1966. The city's elections were operated
under that schrme when Rev. Hill ran for the board of education in 1970.
With strong support from t.lw Nrgro community, Rev. Hill ran again~t
three wtute opponents and received 921 votes in the general election, while
his opponents received 909, 407, and 143 vote;;;, respectively. Rev. Hillt
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The District Court's further conclusion that the city had
failed to prove that the numbered posts, staggered terms, and
Board of Education residency provisions would not have the
effect of forcing head-to-head contests between Negroes and
whites and depriving Negroes of the opportunity to elect a
candidate by single-shot voting, id., at 245, is likewise not
clearly erroneous. 20 The District Court's holdings regarding
all of the 1966 electoral changes are consistent with our statement in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), that
"the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting
procedure changes would be made that would lead to retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral process."
then, would have been rlectrd under the pre-1966 plurality-win voting
scheme. Under the majority-win/ runoff election provisions a,dopted in
1966, however, a runoff election was hE'ld, and the white candidate who
was the runner-up in the general election defea.ted Rev. Hill by a vote
of 1409-1142.
2o In so holding, the District. Court relied on thi;; analy~is by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights :
"'There are a nurriber of voting rules which have the effect of frustrating single-shot voting. . . . [I]nstead of having onr race for four
positions, there could be four race;:;, each for only one position. Thus for
post no. 1 there might be one black candidate and one white, with the
white winning. The situation would be the same for each post, or seata black candidate would alwn~·s fn,ce n, white in a head-to-head contest
and would not be able to win. There would be no opportunity for singleshot voting. A black still might win if tlwre were more than one white
candidate for a post, but this possibility would be eliminated if there was
also a majority requirement.
"' [Second,] each council member might. be required to live in a, separate
district but with voting still at large. Thi~-ju:;t like numbered postsseparate:;; one conte~t into :1 number of individual rontc~t
"' [Third,1 the term:; of council member:;; might be staggered. If each
membrr hal' a 4-year tenn and one mrmber is elected eaC'h year, then
the opportunity for single-~hot voting will never ari:se.'" City of Rome v.
United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 244, n. 95 (DC 1979) (quoting U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights, supra n. 18, at 207-208) .
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The District Court also found that the city had failed
to meet its burden of proving that the 13 disapproved
annexations did not dilute the Negro vote in Rome. The
city's argument that this finding is clearly erroneous is severely
undermined by the fact that it failed to present any evidence
shedding meaningful light on how the annexations affected the
vote of Rome's Negro community.
Because Rome's failure to preclear any of these annexations caused a delay iu federal review and placed the annexations before the District Court as a group, the court was
correct iu concluding that the cumulative effect of the 13
annexations must be examined from the perspective of the
most current available population data. Unfortunately, the
population data offered by the city was quite uninformative.
The city did not present evidence on the current general population and voting-age population of Rome, much less a breakdown of each population category by race. 21 Nor does the
record reflect current information regarding the city's registered voters. The record does indicate the number of Negro
and white registered voters 111 the city as of 1975, but it is
unclear whether these figures included persons residing in the
annexed areas in disputr.
21 In City of Rtchmond ' · United States, 422 U . S. 35R (1975), and
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC' 1972) , summartly aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), evidruce of thr racml rompos1tion of
the general populatiOn wa::; used to asses,; the 1mpact of nnnexatwm; on the
import<mce of the Negro votr in the commnmty. Tins mformntion, when
coupled w1th datn on the racial compositwn of the commumty's votingage population, provide::; more probative rvidence m ::;uch <'H::iPH than does
voter registratiOn data, which may peqwtuate the effect:< of prwr dlscrnninatwn 111 the rrgiHtration of voter:<, EltJ v. Klahr, 40:~ l'. S. 108, 115,
n. 7 (1971). Bunk~ v. Richardson, :384 U. S. n, ~)2-9:3 (1966), or reflect
a belief among tlw Negro population that it cannot elect a candidate of
its choice, d . n. 19, supra. Current voting-age population dahL are probative because the · indiC'atc the electoral pot ential of thP minority
community.
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Certain facts are clear, however. In February 1978, the
most recent date for which any population data was compiled,
2,58~ whites and only 52 Negroes resided in the disapproved
annexed areas. Of these persons, 1,797 whites and only 24
Negroes were of voting age, and 823 whites and only 9 Negroes
were registered voters. We must assume that these persons
moved to the annexed areas from outside the city, rather than
from within the preannexation boundaries of the city, since
the city, which bore the burden of proof, presented no evidence
to the contrary.
The District Court properly concluded that these annexations must be scrutinized under the Voting Rights Act. See
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 388-390 (1971). By
substantially enlarging the city's number of white eligible
voters without creating a corresponding increase in the number
of Negroes, the annexations reduced the importance of the
votes of Negro citizens who resided within the preannexation boundaries of the city. In these circumstances, the city
bore the burden of proving that its electoral system "fairly
reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after
the annexation[s] .'' City of Richmond v. United States, 422
U. S. 358, 371 (1975). The District Court's determination
that the city failed to meet this burden of proof for city commission elections was based on the presence of three votedilutive factors: the at-large electoral system, the residency
requirement for officeholders. and the high degree of racial
bloc voting. Particularly in light of the inadequate evidence
introduced by the city, this determination cannot be considered to be clearly erroneous.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
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v.
States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
United States et al
[December -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term ustate"
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court

concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds,
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this
case. Ttl Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15o/o of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia·
Assembly established a majority vote requireme11t for the City
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num-
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bered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a
net decline of 1% in the b1ack share of Rome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration dunng the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by b1acks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community/' and actively seek black political support. 3 Id.,
1

As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increast-d the Board
of Education from five to six members, eased voter regi~tration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
221, 224 (DC 1979) .
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the c1ty's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 82J
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
1978. See Brief for United State~, at 38, n. 26.
8 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the tran81t system
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." I bid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue
were of vacaut land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning. Again this
background, I address the substantive questions posed by this
case.
II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern·
ment. 472 F. Supp., at 225.
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3. supra. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. 4
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may· bail out so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5
4

Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U . S. C.
§ 1973c. The admini~trntive procedure is 1l8Cd mno:>t cxclu~ivt>ly, since
it takeR lrss time.
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part:
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United Statrs to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vole in any Fedeml, State, or local election because
of his failure to comply with an~· trst or device ·in any State 1cith 1·espert
to which the determinations have been made unde1· the fi1'st two sentences of subdivision (b) of this section 01' in any political subdivision
with 1·espect to which such determinations have been made as a sepamte
unit, unless the Unitrd State;,; DiHtrict Court for the Dl:>trict of Columbia
in an action for a dpc]aratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision againo;t the United States has determined that no such test or
device ha~ been UHed during the o;rventeen yrars precrding the filing of the
action with lhl' purpo~e or with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on nrcount of race or color.. .." 42 U. S. C . § 1973b (a) (emphasis supplied ) .
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition. 0 Thus
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. /d., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in §' 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are located in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 7 Yet the only
6 Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subject to the Act ir
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance reqmrement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1973b (b), 1973c.
1 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C. A.

78-1840-DISSENT

8

CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. ·The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as
Rome are 'political subdivisions~'' or "States," but merely subjected such entities to the preclearance requirement of ~ 5;
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-.
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry,
McKinley and Ote1'0 Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three countie8); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out m 1972,
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a Distnct Court
found that the Stnte had conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC
.Tan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (i974) (referring to Torres Y. Sachs,
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973))
Bailout was denied in one action involvmg a local subdivisiOn, Gaston
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners,
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC
Nov. 8, 1977); Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 752170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States~
' C. A. No . 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969)) .

..
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Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its fac~.
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); Un,ited States v.
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaniug
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.J'
Gooding V, United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J, dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.

III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of~ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. · Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
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gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing
those deprivatioi1s until the entire State of Georgia satisfies
the bailout standards of § 4 (a).
When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates · serious federalism concerns.
I d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).8
That encroachment is especially troub1ing because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity. 9 Unless the federal structure proOther Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting);
Allen v. State Boa1·d of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) ; see also Georgia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting) .
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the
States, is protected by the principles of federalism .
9 The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassite1· v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) .
ThiR Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. B1·adley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of schools through tlwir elected representar8
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vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that l the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d.,
at 330.10
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public hou,;ing project ''ensures that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ...
and to lower tax revenues" ). Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of ;:;tate and local governments.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n 8, 426 U. S., at 855;
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) .
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the
coverage formula in the fact th;Jt there wa~ no evtdence of " r~ent ractat
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." I d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
di~rrimination

involving tests or df'vices" in Stair.~ or subdivisions exempted from prrrlearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black':; view t.hat
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their
rare." I d., at 122. See icl., at 146 (Douglas, .J.); id., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension
of those few literacy te~t~ still in use, see id., at. 147 (Dougas, .J.), without providing any bmlout-likr opt-ion. In contraRI, prrrlearance involves
a broad restramt on all state and local voting pract1res, rrgardles;, of
whether they have been, or even rould be, 11sed to cll:scriminatc •

..
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it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This
outcome makes every city and county in G~orgia a hostage to
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.11 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has
succeeded in bailing out-A1aska in 1966, and again in 1971.12
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people aud 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Comt's position dictate:; this eccentric re:;ult
by insisting that subdivi:;ions in covered States can be relieved of preclearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A
rational approach wo11ld treat the states and local governments independently for purpose~ of bailout.. If Hubdivir:;ion~ in Georgia. wen· free
to seek bailout on their owu, then a bailout action by the State could
propt>rly focus on thr State's voting policieo;. Then, If Gt>orgia were
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to :;ubdivisions
that by their own noncomphancr met fhe coverage rriteria of § 4 (b) .
Of cour;:;e, the situation would be different if the State had contributed,
overtly or covertly, to t'he o;ubdivi;:;ion's failure to comply.
12 Alaska v. United States, · c. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
Alaska v. United State~. C . A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension . The 1975 extension of the Act abo re-e::;tablished
coverage of Alask<t, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action) .
One other State-Virginia-has nttemped to bail out under § 4 (a) .
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F . Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aft''d, 420 U. S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virgmia did not
sati~fy § 4 (a) becau~e a state literacy te!:it admini:;tered in some localities
betwt>en 1963 and 1965 wa:; di~cnminatory in the context of the inferior
education off~>red to Virginia blaC'k::; in certain rural counties before that

pe-riod:,
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approximately five million people and 877 local governments. 13
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally neccessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption,js restri.cted to those governments
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the .presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as
action by Congress· at the limit of its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out. the statute oversteps those limits. For
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court.u
13 The Solicitor General states that Gt>orgia. has 159 counties, 530
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the changE' might be to discrimination in voting. Brief of United StatE's, Avpendix, at 1a.
14 On a practical level, the District Court argut>d that since morE' than
7,000 subdivisions currt>ntly art> required to prt>clPar voting change:;, bailout suit;; by a small perct>ntagE' of tho~!' subdivi~ion~ would ~wamp that
court. Ante, at - . In viE'w of the acknowledged ditficultie::; that confront a local government in srt>king bailout in tht> District of Columbia,
it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the cjourt p_.
would t>ver open. Such suits, involving substantial exprnse as well as
uncertainty, would not likely bt> initiatrd unless tht>re wert> a sub::;tantiai
11
likelihood of succt>ss. Moreover, the <;/ourt'~ argumt>nt ignores the proce-X...
durt>s of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) direct:; the Attorney Gent>ral not to
contest bailout if he finds that the state or local governmt>nt has not used
a discriminatory test or devicr over the preceding 17 yt>ars. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a) . In fact , the Attorney General consented to bailout in the
nine actions under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only threE' bailout
~>nits havE' gone to trial. St>f' 1111. 7 and 1:3, supra. Thm; thr Department
of Justice, not thr courts, would shoulder much of the added burdf'n that
might ari:;e frcm rrcognizing a bailout right for govt>rnmmts likE' the city
of Rome. That burdrn could hardly be more ont>rous than the Attonw,v
Gent>ral's present re:;pon:;ibility for prrclearing all voting changes in 7,000
subdivision:; . In the fir:;t six month~:; of 1979 over 3,200 such voting·

..
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IV
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way p€rhaps
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.

changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25
per working day. Letter to .To~eph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III,
Assi~tant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of
Ju~tice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c.
These a:stoni~hing figure,.; compare unfavorably with those cited by MR.
JUI:l'riCE STEVENS in hi;; Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of
the Attorney General's review of preclearance reque:;t;; that then were
llf1'iving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8,
10. See Berry v. Doles, 43R U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .T., concurring).
It hardly need be added that no ~enior officer in the Jwotice Departmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg·
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employee,; of the federal
bureal.\cracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing.
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MR.

dissenting.
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State"
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield) . Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffi.eld but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.
JUSTICE POWELL,

][

Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds,
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15 % of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action affecting voting. First, in H)6() the Georgia'
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City
Commission and the Board of Educatiou , and rcduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members ~:.
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for nun/

/
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bered postsV Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the
addition.al white ~oters in the annexed land had cau~e_d j1
net dechne of 1% m the b1ack share of Rome's electorateV _
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education na.rrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected offic"ifr'al of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the lack
community/' and actively seek black political support a /d.,~

~of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board

of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration requireand shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
221L?24 (DC 1979) .
~ The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 8n
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
197 . See Brief for United State::;, at 38, n. 26.
The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to
upgrade some black neighborhoods," ha.s subsidized the transit s y s t e /
men ~ ,
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruliug on the t>Vidence is clearly
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court. have departed from the ori ina!
understanding of the Act's purpose and meauing.
gain this
background, I address the substantive questions posed by this

II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
~
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court...............
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern~
ment. 472 F. Supp ., at 225.
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3. supra.. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provisJOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voti~·actice without the prior approval of
federal authorities.A~
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may · bail out so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers
ba~k to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i)~
''in
any State" reached by ~ 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit."

6

/{)'

~Section

:...:=:-------

5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia. for a ruling that
the voting change h; acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c. The admini::;tm1ive procedure i~; used nmo;;t excluKively, sine~
it takes less time.
/.') ~Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part:
To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of his failure to comply with an~· test or device in any State tt•ith respect
to which the deterrnination.s have been made under the first two sentences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a s e p a r a t e /
unit, unless the United States Di~;trict Court for the District of Columbia
in an action for a. declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision again::;t the United States has determined that no such test or
device ha::; been used during the ,;eventeen yeHrs preceding the filing of the
action with the purpo~P or with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.. , ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (emphasis supplied).

0

lY

V
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities 110w must review all changes
in local votmg rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. /d., at 125-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in ~ 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situatiou and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the coutrast between the
~
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local govemments that are lo~
cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions~ Tit
only

me

(f)

~Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subjPct Lo the Act ir
the Director of tho Census finds that less than 50% of the Pligible population volPd in the last prPsidential election, and the AttornPy General
determines that a discriminatory "test or devwe" wa<> mumtained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, wh1ch arp unreviewablr, t r i g - /
ger the application of the prrclearanco requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1973b (b), 1973c.
J... Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C A.
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North .Carolina to bail out but
denying a similar privilege to a, subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. ··· The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for
~
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as
Rome are 'political subdivisions' '' or "States.'' but merely sub~
jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of ~ 5;
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at--.
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); Ne'W Mexico , Curry,
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three counties) ; Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Se'pt. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Catalina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county) ; Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972,

Ne'W York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court
found that the State had· conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating the Act. Ne'W Yor-k v. United States, C. A. No. 2419...:71 (DC
.Tan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (referring to 'l'or-res v. Sachs,
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973) ).
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston
County, Nor-th Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners,
El Paso County, Colorado v. Un-ited States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No . 752170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States;.
' C. A. No . 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969) ) .

..
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Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should contr·ol
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of
fairness, if Rome must preClear it must also be free to bail
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its fac~.
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v.
Oregon, 366 U. "S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute."
Gooding v. U·nited States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all politi~ubdiv...k
sions that exercise control over elections.~cc;dingly, there
is no basis for the majority's reliance on ongressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city c a / 1
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.

0".:iJ

III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of~ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. · Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Cou~
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gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J .,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteeuth Amendment provides no authority for continuing . ~
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies ~
the bailout standards of § 4 (a) . [
When this Court first sustain~';} the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was 11 an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
I d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
11
the statute:s encroachment on state sover~ignt~ is s1g~1i~can~
t !'}:'"
and undemable." 435 U. S., at 141 (d1ssentmg opmwn). ~
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroy
local control of the means of self-go"\Ternment one_ of the...cen:.
tral values of our polityi: Unless the federal structure pro-

-@

ther Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 358 (Black, J ., concurrmg and dis.~enting);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J ., concurring and dissentmg) ; see also Georgia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., di8senting) .
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted tha~ because political subdivi.sio.ns "d~rive .their authority~
and power from their respective Stateo;," their mtegtlty, hke that of the
Sta.t-es, is protected by the principles of federalism.
J.. The federal system allocates pnmary control over elections to state
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J .) ;
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.) ; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) .
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of'
preserving local cont rol of local matter:,. Sec Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local school::; " would de"'
prive th<> people of control of school:, through their elected repre::;entar-

]E/-£ "'cw- .t'

-ii..

~UW>A"""- ~ 1"' "'tr-·-ui.-i ~

ffJc,.._.~ ~ ~s4"'-';.,l~ I~S~ ruUf-<:JJ ~ -h.:s- CAS/!/
r lb. ~-r ~ ~ ~n~ ~S'~ ffw/1; 11~~.

~"'l<f ~ IJ tOv r ~~ ~ ~~ se-.....-t.

l
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vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course withm the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearauce, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in ~ 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d.,
at 330.
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public houo;ing proJect "ensures that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures . . .
and to lower tax revenues") . Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of :;tate and local governments.
See National League of G-itie8 v. Usery, supra n 8, 426 U . S., at 855 ;
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) .
'7\ The Court found important confirmation or the rationality of thecoverage formula in t11e fact thut there wao; no ~v1dence of " recent rac1at
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period] ." I d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
t.musual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option~
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act'5
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
di~rrimination

involving test~ or drvires" in Rtatr,; or subdivi~ions rxempted from prr('learnnce. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a s1milar approach when it affinned the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n . 9. The entll'e Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view thaL
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discrimina.t ory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voterR on account of their
rare." !d., at 122. See icl., at 146 (Douglas, J.); ul., at 216, [Uld n. 94
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supportE'd temporary suspen.·ion
of those few literacy teHts f'till in use, see id., at. 1-17 (Douga:-, J.), with out providing any ba.ilout-likr opt.ion. In contrn;:t, pr<>rlearance involve~
a broad rest ra.int. on all stat.<' and local voting prartH'P:>, rpgardle;., of
whetlwr they have bf'(•n, or ev('ll rould be, UHCd to cl1:-rrimmate.
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it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This
outcome makes every city and county in G~orgia a hostage to
errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.
Since the statute was enacted, only one State has .R}----succeeded in bai1ing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.~~
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
-,rTr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this eccentric re~ulL
by insisting that ~ubdivi:;ions in covered States can be relieved of preclearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
C!I-St serious doubt 011 the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A
rational approach wonld treat the states and local government:; independently for purpo se~ of bailout.. If subdivi::;ions in Georgia were free
to seek bailout on their own, tlwn a bailout action by the State could
properly focus on tlw State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia were
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to :;ubdivisions
that by fheir own noncomphance met fhe coverage rnterin of § 4 (b) .
Of cour~e, the situation would Of' different if the State had contributed,
tly or covertly, to t'he subdivi::;ion's failure to comply.
:Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
ka v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972) . Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-establi:;hed
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action) .
One other State-Virginia-has attemped to bail out under § 4 (a) .
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not
~
satisfy § 4 (a.) becau~e a state literacy test administered in :;orne localitie~
between 1963 and 1965 wa:; di:-;cnminatory in the rontext of the inferior
education offered to Virgi.oia blacks in certain rural counties before that

rerioct,
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approximately five million people and 877local governmentsF
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally nee~
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumptionjs restri.cted to those governments
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
be seen, as the South Carolioo v. Katzenbach Court saw it, -as
action by Congress- at the limit of its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For ~
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court.,

~

ha~

countie~,

)f'The Solicitor General states that Georgia
159
530
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions 'that now mu~t preclear every
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to diHcrimination in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at 1a.
"-)If On a practical level, the District Court argued that ~ince more than
7,000 i:iubdivi~ions currently are required to preclear voting change,, bailout suit:; by a ::;mall percentage of those subdivil:lions would :;wamp that
court. Ante, at - , In view of the acknowledged difficulties that confront a local governmrnt in sreking bailout in the Di~trict of Columbia,
/J
it i;; by no means self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the c/ourtJ.. .L '
would ever open. Such suiti:i, involving substantial exprni:ie as well as
uncertainty, would not likely be initiated unle;;;; therP were a sub::;tantial
/1
0
likelihood of i:iUCcess. Moreover, the rourt'i:i argument ignores the proce-~.L·
dures of a bailout suit. Srction 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to
conte:;t bailout if he find::; that the statr or local government has not used
a discriminatory test or device over the preceding 17 years. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General con::;ented to bailout in the
nine actwns under § 4 (a) that have sucreeded, whilP only threp bailout
~;uits have gone to trial. SeP Ill!. 7 and 1:3, o'Upra. Thu:; the Department
of Ju::;ticP, not thP court:;, would shouldPr much of the addPd burdPn that
might arise frcm rrcognizing a bailout right for govprnrncnt:; likf' the city
of Home. That burden could hardly be more onprou:; than the Attorney
Genpra]'s present reHponsibility for prPclearing all voting changes in 7,000
subdivision~ . In the first l:lix months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting·
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IV
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.

changes were :submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25
per working day. Letter to .lo~eph W. Darn from Drew S. Days III,
As,;istant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of
,Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c.
These astonishing figures compare unfavorably with thosr cited by MR.
Jus·rrcE S'I'EVENH in hio Sheffield di:ssent, where he que:;tioned the efficacy of
the Attorney General':; review of preclearance reque;;t!> that then were
nr.•iving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S., at 147-148, and nn. 8,
10. See Berry v. Doles. 43R U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .T., concurring).
It hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Ju;;tice Departmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personto~l judgment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions
and State:; are finally judged by unidentifiable employee:; of the federal
bureaucracy, ust1ally without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State"
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the
preclearance requirmhent. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffi(ld but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds,
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated. by the facts of this
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia'
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num,.
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bered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com·
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu·
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encoura.ged blacks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern·
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community," and actively seek black political support. 8 !d.,
1 As part of the package of revisions, the A8sembly increased the Board
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
221, 224 (DC 1979) .
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26.
3
The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the transit system
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, 11ine of the annexations at issue
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court. have departed from the original
understanding of the Act's purpose ami meaning. 1 Against
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by
this case.
II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal government. 472 F. Supp., at 225.
4
The Court·~ opinion simply ignores the most relevant facts. In so \
doing, the Court avert~ its eyes from the central paradox of this case:
Even though Rome hns met. every criterion !'!:itablished by the Voting
Right!:i Act for protrcting the political rights of minoritie::~, the Court holdEJ
that. the city ~ust remain subject to pr('Clearance.
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finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color."' Ibid. The District
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3. supra. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. 5
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 0
5 Srction 5 permits two methods of preclt>arance.
A local government
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C.
§ 19nc. The administrative procedure i~> used amost exclusively, since
it takes less time.
6 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part:
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of his failure to comply with an:v test or device in any State 11•ith 1·espect

to which the determinations have been made under the fi1·st two sentences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with respect to which such dete1·minations have been made as a separate
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or sub-
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition .7 Thus
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con"trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. Id., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
§ 4 (b) , and those of covered local governments that are lodivision against the United States has determined that no such test or
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the
action with the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.. .." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (emphasis supplied) .
7 Under § 4 (b ), it State political subdivision is subjrd to th~.> Act if
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1973b (b ) , 1973o.
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cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 8 Yet the only
difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as
Rome are 'political subdivisions'" or "States," but merely sub8 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oldahoma v. United States, C. A.
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry,
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-60 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
32~6 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties) . Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972,
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419--'71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC
Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (19'74) (referring to Torres v. Sachs,
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. '1!1, 1973)) .
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston
Count·y, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), and three
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissionersr
El Paso County, Colomdo v. ·United States, C. A. ·No. 77-0185 (DC'
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 752170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v United States;
C. 'A: No.1702.!....(i6; (DC Sept. 26, 1969).)1 ..

78-1840-DISSENT
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

7

jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5;
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-.
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face.
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v.
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.·"
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise coutrol over elections.\) Accordingly, there
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.
0 This construction applies to polit.ical subdivision;; dPfined by § 14 (c)
(2) of the Art, 42 U. S. C.§ 1973 (c) (2), aH wPII ns to gowrnments like
RomP thnt do not fnll within thP ::;tatutory dt•finition . Thu;;, undPr
Sheffield'~ statutory interprPtatiott all ,;ubdivi,;ion~ in States <·ovrrPd by
the Act should bP entitled to bail out. Thr eon::;titutional analy::;is of
Part III, infm, rrarhP~ the r;ame conclusion.
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III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. Under§ Z of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. s·. 301, 327- 328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 667 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies
the bailout standards of§ 4 (a). 10
When this Court first sustained· the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power."· South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S:, at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
Id., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion). 11
4

10 In view of tht> narrower forus of my appron ch to tlw statutory and
con:-:i itutional isHueo; rai::ll"u in this cn.se, I do not reach the broad analysis
offc•red by Mn . J usTICE HEHNQUrs·r 's dis~ent .
11 Other Ju ~ tices have Pxpreo;~t>d the same conct>rn .
E. g., So·uth Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 35S (Black, J :, concurring and dissenting);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J. , concurring and dissenting); see all:lo Georgia v. United States,
411 U. 8 . 526, 545- (1973) (POWELL, J ., dissenting).
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisions " derive their authority
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the
States, is protected by the principles of federali sm.

I
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity.12 Unless the federal structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
The frdt>rnl systrm allocates primary control over elections to state
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, .J.); LCU3siter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959).
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of
preserving local control of local matter~. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of school~ through their elected representatives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures . ..
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n . 8, 426 U. S., at 855. ~
I(Jovle v Oklahoma, 221 U S 559, 565 (1911)
12
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." 1d.,
at 330. 13
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized.
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could bl"
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowleclgiug the> possibility of oV<'rbreadth. tlw Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." !d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term ''overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
The Court, found important confirmation of tlJC ra tionalii.y of the
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions exempted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voter;; on account of their
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J.); id., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That l1istory supported temporary suspension
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dougas, J.), without providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, pn•clearance involves
a broad restraint on all sta.t e and local voting practic<>s, regardless of
whether the:y have been, or even could be, used to di::;crimina.te.
13
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preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.14 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.:1 5
14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.
The Court's position dictates this eccentric result
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of preclearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
:which rould not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A
rational approach would treat the ~tates and local governments independently for purJ1oses of baHout.. If ;;ubdivisions in Georgia were free
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could
properly focus on the State's voting policie;;. Then, if Georgia were
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to subdivisions
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b).
Of course, the situation would be different if the State had contributed,
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply.
:ts Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action).
One other State-Virginia-has at.temped to bail out under § 4 (a).
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not
~~ti&fy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test administered in some localitie~
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That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's ·ao2;ooo people and 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
_approximately five million people and 877local governments 16
Today's ruling therefore will ·seal off the coi1stitutionally neccessary sa.fety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
be seen, as the South CarOlina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif..
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court/7
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior
education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that
period.
16 The Solicitor General statPs that Georgia has 159 counties, 530
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every
voting ehange, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimi~
nation in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la.
17 On a practical level, the District Court argued that :since more than
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting change", bail~
out suit" by a small percentage of tho:>e ::nibdivi:sions would swamp that
court. Ante, at - . In view of thP acknowlPdged difficulties that confront a local governmPnt in :sePking bailout in the District of Columbia,
it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgate,.;" perceived by the court
would ever open. Such "uits, involving sub,tantial expense as well as
uncertainty, would not likely be initiated unles~ there were a substantial
likelihood of :>ucce"s. Moreover, the court's argument ignore" the procedure~ of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney Geiwral not to
contest bailout if he finds th,~t the state or local government haR not u,e!f
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IV
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.
a discrnmnatory

!e~t

or device over the preceding 17 year:;;.

42 U. S. C.

§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General ron~ented to bailout in the
nine action~ under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout
suits have gone to tnal. See 1111. 7 and 13, supra. Thus the Department
of J u~tlce, not the courts, would :,;boulder much of the added burden that
might arllil' from recogmzing tt bailout right for government;; likf' the city
of Rome. That burden could hardly bf' more onerous than the Attorney
General's present re~ponsibility for prPclraring all voting changPs in 7,000
subdivisiOns. In the fir;;t ;six montht> of 1979 over 3,200 ~uch voting
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a ratP of more th<m 25
per working day. Lettt•r to .Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights DiviHion, U. S. Department of
Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), repnnted iu Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c.
These astom:,;hmg figures compare unfavorably with thosr cited by MR.
JU::>TICE S·rEVENS m lm; Sheffield dissent, where lw que~t ioned thr efficacy of
the Attorney General'::- review of preclearance requests that then were
ar:oiving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S .. at 147-148, and nn. 8,
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .J., concurring).
H hardly need be addrd that no ~enior officer Ill the J usttce DPpartmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judgment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal
bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing•
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,...J-__,~-~~--·rs ago this Court held that the term State"
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in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
11
State" when it comes to an action to 11 bail out" from the
preclearance require1hent. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffif{ld but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds,
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this
case. In Rome, a city of-about 30,000, approximately 15% of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia'
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of
the. Board of Education are chosen from ea£h ward : or " /
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bered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com·
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu.
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device . . . as a prerequisite to voter
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters).
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern·
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community," and actively seek black political support. 3 Id.,

~

1. As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp.
221, 224 (DC 1979) .
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26.
3
The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effo:S~e:
/
upg<odo .ome black no;ghbo<hoode," h., rub,;d;eed the tnnffit ' /
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded three times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is cleaily
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning. 4 Against
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by
this case.
II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preClearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the
~
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S.
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Cour~

C:

which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal government. 472 F. Supp., at 225.
4 The Court's opinion simply ignores the most relevant facts.
In so
doing, the Court averts its eyes from the central paradox of this case:
Even though Rome has met every criterion established by the Voting
Rights Act for protecting the politjcal rights .of minorities, the Court holds:
that the city ·
· must remain subject to preclearance.

'

I
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finds that in that jurisdiction no utest or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color:-'' Ibid. 'The District
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by§ 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. 5
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
available to '~tate or subdivision," language that refers
ba.ck to tbe provisi~n's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in
_____any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in an~
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit."/
5 Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attorney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c. The administrative procedure is used amost exclusively, since
it takes less time.
6 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part :
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with 1·espect
to whicfi the determinations have ·been made undm· the ji1·st two sentences of suo eli vision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separatl!
unit, unles:; the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
in an action for a declamtory judgment brought by such State or sub/

.J
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition:' Thus
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned th~t by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. Id., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are lo- ~

~-

division against the United States has determined that no such test or
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the
action with the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color...." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (emphasis supplied) .
1 Under §"4 (b), astate) political subdivision is subject to the Act if
the Director of the Censu;'linds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1973b (b ), 1973o.

J
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cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub ..
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 8 Yet the only
difference between those governments and the city of Rome
in which Rome is located is itself subject to
is that the State
.
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in.North Carolina -to bail out but
de!J.ying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the· bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force'' of this argument. ·The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as
Rome are 'political subdivisions'" or "States," but merely sub~

.

8 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C. A.
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry,
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. ·752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elrno1·e County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties) . Three counties in New York City ·bailed out in 1972,
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419--'71 (De Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating tbe Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DG
Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 ·u. S. 888 (1974) (referring to Torres v. Sachs,
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. '1!1, 1973)) .
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), and three·
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissionersr
El Paso County, Colorado v. ·United States, C. A. ·No . ·77--0185 (DC"
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75~
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United Statest
' C. :A•.No. "1702-66 (DC Sopt. 26, 1969)).
/

'18-1840-DISSENT
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

.,

jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5;
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-.
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face.
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v.
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 ( 1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a he1pfu1 guide to the meaning
/_
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the p1ain language of the statute."
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting) .
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a,): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections.\) Accordingly, there
is no basis for thelt~'tr's reliance on congressional statements that are incons1s nt with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city can
__.-demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.
~
This construction applies to political subdivisions defined by § 14 (c)
(2) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (c)(2), as well as to governments like
"--\" !Rome that, do not fall within ... bi atutory definition . Thus, under
Sh-effield's statutory interpret.atio.!!)"all subdivi:oions in States covered by
the Act should be entitled to bail out. The constitutional analysis of
P<trt III, infra, r·eaches the same conclusion.
0

..
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III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con.
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. · 'The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. ·Under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383' U. S'. 301, 327-328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies
the bailout standards of 4 (a) .10
When this Court first sustained· the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power."· South Carolina v; Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S:, at 334'. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
ld., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 43'5 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion). 11

s

l

In view of the narrower focus of my approach to the statutory and
issue::; raised in this cm;e, I do not reach the broad analysis
offPred by MH. JusTrcE REHNQUrs•r's dis::;ent.
11 Other Justices have expresHed the same concern . E. g., So'Uth Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 ; 358 (Black', J:, concurring and dissenting);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U: S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Geo1·gia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545· (1973) (PowELL, J., dissenting).
In National Leag'Ue of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority
and · power from their respective Sta.tes," their integrity, like that of the ·
States, is protected by the principles of federalism;
10

con~tit.utional
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity.u Unless the federal structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like ·any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) .
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public housing project "ensures that all the peop1e of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures .. .
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n. 8, 426 U. S., at 855;
!Qo..11le v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) .
12
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantia1 voting discrimination in recent years." l d.,
at 330.13
The Court in South Carolina v. .Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth. tlw Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." !d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
13 The Court, found important confirmation of the rationality of the
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions exempted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, J.) ; id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHI1'E, and MARSHALL, JJ.);
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dougas, J.), without providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclearance involver5
a broad rest raint on all sta.te and local voting practices, regardless of
whether they have been, or even could be, used to discriminate.
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preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclea.rance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria,. This
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.14 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971,1 5
14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this eccentric result
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of preclearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
:which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A
rational approach would treat the statPs and local governments independently for purposes of bailout. If subdivisions in Georgia were free
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could
properly focus on the State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia were
entitled to bail out, preclearance would cont.inue t.o apply to subdivisions
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b).
Of course, the situation would be different if the State had contributed,
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply.
15 Alaska v. United States, C . A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
Alaska v. United States, c·. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action) .
One other State-Virginia-has aLtemped to bail out under § 4 (a).
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC
1974) , aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 (1975) . The court held that Virginia did not
s~tis.fy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test adrninli:;tered in some localitie~

j
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That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's ..302;ooo people and 60 subdivisions,
is a f~r cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
. approximately five million people and 877local governments lil
Today's ruling therefore will ·seal off the constitutionally neccessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes 'by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is -restricted to those governments
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
be seen, as the South Caro'lina v. Katzenoach Court saw it, as
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif,.
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District
~
Court.17
~
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior
education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that
period .
16 The Solicitor General statrs that Georgia has 159 counties, 530
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimination in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la.
1 7 On a practical level, the DistriC't Court argued that since more than
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes, bail.9llt suits by a small percentage of those subdivisions would swamp that
' court.
. In view of the acknowledged difficulties that confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District of Columbia,
it is by no mean~ self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the court
would ever open. Such suits, involving substantial expense as well as·
w1certainty, would not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial
:likelihood of succes:::. Moreover, the court's argument ignores the procedures of a bailout suit. Sect10n 4 (a) dirPcts the Attorney GenPral not to
contest bailou1 if he finds that the state or local government'has not used

J
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IV
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way/perhaps~
this case could be viewed as one where the CoJr\'s ends ....
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small mty in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the F i f t e e n t v
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.
a discrimmatory

te~t

or device over the preceding 17 year::.. 42 U. S. C.

§ 1973b (a) . In fact, the Attorney General consented to bailout in the
nine actwn:; under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout
suits have gone to trial. See nn. 7 and 13, supm. Thus the Department
of Just1ce, not the courts, would ~boulder much of the added burden that
might arilse from recogmzing a bailout right for governments like the city
of Rome. That uurden could hardly br more onerous than the Attorney
Genrral's pre~ent re:;poni:libility for prec!Parmg all voting change:; in 7,000
subdivis10n:s. In thr fir:st :six month:; of 1979 ovrr 3,200 :such voting
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of morr than 25
per working day Letter to Joseph W. Darn from Drew S. Days III,
Assistant Attorney General, Civll Rights Division, U. S. Department of
Ju:;tice (Aug. 3, 1979), repnnted in Brief for Petitioner:;, App. C, at 1c.
These a:;tomshmg figures compare unf<worably with thosr cited by MR.
Ju~:>TICE S'l'EVENS in his Sheffield dissent, whPre hP que~t10ned the efficacy of
the Attorney General's review of preclearance requests that then were
ar:oiving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8,
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowELL, .J., concurring).
It hardly need be added that no :;enior officer in the J ushce Departmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg~
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. ·Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivision~
and States are finally judged by umdentifiable employees of the feder~~

1

/

bureaumoy, u•u.Jly without anything "'"'mbling an ovidontiory h o a r i n /

To: ~' '·
lh'
1.1 r.

,: ,
,

••

..

··• . .1o.an

t ·! r H~ .~T,e<W&rt

tl !' . ' us t. ·, :)'3

.ru ~ i, l.t) .a

~~lite

~.n~ha.ll

'tr. .JmJt l oe 'Bla.okmun
M-r. Jus ticA Rab.nq,uist.

Mr. Juatioe Stevens

-... · Justice Powell
From.. u-

4-8- 0
3rd DRAFT

Ci rculated:-------------APR 9 1980

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrr~1jYSTATES:
No. 78-1840
City of Rome et al., Appellants,] On Appeal from the United
v.
States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
United States et al.
[December -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Two years ago this C'ourt held that the term ",'tate" in
\ , 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures.
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield) . Today the Court
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent.

I
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds,
t he need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 th e Georgia
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new
arrangement, three city commissioners and two memhers of
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num-
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bered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But
~ of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 19.78 the
additional white voters in the anne;xed lan.d had caused .f'!.
ne~ decline of 1 ro in the blacJ<: share of !tome's electorate. 2
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of
fact. Tha~ court made a finding that Rome has not employed
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter
registration during th~ past seventeen years," and that "in
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting
in ~ome." 472 F , Supp. ~1, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to
run for office, th~Lt there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters) .
Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected officials of
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black
community," and actively seek black political support.3 !d. ,
As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration requirements, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F . Supp.
221, 224 (DC 1979) .
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975
voter registration totals. 'Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26.
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to
upgra:de some black neighborhoods," has S\~bsidized the transit ·system
1
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can
probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Ibid.
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a
black candidate running under the challenged election rules
commanded thre, times the share of votes that the black
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies
of the holding below because they highlight how far the
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original
understanding of the Act's purpose and meauing."' Against
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by
this case.
II
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout" ) in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a) . Bailout must be granted if the District Court
which has a predominantly bla ck ridership, and has hired a number of
of bla cks for skilled and supervisory p ositions in the municipal government. 472 F . Supp ., at 225.
4 The Court '::; opinion Himply ignorf>s thf> most relevant facts.
In so
doing, t.he Court awrts its Pyes from the central paradox of this case :
F.wn though RomP has mrt. every crilPriou e.~ tabli s h r d by the Votmg
Rights Act for protecting the polincal rights of minorities, the Court holdt:>
that 1h(· <'it · mu~t remain ~ ubj ect to prccleanlll ce.

I
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finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.'' Ibid. The District
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political
life. See pp. 2-3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of
federal authorities. ~
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court,
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its
Rtate remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout
\available to 11 such Rtate or subdivision." language that refers
hack to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests ( i) 11 in
any State" reached by ~ 4 (b) of the Act. or (ii) uin any
political subdivision'' which is covered ''as a separate unit." 0
" Section 5 permits two nwthod::- of prrclrarancr. A local iJ:Ovrrnmrnt
the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that
the vot.ing change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the Attome~· General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. R. C.
§ 1973r. The admmistrativr procedure iR URed amost exclusively, inre
it takl•,.: lPSs timr.
~ Sretion --l (a) provide,.: in rrlevtmt part:
" To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is
not drnied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be·
drnied t,he right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because
of hi~ fajJmr to eomply w1t h any test or device m any State with res peel
to which the determinations have been made under the first two senlences of subdivision (b) of thtS section or in any political subdivtSion
'tl'ith respect to which such determinations have been made as a sepamte
•twit. nnlt>ss the United States Distriet Court for the District of Columbia
lu an artiou for !\ dechlrator · judgment, brought hy such State 01' SHb·ma~· a~k
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b),
this case concerns the first category in that definition.' Thus
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b).
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ba.n
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance.
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the
Act. Id., at 126-127.
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the
statute to irrationality.
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by
~ 4 (b). and those of covered local governments that are lodivision against the United States has determined that no such test or
device has been u~ed during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the
action with the purpose or with the eiiect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color... ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (emphasis supplied) .
7 l ' m!N §-!(b), a St.ate or political subdivi,;ion ii> ~ubj('C't to thr Act if
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible population voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trigger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U S. C.
§§ 1973b (b) , 1973c.
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cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight subdivisions in tho latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions. 8 Yet the only
difference between those governments and the city of Rome
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bailout criteria.
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as
Rome are 'political subdivisions' " or "States," but merely sub8 Counties of Choctaw and i\1 cCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States.
. A.
No . 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry,
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 752125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23,
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No.
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Coconino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966)
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972,
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a Distnct Court
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC
Jan . 18, 1974-) , aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 ( 1974) (referring to 'l'orres v. Sachs,
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)) .
Bailout was denied in one action involving a locaJ subdivision, Gaston
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U . S. 285 (1969), and three
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners,
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C A. No .· 77-0185 (DC
Nov 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 752170 (DC May 25, 1976) ; Nash County, North Carolina v United States,.
C. A: No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969) ).
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jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5;
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at - .
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face.
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v.
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute."
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections.9 Accordingly, there
is no basis for the Court's rdiance on congr('ssional state- '
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same
section must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout.
0 Thi~ construction applies to political subdivisions d<•fi.nrd hy § 14 (c)
(2) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (c) (2), as well as to governmt'nt::; like
Romp 1lwt do not. fnll within that ~tat11tor~· dpfinition. Thu~ , und<>r \
8heffiP!d '~ ~tatutor~· interpn·tat.ion, all ~nhdivision~ in StHtP.-< cov<•rpd by
the Act. should be ent itlt>rl to bail out. The <:Oll~>titut ional atlaly:-;i:; of
Pa.rt III, infra, reachcl:l the same conclusion.
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III
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a)
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered
under the Act. Under§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South
' Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 327-328 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies
the bailout standards of§ 4 (a). 10
When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns.
!d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield,
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion). 11
In view of the narrower focus of mr approach to the statutory and
itiSU<'S raitied in this ca.~e, I do noL r<.'ach t be broad analyt'is
offerrd by l\ln . .TU:>'l'ICE REHNQUrS'r's dis;:cnt.
11
Other ,Ju~tices have <.'xpre~sed the :same concern E. g., South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J ., concurring and dissenting);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring and di senting); see also Georgia v. United States,
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n . 20 {1976),
the Court noted that because political subdivisiOns "denvc their authority
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the
States, is protected by the prmciples of federali'illl.
10

con~titutional
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity. 12 Unless the federal structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own
democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to
chart policy.
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new
12

The frderal system allocates primary control over election::; to ::;tate
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.);
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.) ; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) .
This Court has emphasized the importance in a. democratic society of
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives") ; James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ...
and to lower tax revenues") . Preservation of local control, naturally
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n , 426 U. S., at 855 ;
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U S. 559, 565 (1911 ) .
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." ld.,
at 330. 13
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized,
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact
did not continue or materializf' during the prescribed period.
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth. the Act
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." I d., at 331.
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing
13

Tlw Court found important confirmation of the ralionalit.,v of the
coverage formula in the fact thaL there was no evidence of "recent racial
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions e empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331.
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell,
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that
the congressional action was ,iustified by the "long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J .) ; id., at 216, and n. 94
(Harlan, J.) ; id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ;
zd, at 284 (S'l'EWART, J.) . That history supported temporary suspensiOn
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id. , at 147 (Dougas, J.), withonL providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, prrclcarance involve.
n broad restraint on all stat.e and local votmg practices, regardless · o['
whether they have been, or even could be, used to cli~criminate.
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preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute.
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not
have direct control over their city's voting practices until
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word
<~State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and
every one of its politica1 subdivisions meets those criteria. This
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.n Since the statute was enacted, only one State has
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971. 15
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Cour1's position dictalrs this rccentric result
by msisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of preclearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State
which could not bail out d u\' 10 the failings of a single subdivision. A
rational approach would trrat the states and local governments independently for purposes of bailout. If subdivi ' ions in Georgia were free
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could
properly focus on the State's voting policies. Thm, if Georgia were
entitled to bail out., preclearance would conti11ue to apply to subdivisions
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b) .
Of cour;:;e, the situation would be different if the State had contributed,
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply.
15 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966);
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972) . Alaska's
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in
the 1970 extension . The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit.
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No . 78...()484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of action) .
One other State-Virginia-has attemped to bail out under § 4 (a) .
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F . Supp. 1319 (DC
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 {1975). The court held that Virginia did not
atisfy § 4 (a) · because a state literacy test administered in some localities
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That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions,
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions,
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's
approximately five million people and 877local governments 16
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally neccessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act.
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption
against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may
be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as
action by Congress at the 1imit of its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court. 11
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the contexL of the mfenor
t>ducation offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that
pPriod
1 '; The Solicitor General states that Georgia has 159 countH·.•. 530
mumcipali ties, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every
voti ng change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimination in voLing. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la.
17 On a practi cal Jevt>l, thl' District Court argut>d that simP more than
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes, bailout suits by a small percentage of tho;;e ;;ubdivisions would swamp that
('C\ll'l.
.J'/2 ~'. Supp .. at. ~;{l-2;l2. In view of tht> acknuwlrdgt'd difficultiP;o; '
that. !'Oill'ront. :L lo<"al gowrnnwnt in ~Pt•king bailout in tlw Di~trirt of Colu111hi:1. it i~ b~ · 110 mra11~ ,;plf-r\·idt>nt that thr "rloodgatp~" JH'J'('l'ivt>d by tlw
c·O ill't· would rvC'I' O]Wil. ~urh ,-uit:<, involvinp; substa ntial <'Xpt•nse as w('i[ as
unrerlainty , would not likely be initiated unl ess therP were a ~ ub sta nlial
likl'lihood of succrss. Moreover, the court's argument ignores tlw procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to
contest bailout jf he finds that the state or local government has not used
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IV
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, perhaps
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the
Act's requirements. Neither the Fratners of the Fifteenth
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights
Act could have intended that result.
a discriminatory test or device over the preceding 17 years. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General consented to bailout in the
nme actions under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout
suits have gone to trial. See nn. 7 and 13, supra. Thus the Department
of Justice, not the courts, would shoulder much of the added burden that
might arise frcm recognizing a. bailout right for governments like the city
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than the Attorney
General's present responsibility for preclearing all voting changes in 7,000
subdivisions. In the first six months of 1979 over 3,200 ::mch voting
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a. rate of more than 25
per working day. Letter to Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of
Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App . C, at lc.
These astonishing figures compare unfavorably with tho~e cited by MH.
JusTICE STEVENS in his Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of
the Attorney General's review of preclearance requests that then were
amving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S., al 147-148, and 1111. 8,
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 200-201 (POWELL, J., concurring) .
It hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Justice Departmentmuch less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judgment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisiOns
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal
bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling a.n evidentiary hearing
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. dissenting.
~~
We have only this Term held that the city of Mobile does ~
not violate the Constitution by maintaining an at-large system of electing city officials. Oity of Mobile v. Bolden,- ~~~-I
U. S. (19-) . This result is reached even though the ~ --~
black residents of Mobile have demonstrated that racial "bloc"
'"" ~~· ~ _.
voting has prevented them from electing a black representa- ,_.,.,..._,... ~
tive to the city government. The Court correctly •concluded I It~ -I- I r':!-.
that a city has no obligation under the Constitution to ~ ~
_
structure its representative system in a manner that maxi- _a
L1 1
mizes the black community's ability to elect a black repre- ~ .'-V
sentative. Yet in the instant case, the city of Rome is pre- ~\J
vented ~, from instituting precisely the type of structural
changes which the Court says Mobile may maintain con- .a-c:-~ ,
sistently with the Civil War Amendments because Congress ~
has prohibited these changes under the Voting Rights Act as
~
an exercise of its "enforcement" power conferred by those ~
Amendments.
....__ ------.
.
1t is not necessary to hold that Congress is limited to ~ ~
merely providing a forum in which aggrieved plaintiffs may
assert rights under the Civil War Amendments in order to ~
disagree with the Court's decision permitting Congress to k ~ ~
. strait-jacket the city of Rome in this manner. Under § 5 '~j ...--:_ ,-~ '
of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth ~r,''
Amendment, Congress is granted only the power to "enfor~e'' ~
by "appropriate" legislation the limitations on state actwn ~
I
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embodied in those Amendments. While the presumption of
constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of
the Federal Government or of one of the States, it is this
Court which is ultimately responsible for deciding challenges
to the exercise of power by those entities. Marbury v. Madi'
son, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683 ( 1974). Today's decision is nothing less than a
total abdication of that authority, rather than an exercise of
the deference due to a coordinate branch of the government.

I
The facts of this case readily demonstrate the fallacy
underlying the Court's determination that congressional prohibition of Rome's conduct can be characterized as enforcement of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 1 The
three-judge District Court entered extensive findings of factfacts which are conspicuously abs.e._n t from the Court~..Q.Pin
ion.
...._ The lower court f ound that Rome has not employed
any discriminatory barriers to black voter registration in the
past 17 years. Nor has the city employed any other barriers
to black voting or black candidacy. Indeed, the Court found
that white elected officials have encouraged blacks to run for
elective posts in Rome, and are "responsive to the needs and
The Voting Rights Act. io generally viewed as an exercise of Fifteenth
Amendmrnt power. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301
_ _ _ _.......,.""'.'
())~._..::S::;
in:;;ce vote ''dilution " device~ are in i~ue in this case, the rights
nt ~tnKe ar
. viewed as Fourteenth Amendment rights. See
Czty of Mobile v. Bolden, U. S. (19-). Nrvertheless, this
Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act if it is applied to remedy
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U. S 286, 290, n. 5 (1969). Moreover, the nature of the
enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-·
mmt;; haH alway~ been treated a~ coexten~ive. See, e. g., United States
v Guest, 383 U. S 745, 784 (1965) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); James
v Bowman, 190 U. S. 127 (1903). For this reason , it is not nece;;sary
to differentiate between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers:
for the purposes of th1s opmion .
1
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·interests of the black community." The city has not discrim"inated against blacks in the provision of services and has
nude efforts to upgrade black neighborhoods.
It was also established that although a black has never
been elected to political office in Rome, a black was appointed
to fill a vacancy in an elective post. White candidates vigorously pursue the support of black voters. Several commissioners testified that they spent proportionately more time
campaigning in the black community because they "needed
that vote to win." The Court concluded that "blacks often
hold the balance of power in Rome elections."
Despite this political climate, the Attorney General refused
to approve a number of city annexations and various changes
in the electoral process. The city sought to require majority
vote for election to the City Commission and Board of Education; to create numbered posts and staggered terms for those
elections; and to establish a ward residency requirement for
Board of Education elections. In addition, during the years
between 1964 and 1973, the city effected 60 annexations.
Respondents concede that none of the annexations were
sought for discriminatory purposes. All of the electoral
changes and 13 of the annexations were opposed by the Attorney General on the grounds that their adoption would
lessen the likelihood that blacks would be successful in electing a black ·c ity official, assuming racial bloc voting on the
part of both whites and blacks. Each of the changes was
considered to be au impermissible "vote-dilution" device.
Rome sought judicial relief and the District Court found that
the city had m!1 its burden of proving that these electoral
cha nges anCI annexations were not enactea with the purpose
oTC:i"iSCfim~ting against blacks. The changes were nevertheless prohibited because Of their perceived disparate effect. 2
" I share MH. JusncE PowELL'~ observation that the factual conclusions
respecting the discriminatory effect of the annexations are highly questiOnable. Supra, at 3. I rest my dissent, however, on somewhat broader
gronnd&.

. ,.'·
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II
The Court holds today that the city of Rome can constitutionally be compelled to seek congressional approval for most
of its governmental chauges even though it has not engaged
in any discrimina.tion against blacks for at least 17 years.
Moreover, the Court also holds that federal approval can be
constitutionally denied even after the city has proven that the
changes are not purposefully discriminatory. While I agree
with MR. JusTICE PowELL's conclusion that requiring localities to submit to preclearance is a significant intrusion on
local autonomy, it is an even greater intrusion on that autonomy to deny preclearance sought.
The facts of this case signal the necessity for this Court
to carefully scrutinize the alleged source of con ressional
power o mtrude so eeply in the _governmental structure of
t~unicipal ·corporations created by some of the 50 States.
Sectwn 2 of the F ifteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth provide that Congress shall have the power to "enforce" § 1 "by appropriate legislation." Congressional power
to prohibit the electoral changes proposed by Rome is dependent upon the scope and· nature of that power. It is
clear that if the proposed changes would violate the Constitution, Congress could certainly prohibit their implementation. It has never been seriously maintained, however, that
Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the
Amendments' commands. Thus, if the electoral changes in
issue do not violate the Constitution, as judicially interpreted,
it must be determined whether Congress ·could nevertheless
appropriately prohibit these changes to enforce the substantive prohibition of the Amendments. If not properly reme- (
dial, the exercise of this power could be sustained only if
Congress has the authority under its enforcement powers to
determi.pe without more that electoral changes with a disparate itrpact on race violate the Constitution, in which case
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Congress by a legislative Act could effectively amend the
Constitution.
I think it is apparent that neither of the first two theories
for sustaining the exercise of congressional power support this
application of the Voting Rights Act. After our decision in
City of Mobile there can be no dispute that Rome has not
en aged in constitut-ionally prohibited conduct. I also do not
believe
at prohibition o
ese c anges can genuinely be
characterized as a remedial exercise of congressionaJ enforcement powers. Thus, the result of the Court's holding is that
Congress effectively has the power to determine for itself that
this conduct violates the Constitution. This result violates
previously well-established distinctions between the Judicial
Branch anJ the Legislative or Executive Branches of the Federal Government. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683
(1974) ; Marbury v. Madison, (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .

A
If the enforcement power is construed as a "remedial" grant
of authority, it is this Court's duty to ensure that a challenged congressional act does no more than "enforce" the
limitations on state power established in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. M arbury v. Madison. The Court
has not resolved the question of whether it is an appropriate
exercise of remedial power for Congress to prohibit local
governments from instituting structural changes in their government, which although not racially motivated, will have the
effect of decreasing the ability of a black voting bloc to elect
a black candidate.
This Court has found, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress intended to prohibit governmental
changes on the basis of no more than disparate impact under
the Voting Rights Act. These cases, however, have never
directly presented the constitutional questions implicated by
t he lower court finding in this case that the city has engaged
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in no purposeful discrimination in enacting these changes, or
otherwise. for almost two decades. See Beer v. United States,
425 U. fl. 130 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States, 422
U. S. 3.58 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971);
Farley v. Patterson, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). In none of these
cases was the Court squarely presented with a constitutional
challenge to congressional power to prohibit state electoral
practices after the locality has disproved the existence of any
purposeful discrimination. a
The cases in which this Court has actually examined the
constitutional questions relating to congressional exercise of
·its powers to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments also did not purport to resolve this issue. 4 But the
a In Ott.tJ of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC), aff'd
nwm., 410 U.S. 962 (1973), the District Court did find that an annexation ~chcrnr could be prohibited solely on the basis of its disparate impact,
without a finding of purpol:leful discrimination on the part of the local
govrrnment,. Petersburg cannot be considered dispositive of the question
presentrd in this ca;;e, however. The court did. not address any possible
eon~titut ional difficulties with its conclusion, and thus it is not clear that
theHe arguments were raised by the parties. An unexplicated per curiam
affirmance b~r this Court affirms only the judgment, not thE' reasoning;
of the Dt~t rict Court. See Hicks v. 'Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975).
'1 Thi~ i"Hue was also not squarely presented or resolved in United
Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). In UJO, the issue
wa:> whcthE'r the State could constitutionally take racial criteria into
n.ecount in drawing its district lines where such redistricting was not
strictly necessary to eliminate the effects of past discriminatory districting
or npportionment. The Court found that use of this criteria was proper,
for differing real:lonH. In an opinion by MR. JusTICE WHITE, joined by three
ol'hrr Members of the Court, it was suggested in part that the Voting
Right~ Act conld com;titutionally require this. The only question, however, wa::; the constitutionality of state use of racial criteria, vis-a-vi" other
citizens, and 11ot the constitutionality of congressional acts which required
stale governments to use racial criteria against their will . In another
par(, of the opinion, MR. JusncE WHITE reasoned that "the state is not
powerlc~:5 to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voterS"
when it is regularly practiced at the- polls." 430 U. S., at 167. While
Stntcs may he empowered tu1 voluntarily use racial criteria in order tm·

I
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1Jriuciples which can be distilled from those precedents require the conclusion that the limitations on state power at
issue cannot be sustained as a remedial exercise of power.
While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit
only purposeful discriii1ination, the decisions of this Court
nave recognized that in some circums~ces, congressional
prohibition of state or local action which 1s not purposefully
discriminatory may nevertheless be appropriate remedial legislation under the Civil War Amendments. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970); Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 286 (1969) .
Those circumstances, however, are not without judicial
limits. These decisions indicate that congressional prohibition of some conduct which may not itself violate the Constitution is "appropriate" legislation "to enforce" the Civil War
Amendments if that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior
. constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if necessary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination by a
governmental unit. In both circumstances, Congress would
still be legislating in response to the incidence of state action
vwlative of the Civil War Amendments. These precedents
are carefully formulated around a historic tenet of the law
that in order to invoke a remedy, there must be a wrongand under a remedial construction of congressional power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, that
wroug must amount to a constitutional violation. Only when
the wrong is identified can the appropriateness of the remedy
be measured.
The Court today identifies the constitutional wrong which
was the object of this congressional exercise of power as purposeful discrimination by local govenunents in structuring
their political processes iu an effort to reduce black voting
mimmize the effects of racial bloc voting, that conclusion does not deter-·
mme the constitutional authority of Congress to require States to use
racial cntena m structuring their governments.

78-1840-DISSENT (A)
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

strength. The Court goes on to hold that the prohibitions
imposed in this case represent an "appropriate" means of
preventing such constitutional violations. The Court does
not rest this conclusion on any finding that this prohibition is
necessary to remedy any prior discrimination by the locality.
Rather, the Court reasons that prohibition of changes discriminatory in effect prevent the incidence of changes which
are discriminatory in purpose:
"Congress could rationally have concluded that, because
electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting
create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper
to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact."
Supra, at 19.
What the Court explicitly ignores is that in this case the city
has proven that these changes are not discriminatory in purpose. Neither reason nor precedent support the conclusion
that here it is "appropriate" for Congress to attempt to prevent purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which
a locality proves is not purposeful discrimination.
Congress had before it evidence that various governments
were enacting electoral changes and annexing territory to
prevent the participation of blacks in local government by
measures other than outright denial of the franchise. 5 Congress could of course remedy and prevent such purposeful
discrimination on the part of local governments. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 347 (1960). And given
the difficulties of proving that an electoral change or annexatiOn has been undertaken for the purpose of discriminating against blacks, Congress could properly conclude that as
a remedial matter it was necessary to place the burden of
proving lack of discriminatory purpose on the localities. See
5
See the reference to tlw legislative history in United Jewish Organiza·
tions v. Carey, 430 U. El. 144, 158 (1978),

7s-184o-DISSENT (A)
C!TY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). But
all of this does 110t support the conclusion that Co11gress is
acting remedially when it continues the presumption of purposeful discrimination even after the locality has disproved
that presumption. Absent other circumstances. it would be a
topsy-turvy judicial system which held that electoral changes
which have been affirmatively proven to be permissible under
the Constitution nonetheless violate the Constitution.
The precedent on which the Court relies simply does not
support its remedial characterization. Neither Oregon v.
:Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), nor South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, legitimize the use of an irrebuttable presumption
that, vote dilution changes are motivated by a discriminatory
animus. The principal electoral practice in issue iu those
cases was the use of literacy tests. Yet. the Court simply
fails to make any inquiry as to whether the particular electoral practices iu issue here, are encompassed by the "preventJvc " remedial rationale invoked in South Carolina and
Oregon . The rationale does support congressional prohibitiOn of some electoral practices, but simply has no logical
application to thf' "vote-dilution" devices in issue.
Iu Oregon, the Court sustained a nationwide prohibition
of literacy tests, thereby extending the more limited suspension approved in South Carolina. By upholding this con~
grc~sional measure, the Court established that under some
circumstances, a congressional remedy may be constitutionally
overiuclusive by prohibiting some state action which might
not be purposefully discriminatory. That possibility does
not .JUStify the overinclusiveness countenanced by the Court
in this case, however. Oregon by no means held that Congress could simply use discriminatory effect as a proxy for
discrmunatory purpose, as the Court seems to imply. Instead, the Court opinions identified the factors which rendered
this prohibition properly remedial. The Court found the
nationwide ban to be an appropriate means of effectively
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preventing purposeful discrimination in the application of th,e
literacy tests as well as an appropriate means of remedying
prior coustitutional violations by state and local governments '
in the administration of education . to minorities.
The presumption that the literacy tests were either being
used to purposefully discriminate, or that the disparate effects
of those tests were attributable to discrimination in stateadministered education was not very wide of the mark. Various opinions of the Court noted that at the time that Con. gress enacted the ban, few States were utilizing literacy tests,
400 U. S., at 147 (opinion of Douglas, J.), and the voter
registration statistics available within those States suggested
that a disparte effect was prevalent. !d., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.) . Even if not adopted with a discriminatory
purpose, the tests could readily be applied in a discriminatory
fashion. Thus a demonstration by the State that it sought
to reinstate the tests for legitimate purposes did not eliminate
the substantial risk of discrimination in application. Only a
ban could effectively prevent the occurrence of purposeful
discrimination .
The nationwide ban was also found necessary to effectively
remedy past constitutional violations. Without the nationwide ban. a voter who was illiterate due to state discrimination in education could be denied the right to vote on the
basis of his illiteracy when he moved into a jurisdiction retaining a literacy test for nondiscriminatory purposes. I d.,
at 383- 384. Finally, MR. JusTICE STEWART found that a
uniform prohibit~on had definite advantages for enforcement
and federal relations: it reduced tensions with particular
regions. and it relieved the Federal Government from
the administrative burden implica.ted by selective state
enforcement.
Prcsum.pti vc prohibition of vote diluting procedures is not
similarly an "appropriate" means of exacting state complitlllCQ with the Cjvil War Amendments.. First, these prohi-
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bitions are quite unlike the literacy ban, where the disparate
effects were traceable to the discrimination of governmental
bodies in education even if their present desire to use the
tests was legitimate. See Gaston County, supra. Any disparate impact associated with the nondiscriminatory electoral changes in issue here results from bloc voting-private
rather than governmental discrimination. It is clear therefore that these prohibitions do not implicate congressional
power to devise an effective remedy for prior constitutional
violations by local governments. Nor does the Court invoke
this aspect of congressional remedial powers.
It is also clear that while most States still utilizing literacy
tests may have been doing so to discriminate, a similar generalization could not be made about all government struc ..
tures which have some disparate impact on black voting
strength. At the time Congress passed the Act, one study
demonstrated that 60% of all cities nationwide had at-large
elections for city officials, for example. This form of government was adopted by many cities throughout this century as
a reform measure designed to overcome wide-scale corruption
in the ward system of government. See Jewel, Local Systems
of Representation: Political Consequences and Judicia
Choices, 36 Geo. ·w ash. L. Rev. 790, 799 (19 7). Obviously,
annexations similarly cannot be presumed o be devoid of
legitimate uses. Yet both of these practices are regularly
prohibited by the Act in most covered cities.
Nor does the prohibition of all ~te dihtien {bractices with
a disparate impact enhance congressional prevention of pur.,.
poseful discrimination. The changes in issues are not, like
litracy' tests, though fair on their face, subject to discriminatory application by local authorities. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). They are either discrimi.,.
natory from the outset or not.
Finally, the advantages supporting the imposition of a
n.atjonwide ban. are simply not implicated in this case. N0-.
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added administrative burdens are in issue since Congress has
provided the mechanism for preclearance suits in any event,
and the burden of proof for this issue is on the locality. And
it is certain that the only constitutional wrong implicatedpurposeful dilution-can be effectively remedied by prohibiting it where it occurs. For all these reasons, I do not think
that the present case is controlled by the result in Oregon.
By prohibiting all electoral changes with a disparate impact,
Congress has attempted to prevent disparate impacts-not
purposeful discrimination.
Congress unquestionably has the power to prohibit and
remedy state action which intentionally deprives citizens of
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. But unless
these powers are to be wholly uncanalized, it cannot be appropriate remedial legislation for Congress to prohibit Rome
from structuring its government in the manner as its population sees fit absent a finding or unrebutted presumption that
Rome has, or is. intentionally discriminating against its black
citizens. Rome has simply committ
onstitutional violations, as this our as e ne them.
More is at stake than sophistry at its worst in the Court's
conclusion that requiriug the local government to structure
its political system in a manner that most effectively enhances black political strength serves to remedy or prevent
constitutional wrongs on the part of the local government.
The need to prevent this disparate impact is premised on the
assumption that white candidates will not represent black
interests, and that States should devise a system encouraging
blacks to vote in a block for black candidates. The findings
in this case alone demonstrate the tenuous nature of these
assumptions. The court below expressly found that white
officials have ably represented the interests of the black community. Even blacks who testified admitted no dissatisfaction, but expressed only a preference to be represented by
officials of their own race. The enforcement provisions of the
Civil War Amendments were not premised on the notion that..
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Congress could empower a later generation of blacks to· "get
even" for wrongs inflicted on their forebears. What 1s llPW
at stake in the city of Rome is the preference of the bhtck
community to be represented by a black. This Court has
never elevated a notion, by no means confined to blacks, to
the status of a constitutional right. See Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124 (1971) . This Court concluded in Whitcomb
that
"[t]he mere fact that one interest group or another
concerned with the outcome of ... elections has found
itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own
provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies
where, as here, there is no indication that this segment
of the population is being denied access to the political
system." !d., at 15~155.
The Constitution imposes no obligation on local governments
to ere<)t institutional safeguards to ensure the election of a
black candidate. Nor do I believe that Congress ·can do so,
absent ~ finc:Fng that this obliga.tion would be necessary to
remedy constitutional violations on the part of the local
government.
It is appropriate to add that even if this Court could find
a remedial relationship between the prohibition of all state
action with a disparate impact on black voting strength and
the incidence of purposeful discrimination, this Court should
exercise caution in approving the remedy in issue here absent
purposeful dilution. Political theorists can readily differ on
the advantages inherent in different govermental structures.
As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Farley v. Patterson,
393 U. S. 544 (1969): "It is not clear to me how a court
would 'go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be
preferred over a district system. Under one system, Negroes
have some influence in the election of all officers; under the
other, minority groups have more influence in the selection
of fewer officers.'' I d., at 586.
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B
The result reached by the Court today can be sustained
only upon the theory that Congress was empowered to determine that structural changes with a disparate impact on a
minority group's ability to elect a candidate of their race
violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. This construction of the Fourtee11th Amendment was rejected in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). The Court emphasized that the_ power couferred was "remedial'' only;. The
Court reasoned that the structure of the Amendment made
it clear that it did not "authorize Congress to create a code
of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to
provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws,
aud the action of State officers . . . , when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the Amendment.".
This interpretatiOn is consonate with the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the Amendment. 6
This construction has never been refuted by a majority of'
the Members of this Court. Support for this construction in
current years has emerged in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
and Oregon v. Mitchell. 7 See also opinion of PowELL, J.,
0 See, e. g., Burt, "Miranda And Title II: a Morganatic Marriage," 1969
S. Ct. Rev. 81.
7
Explicit support can also be derived from Mr Jn §!j~Ha~an'a dis?!!orsenting opinion, joined by MR. JUS'l'ICE S·rEWAR'l', in Katzen:
gan, 384 U. S. 641 ( 1966). Mr Justii e Ha r]~ clarified the need for thr
remedial construction of congresswna powers. · It is also unnecessary,
however, to read the majority opinion as establishing the Court's rejection
of the remedial con~truction of the Civil Rights Cases. While MR . .JusneE BRENN AN's majority opinion did contain language sugge::;ting a rejection of the "remedial" construction of the enforcement. powers, the
opinion also advanced a remedial rationale which supports the determination reached by the Court. Compare the rationales forwarded at 384
U. S., at 654 with the statemrnts, at 65fi. It would be particularly inap~
propriate to con::>true Katzenbach v. Morgan as a rejecti011 of the remedial interpretation of congres::;ional powers in view of thi~ Court's subse-quent deril'IOn in Oreg<m v. Mitchi:ll, 400 U.S. 112 U970).
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supra, at - . In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court
observed that Congress could not attack evils not comprehended by the Fifteenth Amendment. 383 U. S., at 326.
In Oreyon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 ( 1970), five Members
of the Court were unwilling to conclude that Congress had
the power to determine that establishing the age limitation
for voting at 21 denied equal protection to those between
the ages of 18 and 20.
'l'heopinion of JusTICE STEWAR'l' in that case, joined by
HIEF USTICE BuRGER an
JusTICE BLACKMUN, reaffirmed
that Congress only has the power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to "provide the means of eradicating situations
that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause"
but not to "determine as a matter of substantive constitu111
tional law that situations fall within the ambit of the clause."
'/t~Justice Hari~J.!, in a separate opinion, reiterated
his belief tfiat it 1s the duty of the Court, and not the Congress, to determine when States have exceeded constitutional
limitations imposed upon their powers. I d., at 204-207. Cf.
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 ( 1975); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U. S. 1, 18 (1958) J Jus&ce ~ also was unwilling to acce t the broad construction o\illircement powers formulated
in the opinion 0
USTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICES
WHITE and MAR::; HALL. 8
The Court today fails to heed this prior precedent. To
permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this case requires state and local governments to
cede far more of their powers to the Federal Government
than the Civil War Amendments ever envisioned; and it

:t-

Smcr lV
Ju~tit• ~ · · · fonnd that congre:ssional powt•rs were more
rircumseribe w t>Il uo aetmg to counter racial di::;criminatwn under
lhe Fottrtf'rnth Anwndment, hC:' did not have to detC:>rmine the precisr
na.ture of congres:swnal vower:-; whC:>n they wrrr exC:>rcised in the field of
mcial rrhltion~. H1~ anal~·,;i~ of thC:' nationwide ban on literacy tr;;t~;, al;;o
pre::;entrd in Oregon v. Mitchell, howrver, it< ron~istent with a remedial
intrrprPt n1 ion of t ho:-e power,;.
6

78-1840-DISSENT (A)
16

CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES

requires the judiciary to cede far more of its power to interpret
and enforce the Constitution than ever envisioned. The intrusion is all the more offensive to our constitutional system
when it is recognized that the only values fostered are debatable assumptions about political theory which should properly be left to the local democratic process.

